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Abstract
This thesis has three pieces of empirical studies that analyse economic inequality across so-
cial groups (castes and gender) and its impact on human capital endowments in developing
countries with particular reference to Nepal. Three aspects of inequalities have been examined:
disincentive in educational attainment in female arising from labour market discrimination,
disproportional representation of low-caste workers in better jobs and inequity in health care
utilisation and health outcomes across castes. This study contributes to the literature of eco-
nomics by developing a new theory and extending existing econometric models in analysing
economic inequality across social groups.
The first piece of research examines the impact of marital anticipation on female education
in the presence of labour market discrimination. It develops a theoretical model for jointly
determining the age at marriage and female education. The model hypothesizes that as females
are not rewarded in the labour market as much as men are; married women are encouraged to
engage in household work as a result of the intra-household division of labour in their marital
union. Thus, parental anticipation of this effect affects their daughter’s age at marriage and can
influence investment in girls’ schooling. It then estimates the causal effect of age at marriage on
education in light of the theoretical model using household data from Nepal. In order to control
for potential reverse causality this study uses variation in cultural norms regarding dowry and
differences in average age of female marriage among ethnicities and regions as instrumental
variables. The econometric results confirm that the gender gap in education is significantly
affected by cultural practices that favour early marriage and that increasing girls’ marriage age
by one year would produce on average .4 year increment in women’s schooling.
The second study examines the sources of wage differentials across castes in Nepal by em-
ploying an extended form of Oaxaca decomposition methodology. This study shows that, in
countries such as Nepal which have imperfect labour market for both goods and services, the
conventional Oaxaca decomposition methodology fails to estimate the source of wage differen-
tial precisely. Thus, it estimates the sources of caste wage differential by using an extended
xiii
model of occupational choice, firm size distribution and the interaction between these two along
with the conventionally used measures of human capital endowments. Furthermore, it examines
the caste differences in the likelihood of access to jobs in large firms. Results indicate that the
lack of access to better paying occupations and larger firms have significant impact on caste
wage differential. In addition, it evaluates the impact of government policy interventions on
caste wage differential in Nepal and shows that the government policy of ‘affirmative action’
has not yet been effective in narrowing down the caste wage differential in the labour market.
The third piece of research evaluates caste- inequity in health care utilisation and examines
the determinants of Self-Assessed Health (SAH) status across castes. It argues that societies
with a caste based social stratification in the past perpetuate health sector inequity via inferior
social capital in historically discriminated-against castes. Additionally, this study evaluates the
effectiveness of the health policy of the Government of Nepal (GoN) that aims to support poor
and vulnerable people and consequently to promote equity. The empirical evidences reveal that
in a social setting of caste classification the historically discriminated-against caste groups, low
castes, face both inequities in health care utilisation and health outcomes. Nevertheless, both
types of inequities are decreasing over time this study did not find explicit evidences in favour





Economic inequality can broadly be defined as the unequal distribution of economic
benefits among equally prospective economic agents. This is widely studied in the
field of labor economics while examining labour market discrimination across social
groups.
Discrimination in labour market is defined as paying differently for workers from
different groups, i.e., race, gender, caste, ethnicities etc. with identical productivity
characteristics. These concepts emerge from the theories of taste discrimination,
whereby, employers directly hold preferences about group background of their em-
ployees ( Becker 1957, 1971) and statistical discrimination, whereby employers have
incomplete information about workers’ productivity and statistical priors about how
productivity varies with social groups (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Akerlof, 1984).
Thus the literatures in the labour market discrimination are grounded on either
one of these theoretical frameworks. However, both of these theories are based on
neoclassical model that implies that the competition will lead to the elimination
of discrimination in the long-run. In contrast, empirical evidence show that the
1
wage differentials across social groups continues even in the long-run indicating the
weakness of both theories in explaining the persistence nature of labour market
discrimination that perpetuates income inequality in societies.
Being motivated by these limitations in the literature of labor economics this
research argues that discrimination persists via pre-market effects accede to the de-
ficiency in human capital endowment in discriminated-against social groups that
in turn reinforces income inequality among them. Additionally, labor market dis-
crimination is not only a form of economic inequality that different groups in a
society face in their practical lives. Other sources of discriminations, for instance,
unequal distribution of health care services can produce inequality in human capital
endowment and underpin income inequality indirectly. Therefore, the perseverance
of income inequality should be studied in the context of deficiency in human capital
in disadvantaged social groups.
The conceptual framework depicted in the figure 1.1 below shows that deficiency
in human capital stock in discriminated-against groups can be produced via two
channels. First; the disadvantaged groups might have fewer incentives to invest in
human capital because of its low return. Secondly, a relatively low level of income,
which can partly be attributed to the current market discrimination, undermines
their ability to invest in human capital, i.e., to invest in health or in education.
In other words, current market discrimination reinforces negative effects on abil-
ity to invest as well as the willingness to invest in human capital endowment in
discriminated-against groups. It implies that the labor market discrimination can
lead to a vicious circle of income inequality via pre-market effect even if there is no
longer practice of current market discrimination by employers.
Nonetheless, there is a substantial lack in the empirical literature that attempt
to analyse such linkages. That is how discriminated-against social groups end up in
2
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework
an inferior human capital endowment that impede them in achieving “fair share” of
socioeconomic outcomes at present as the effect of past discrimination. The “fair
share” can be viewed in terms of proportionate representation in white collar jobs,
better occupation , access to larger firms or obtaining better health status etc. which
ultimately affects their economic wellbeing via the low level of socioeconomic status.
This study aims to examine these issues. This section, thus deals with the rationale
for study, its objectives and samples etc.
1.2 Rationale for study
Over the last few decades, the notion of empowering socially disadvantaged groups
has dominated the public policy agenda particularly in developing countries. Social
planners in these countries have paid special attention in narrowing down the gen-
der gaps in education and income inequality based on social identity such as caste,
race and ethnicities while designing their development policies. These issues had
been addressed not only in country-specific context but also at the international
arena. For instance, the United Nation Development Program (UNDP), in its Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs), vowed to attain gender parity in education by
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2015. All member countries have applied their own action plans to achieve MDGs.
Some countries have even provided cash incentive for girl’s enrolment in school (for
instance: Bangladesh). Despite these, gender gap in education seems to remain
significant even after 2015.1
Additionally, international development partners such as the World Bank (WB)
and Department for International Development (DfID) explored caste/ethnic and
regional disparities in socioeconomic status (SES) in developing countries (Bennet,
2005) and showed their concern to empower historically disadvantaged social groups.
Acknowledging this, developing countries persuaded the policy of affirmative action
to enrich disadvantaged groups’ SES. The affirmative actions include the assurance
of proportionate representation in different levels of political structure, target-group
allocation of national budget along with the provision of qota in public sector jobs
for disadvantaged groups. However, analogous to the persistence gender gaps in
education the inequality in SES across castes remains significant in historically caste-
based societies.
These indicate that there might be additional factors that marginalized the ex-
pected outcomes of such policy interventions. Therefore, the main purpose of this
study is to explore additional underlying factors that perpetuate gender gaps in
education and caste inequality in income with particular reference to labour market
outcome. In particular, marital prospect has been analysed in explaining persis-
tence of gender gap in education whereas the group difference in access to better
paid jobs, proxied by larger form, has been examined as the casual factor of caste
wage differential.
Finally, it examines inequity in health care utilisation and evaluates the deter-
minants of health status across castes in Nepal. A special attention is given to
1UNESCO predicts 17.3% women in South Asia 23% in sub-Saharan Africa will remain illiterate
by 2020 while same measures stand at 8.1% and 11.3% respectively, for male (UNESCO 1993).
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see whether low-castes end up in inferior health outcomes relative to the dominant
caste. Hence, this research aims to find answers for the following research questions.
• Does the marital anticipation affect female educational attainment ?
• What is the role of difference in access to better paid jobs, larger firm, in
producing caste differential in labour market outcome ?
• Does inequity in health care utilisation across castes prevail in historically
caste-based society ?
• Do historically discriminated-against castes face inferior health outcomes rel-
ative to the dominant caste ?
1.3 Research objectives
This research has following objectives
• To extend the literature by developing a new theoretical framework to explain
the impact of marital anticipation on female education.
• To offer an empirical test for newly developed theoretical framework.
• To explore additional factors of caste wage differential by extending existing
methodologies.
• To examine the inequity in health care utilisation across castes.
• To examine the impact of caste on health outcomes.
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1.4 Data
This research employs nationally representative household survey data from Nepal
for various periods. Details of the samples are described in respective chapters.
1.5 Research scheme
The research is divided into following three chapters.
Chapter One : The Impact of Marital Anticipation on Female Education: Theory
and Evidence from Nepal.
Chapter Two: Earnings and Caste: An Evaluation of Caste Wage Differentials in
the Nepalese Labour Market.
Chapter Three: Caste Inequity in Health Care utilisation and The Impact of
Caste on Health Outcomes: Evidence from Nepal.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Marital
Anticipation on Female Education:
Theory and Evidence from Nepal
(joint with professor Gabriel
Montes-Rojas and professor Saqib
Jafarey)
2.1 Introduction
Education is not only a human right but also an input into economic development.
In particular female education has been found to be positively associated with many
desirable socioeconomic outcomes such as lower fertility rates, healthier and better
educated children and greater female labour force participation (Bayisenge,2010).
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Despite this, females fall behind males in educational attainment. The problem
is particularly severe in South Asia, where the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which
measures the female to male ratio in education, is significantly low. In this region,
the GPI for pre-primary, primary, secondary and upper secondary level enrolment is,
respectively, .98, .86, .83 and .75 whereas the global average for the same measures
stands at .99, .93 , .93 and .92, respectively. All countries in this region, apart
from Sri Lanka and Maldives, lag far behind from the global average of girl’s school
enrolment ratio and this is increasing on level of schooling (see Table 2.3).
Existing empirical studies on the gender gap in education can be divided into
two strands. The first focuses on household characteristics, such as economic status
and parental education, and how these influence gender preferences in schooling.
In general these studies find that poverty, lack of social security, credit markets
and low levels of parental education all contribute to gender biases in educating
children (see Cameron and Worswick, 2001; Sawada, 1997). The second strand of
empirical studies takes into account gender differences in labour market outcomes.
Using data from Uttar Pradesh, India, Kingdom (1998) found that girls face lower
economic rate of returns to education. This is not a robust finding, however. For
example, Aaslam (2009) decomposes the gender-specific returns to education in the
Pakistani labor market between a labour market effect which captures discrimination
on the part of employers and a pure education effect. He found that while the pure
returns to education were significantly higher for females, the overall market returns
were higher for males. Other authors found returns to education to be higher for
females in Indonesia (Behrman and Deolalikar (1995)) and Bangladesh (Asadullah
(2006)). Moreover, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) argue that when a traditional
institution such as the Indian caste system interacts with modern labour market
institutions, the results can favour female education among the lower castes, since
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males belonging to these castes are more likely to face occupational constraints
imposed by the caste system. Using panel data from Bombay over the period 1982-
2002, they found that girls were more likely to be enrolled in English-medium schools
that prepare students for working in white-collar jobs, while boys were more likely to
be enrolled in schools where a local language was used as the medium of instruction
and which ultimately led to their students following a traditional occupational path.
Thus, it is not clear whether low female education in South Asia can be completely
explained by expected lower returns to female education.
An important unexplored dimension of the gender gap in education is marriage.
In Asian, particularly South Asian, cultures parents consider a daughter’s marriage
to be one of the family’s main milestones and start planning for it years in advance.1
Not much attention has been paid to how parental plans regarding a daughter’s
marriage might influence their decisions regarding her education. On the theoretical
side, some papers have argued that the prospect of marriage alone biases parents
against educating their daughters. Lahiri and Self (2007) analyse the impact of
patrilocality in post-marital living arrangements on female education. Patrilocality,
which is especially widespread in South Asian countries, leads to the anticipation
that a daughter’s future earnings will accrue to her in-laws’ household rather than
her natal household and this discourages investment in her education. Jafarey (2011)
argues that due to gender wage inequality in labour markets, the marital division of
labor will encourage lead to female’s shouldering a larger share of responsibility for
housework and the anticipation of this effect will discontinuously lower the value of
her education relative to her hypothetical single self.
Following Becker’s seminal work (Becker, 1973) on the theory of marriage, there
has developed an empirical literature that treats marriage itself as an endogenous
1A common metaphor in Urdu, the main language of Pakistan, for someone being sound asleep
is “he/she is sleeping like he/she has just married off all his/her daughters”.
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variable and studies its determinants. However, to my knowledge, only three empir-
ical papers, Mensch et al. (2005), Brien and Lillard (1994) and Field and Ambrus
(2008), have so far studied the interaction between marriage and female education.
The first study evaluates the effect of expansion in schooling and urbanization on the
proportional increase in age at first marriage. However, this study does not consider
the effect of age at marriage on education. The second study develops a theoretical
framework for joint estimation of education, marriage and first conception. It shows
how educational attainments and marital behaviour can influence each other, i.e,
the impact of education on the probability of getting married and the probability
of enrolment in upper grades after marriage.
Field and Ambrus (2008) look at the effect of early marriage on female school-
ing and other adult outcomes in Bangladesh. This paper argues that in impover-
ished and culturally traditional societies parents have an incentive to marry their
daughters young as a form of protection against economic vulnerability. The age
of menarche imposes a constraint on how early girls can be married. Therefore,
the authors use the timing of menarche as an instrument in identifying the impact
of early marriage on female schooling. They find that early marriage significantly
lowers female schooling and that each year’s delay in marriage would increase female
schooling by 0.22 years.
Although the study carried out by Field and Ambrus (2008) is an important
step in isolating the effects of age at marriage on female education, the relevance of
menarche as an instrumental variable for age at marriage is limited to social settings
in which child marriage is prevalent. While this might be true of Bangladesh, it
is not necessarily true even of other South Asian countries.2 Moreover, both of
2A report published by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) shows that Bangladesh
has a considerably higher ratio of females marrying below the age of 15 years than the other
countries in this region. For example, in Bangladesh, approximately 30% of married females from
the age group 20-24 are married bellow the age of 15 years while in India the corresponding figure
10
these studies (Brien and Lillard, 1994 and Field and Ambrus, 2008) look into the
direct effect of marriage on female education. The concern of this study is with the
indirect disincentive to female education that marriage can exerts via its implied
division of labour. It can be observed that once a woman gets married her burden
of household work increases. Therefore, even a female married after the normal age
for a particular levels of schooling, the sooner she plans to marry after reaching that
age, the less likely that she will attain that level in the first place.
This study contributes to the analysis of the above effect by first outlining a
theoretical framework for jointly determining female education and planned age
at marriage. The framework is based on Jafarey (2011), in which gender wage
inequality is shown to lead to both a direct discount on female education and an
indirect one following from the marital division of labour which allocates women to
spend relatively more time in housework and men in market work. It is shown that
the indirect discount decreases with the anticipated age of marriage of a female. In
addition, the age at marriage can itself depend on individual and cultural factors,
such as a female’s ability to benefit from schooling and/or cultural expectations
regarding an ideal age for her to marry.
Second, this study tests the causal effect of age at marriage on female education
using data from a household survey in Nepal. Since the theoretical framework
suggests that females may select into early marriage on the basis of idiosyncratic
and unobservable differences in ability, it cautions that least-squares estimates will
be potentially biased. Therefore an instrumental variables strategy is used.
Nepal is well suited for this study because it has considerable variation in age
at first marriage across ethnic groups and communities. In particular, members of
the Maithili community, which is concentrated in the regions bordering India, have
is 18%. The same measure stands at less than 10% in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri-lanka (UNICEF,
2011).
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been identified by ethnographers as practicing an extreme form of dowry culture
which leads them to marry their daughters young. Table 2.5 shows a comparison of
dowry cost as well as wedding expenses in current year between Maithili and other
communities in Nepal. This shows that average dowry paid by Maithili households
is almost three times larger than that of the dowry paid by non-Maithili households.
The ratio of dowry payment and wedding expenses to household wealth, captured
by the price of land holding and household income are also significantly high within
the Maithili community. For instance, rural Maithili households pay dowry approx-
imately 25% of their price of land holding whereas the same payment stands at less
than 3% for rural non-Maithili households. Similar trends can be observed in the
ratio of dowry cost and wedding expenses with household income. This further im-
plies that this particular community fare higher burden of weeding cost relative to
their wealth status than the rest of communities in Nepal. There is also a significant
rural/ urban variation in dowry cost within Maithili communities.
The particular dowry practice, locally known as Tilak Pratha, which Maithili
communities practice in an extreme form, is effectively a groom price. In order
to find a suitable groom, a Maithili girl requires not just physical attributes and a
suitable family background, she also needs to pay Tilak money, which increases along
with the educational qualification and social standing of the boy (Das, 2009). One
reason for their strong adherence to this practice is the geographical and cultural
proximity of Maithilis to India, where dowries and groom prices are more prevalent
than in other communities of Nepal. Empirical findings from India also suggest a
positive correlation between the size of the dowry and the socioeconomic standing
of the prospective husband (Halli, 2003). The result of Tilak Pratha is that parents
try to get their daughters married as soon as possible because older girls are more
likely to match with more mature and well-educated boys, putting upward pressure
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on the amount of dowry. The survey data used in this analysis shows that 65% of
Maithili girls were married by the age of 16, compared with 42% of non-Maithili
girls (see Table 2.8). These differences are significant even at the 1% level, and are
prime facie evidence that Tilak Pratha influences marital behaviour in Nepal within
the Maithili community.
One of instrumental variables will therefore be a dummy variable indicating
membership of the Maithili community.3 However, since there is the possibility that
the Maithili community’s cultural attitudes are biased against female education (rel-
ative to those of other communities), this study uses a second instrument, namely
the average age at marriage within the respondent’s ethno-regional group. The sec-
ond instrument captures joint ethnic and regional variation with regards to marital
behaviour and is less likely to be affected by the prevailing cultural attitudes of
the respondent’s own reference group towards female education. Result shows that
reducing age at marriage by one year reduces female education by approximately
0.4 years of schooling.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous litera-
ture related to the female education. Section 2.3 describes the theoretical framework
followed by data and descriptive statistics in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 explains the
econometric model. Section 2.6 reports the empirical results. The last section con-
cludes.
3Dowry payment itself can not be used as an instrumental variable since survey provides in-
formation regarding dowry only for the current year. Similarly, a comparison of results by using
rural and urban Maithilis as instruments, as there might be significant difference in the adherence
of dowry culture between rural and urban Maithilies, is not possible due to a negligible proportion




2.2.1 Investment in human capital endowment
Human capital refers to skills or knowledge acquired by a person that enhances his
or her economic value. Shultz (1961) has pointed out five different categories of hu-
man capital investment: health facilities and services, on-the-job training, education
(Formal), study programs for adults and migration. However, since this study fo-
cuses on female education discussion below concentrates on the investment in formal
education.
The basic theory of human capital production pioneered by Becker (1962) ex-
plains individual choice of investing in human capital endowment analogously to the
behaviour of profit maximizing forms. In other words, an individual continues to
acquire extra units of human capital until the marginal cost of obtaining it equalizes
the marginal benefit that it produces. Costs of education include direct cost such as
tuition fee, books stationaries, etc. and indirect cost which is the opportunity cost
for not allocating time in the labour market.
Since the cost of acquiring education is an upfront cost a discounted present
value of life time earning is compared when making an investment decision under
this theoretical framework. Thus, this model shows that an individual’s preference
of acquiring an extra unit of human capital declines with the discount rate whereas
it rises with the ability parameter and expected time of its utilisation over life time.
This model also shows an increase in lifespan of an activity would positively affect
the rate of return. Therefore, a young person is likely to invest more in education
relative to the old person because the former can collect the returns longer. This
model explains investment decisions on different points of time but do not show how
the accumulation of human capital varies over the life cycle. Additionally, it does
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not incorporate depreciation in human capital.
An extended model, the production of human capital and the life cycle of earn-
ings (Ben-Porath, 1967) shows the time path of human capital accumulation in-
corporating a depreciation component into the model. It shows that not only the
human capital but also the investment declines with age. An increase in interest
rate reduces the production of human capital and investment along with the rate
which investment declines. However, if rental price of human capital and unit price
of other inputs rises in the same ratio it leaves quantity of human capital produced
unaffected. On the other hand, production of human capital will rise if rental price
rises more than the cost of other inputs and vice versa.
2.2.2 Human capital theory and female education
As stated in the previous paragraph, a standard human capital model exhibits that
individuals decision to attain extra units of human capital (education) depends on
the present value of future earnings. That is the added unit of human capital com-
plements to the future earning spectrum of an individual. However, this model does
not explicitly incorporate how earnings itself can be influenced across individuals
even with similar levels of educational endowment. For instance, Becker (1975)
claimed that educational benefits to women is determined by family earnings rather
than her own earning due to a significantly less labour force participation by married
women (Yokozeki, 2000). Additionally, Chiswick (1970) argues that female labour
force participation is not independent as of men and single women but is strongly
influenced by other factors such as husband’s income, number of children and their
age distribution. Therefore, this author excludes married women and students in an
empirical analysis of returns to education.
Another factor that undermines female education relative to men is the gender
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difference in access to resources. Lerner et al. (1997), while analysing gender gaps
in entrepreneurial performances, indicate a lack of pre-requisites (human capital as
well as financial capital) in women to achieve success because of their fewer access to
resources compared to men. Female can face the lack of resources because of their
expected career path as well as the rate of labour force participation. Both of these
variables can largely be influenced by the socio-specific cultural context. Therefore,
gender gaps in human capital vary across regions depending in the cultural contexts
(Rosenbusch et al., 1994). In a society where women are expected to work more in
domestic chores are likely to have less human capital endowment than where they
work more in the labour market. Woodhall (1973) describes females’ education as
either a form of consumption or unprofitable form of investment.
This analysis leads to a conclusion that female’s education can not merely be
explained within the framework of the traditional standard theory of human capital
production. In other words, the concept of human capital investment may not apply
to women as it does to men. Two compelling approaches, intrahousehold allocation
of resources and gender difference in returns to education are generally referred
in deriving economic explanation of gender gaps in education. Household income
influences parental decision to invest in children’s education especially when families
face credit constraints (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994).
2.2.3 Parental preferences
Various types of parental characteristics and its linkage with their preference in allo-
cating household resources in children’s education have been analysed in literature
to explain gender gaps in education. Altruistic parents decide whether to invest in
boys’ or in girls’ education taking into account the innate ability associated with
their respective children. If the cost of educating children with different ability is the
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same parents invest more on less able children in order to compensate difference in
ability (Becker and Tomes, 1976). Inequality-averse parents allocate their resources
equally in sons’ and daughters’ education whereas more resources may be channelled
to the children with higher returns to education if parents focus on efficient use of
their resources (Behrman et al., 1982). The latter type of parental characteristic
produces gender gaps in education if returns to education vary across gender while
the former type is likely to maintain a gender balance. However, some authors have
criticized this approach on the ground that parents (father and mother) could rarely
have similar preferences over their children’s education (Pasqua, 2005). Empirical
evidence reveal that parents have asymmetric preferences towards their children’s
education and thus unitary models do not represent satisfactory results (Doss, 1996).
Additionally, parental decision on investing in children’s education may also
depend on the perceived future income particularly for those who rely on children’s
support in their old age (Yueh, 2001). Therefore, parents may take into account
not only the returns that accrue to their children but also expected future earnings
that children might transfer into household while making the investment decision.
Defining personal rate of return to the former and familial return to the latter,
this author argues that educational investment among offspring is not influenced by
taste or preference for son but due to the efficient use of resources which accounts
for both types of returns. Parents will invest more on the children associated with
higher returns to education if they take into account the personal return of children
whereas they invest on those likely to transfer larger amount of income into the
household if familial return is considered.
Whether such parental characteristics produce gender gaps in education is not
clear. Reason is that household income comprises of children’s labour income,
spouses income and other non-labour income. Therefore, parental investment deci-
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sion depends on whether to take into account of children’s future income alone or
total household income. Parents may invest less in girl’s education as they move to
the husband’s house after marriage and are likely to transfer less income into the
household relative to sons if only children’s own income is considered. However, if
likelihood of future transfers from all offspring is same under the assumption of as-
sortative mating parent will invest more in girl’s education because this will generate
larger household income than the income would be transferred by son.
A bargaining model developed by Pasqua (2005) demonstrates that parental
preferences over children’s education depend on their respective bargaining power.
This approach attempts to extend previous literature that characterise household’s
decision making process as a single utility maximization problem (see Becker,1974;
Becker and Tomes,1976) by allowing parents to have different preferences over con-
sumption, leisure and children’s education. Therefore, household decision in in-
vesting either in son’s or in daughter’s education in this model is determined by
maximising both parents utility who are allowed to be different in own income level
as well as in preferences.
In a another model, the household production model, Yang and Zhu (2003),
show that intrafamily allocation of resources depends on parental expectation of
their children’s roles in household production activities. According to this theoret-
ical framework each family gets involve in household production comprises of two
activities namely (a) managerial and (b) execution of production task. Every child
is expected to involve in one of these activities. This division of work is central in
this analysis to see intrahousehold allocation of schooling. Since education positively
affects the quality of decision and managerial decision plays a long lasting effect on
family business parents will have incentive to invest more in the children designated
as manager than other children who are expected to be a regular worker. This model
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demonstrates that families under household production allocate their schooling more
unequally than that of families participating in the labour markets. These authors
acknowledge the applicability of this theoretical approach especially in developing
world where people earn part of their livelihood by working in family-run business.
This model does not explicitly indicate whether parent choose male child to be
manager in household production and thus invest more in son’s schooling. However,
it can be observed that females are not equally given opportunities as males to
take a charge of organizational leadership especially in the developing countries.
Therefore, this model indicates that anti-bias in female education can exits even in
a more extreme form in developing world where the rate of labour force participation
is relatively low and the majority of families are involved in family-run enterprises.
2.2.4 Empirical studies
Existing empirical studies on gender gaps in education can be divided into two
strands. The first focuses on household characteristics, such as economic status and
parental education, and how these influence gender preferences in schooling. In gen-
eral these studies find that poverty, lack of social security, credit markets and low
levels of parental education all contribute to gender biases in educating children.
For example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) found that rural households in south India
vary children’s school attendance as self-insurance against seasonal income shocks.
While their study did not look for gender differences, when Cameron and Worswick
(2001) used the Indonesian Family Survey (1993) data to investigate the same phe-
nomenon from the point of view of gender, they reported a significant bias against
females’ school attendance. Similarly, using a Pakistani panel data collected by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Sawada (1997) found that
households might sacrifice their daughters’ education as a coping strategy in the
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face of income risk.
The second strand of empirical studies takes into account gender differences in
labour market outcomes. Starting from the seminal work of Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1982) in rural India, researchers have investigated the link between gender-specific
allocation of household resources and gender-specific indicators of labour market
outcomes, both indirect ones such as gender-specific survival ratios and direct ones
such as returns to education. For instance, using 1995 urban household survey data
from Uttar Pradesh, India, Kingdom (1998) found that girls face lower economic
rate of returns to education. This is not a robust finding, however. For example,
Aslam (2009) decomposes the gender-specific returns to education in the Pakistani
labour market between a labour market effect which captures discrimination on the
part of employers and a pure education effect. He found that while the pure returns
to education were significantly higher for females, the overall market returns were
higher for males.
Other authors have also found returns to education to be higher for females in
Indonesia (Behram and Deolalikar, 1995) and Bangladesh (Asadullah, 2006). More-
over, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) argues that when a traditional institution such
as the Indian caste system interacts with modern labour market institutions, the
results can favour female education among the lower castes, since males belonging
to these castes are more likely to face occupational constraints imposed by the caste
system. Using panel data from Bombay over the period 1982-2002, they found that
girls were more likely to be enrolled in English-medium schools that prepare stu-
dents for work in white-collar jobs, while boys were more likely to be enrolled in
schools where a local language was used as the medium of instruction and which
ultimately led to their students following a traditional occupational path.
To summarize, both the theoretical frameworks and empirical studies do not
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clearly indicate the underlying factors of persistence of gender gaps in education.
In other words, it is not clear whether low female education can be explained com-
pletely by lower expected returns to female education and pro-son parental biases
in educational investment.
2.2.5 Marital prospects: Gains from marriage
An important unexplored dimension of the gender gaps in education is marriage. A
seminal work to introduce marital prospects into a framework of economic analysis
was “A theory of marriage” by Becker (1973, 1974). This framework demonstrates
that the gain from marriage relative to remaining single positively depends on their
income, human capital and relative difference in wage rates. It shows that couple
will enter into marriage if the utility of getting married outweighs the utility from
remaining single. The intuition is that married person achieves higher level of util-
ity than being single by utilizing division of labour in household production. For
instance, the spouse with a relatively higher labour market outcome will specialize
in labour markets whereas the spouse with lower wage can specialize in household
works. In turn both of them better off in a marital union. Additionally, sharing same
household and other economic and social resources i.e., heating, cooking, housing
etc. also yields economies of scale (Becker, 1973).
Becker’s view of specialization is not out of critics, however. His framework does
not incorporate the possibility of relative advantage in hiring people for household
works that allows both spouses to work in labour markets. Opepenheimer et al.
(1997) highlight this issue. Similarly, technological advancement can also marginal-
ize the demand for labour in household works allowing both spouses to work in the
labour market. Greenwood et al. (2005) and Matouschek and Rasul (2008) point
out that decline in labour market discrimination against women and the introduc-
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tion of capital goods such as vacuum cleaner and washing machine can reduce the
benefit from specialization of spouses. Nonetheless, these authors have not indicated
a complete elimination of specialization and thus Becker’s theory of marriage can be
considered as an important step to explore a new dimension of household economics
that analyses marital prospect in a framework of modern economics.
2.2.5.1 Marriage and female education
Becker’s theory of marriage does not pay attention on how parents’ decisions regard-
ing children’s education can be influenced by factors related to marital prospects.
Some other papers have shown that the prospect of marriage alone can bias parents
against educating their daughters. Lahiri and Self (2007) argue that parents dis-
count the returns to female education since their daughter’s future earnings will flow
onto their in-laws’ household rather than to the natal home. Jafarey (2011) argues
that since the marital division of labour encourages some degree of specialization
between married couples, the anticipation that a female will get married can dis-
continuously lower the value of her education relative to her hypothetical self who
remains single. However, both of these studies do not incorporate explicitly the age
at marriage into their theoretical models. Additionally, hypothesis posited in these
models remained to be tested empirically.
Empirical analysis with reference to age at marriage and female education is
scant apart from some works carried out by demographers and sociologists but not
economist (See for instance; Dahal et al. ,1993; Singh and Sharma, 1996; Bayisenge,
2010; UNICEF, 2011). These descriptive studies explain impact of early marriage
on education including other indirect effects such as poor health of children, higher
mortality rate, violation of human right etc. but do not establish a casualty between
these two variables.
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While marriage does not necessarily mean to stop education for those who enter
into the marital union but it does in case of females. Several factors can hinder mar-
ried women’s education. Firstly, girls are less likely to attend school after marriage
especially in developing countries (Cochrane, 2009; Singh and Sharma, 1996). Addi-
tionally, it is difficult for married women to shoulder double responsibilities as wife
or mother and schooling at the same time. Some schools even lack female-friendly
environment particularly in developing countries since girls often face bullying and
abuse by their teacher and mates which makes them feel unsecured and force them
to give up schooling (Bayisenge, 2010). The expected future role can also influence
female’s educational attainment. For example, in a stereo type traditional society
females are expected to engage in household chores where education matters less.
This encourages females to start a marital life earlier so that they can enjoy larger
span of established marital life rather than continuing own education.
Moreover, higher education narrows range of potential mates for girls considering
the fact that educated females expect for educated partner, at least not less than
their own level of education. This might eventually delay marriage age. Higher
education can also delay female’s age at marriage by increasing their ability to
regulate fertility as well as giving an exposure to western values and behaviour. A
relatively high probability of labour force participation and access to better paid
jobs which offsets the economic advantage of getting early married is yet an another
key factor in delaying female’s age at marriage (Singha and Sharma, 1996).
These indicate a positive corelationship between age at marriage and female
education. A descriptive statistics from Nepal depicts a similar picture. For instance,
the ethnic groups Yadav and Sarki have the lowest age at marriage of 15 years, which
is 2 years less than the national average, and also have an average of 2 less years of
schooling. Similarly, the ethnic groups, Brahman, Newar and Chettri have higher
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average age at marriage and also a higher level of education. The relationship
between these two variables is not symmetric for all ethnic groups (see Table 2.6 for
details). This implies that the magnitude of correlation between these two variables
can largely be influenced by cultural factors and thus can differ significantly across
societies. This aspect is given a very less attention while analysing marital behaviour
in empirical works reason being either a difficulty to capture heterogeneous socio-
cultural variables in the available dataset or has simply been overlooked.
Despite various studies on marital impact on female’s wellbeing no attention has
yet been paid in empirical studies to establish causality between age at marriage and
female education. There have been three studies so far, at least in my knowledge,
which examine the interaction between these two variables. The first study carried
out by Brien and Lillard (1994) evaluates the relationship between marital status
and probability of continuing schooling utilising data from Peninsular, Malaysia.
This study also estimates the effect of education on the probability getting married.
The second study by Mench et al. (2005) investigate the contribution of urbaniza-
tion and the levels of schooling on age at marriage. Looking at evidence from 73
developing countries, these authors found that the expansion of schooling has led
to a proportional increase in the age at first marriage for females but did not find a
similar result for males. This paper, however, did not consider the effect from age
at first marriage to education.
Field and Ambrus (2008) look at the effect of early marriage on female schooling
and other adult outcomes in Bangladesh. This paper argues that in impoverished
and culturally traditional societies, parents have an incentive to marry their daugh-
ters young as a form of protection against economic vulnerability. But even in these
societies, the age of menarche imposes a constraint on how early girls can be married.
Therefore, the authors use the timing of menarche as an instrument in identifying
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the impact of early marriage on female schooling. They find that early marriage
does significantly lower female schooling and that each year delay in marriage age
would increase female schooling by 0.22 years.
2.2.5.2 Marital anticipation and female education
Although the study carried out by Field and Ambrus (2008) is an important step
in isolating the effects of age at marriage on female education, the relevance of
menarche as an instrumental variable for age at marriage is limited to social settings
in which child marriage is prevalent. While this might be true in Bangladesh, it is not
necessarily true even in other South Asian countries. Moreover, while child marriage
directly hinders a female’s time in school by imposing spousal duties and possibly
motherhood on her at a young age, marriage can exert a more indirect disincentive
to female education, which applies even to females who marry post-childhood: that
is the market return to female education can be lower for a married female than a
single one of the same age and level of education. This is because once a woman gets
married, in most cultures her burden of non-market household activities increases.
Thus, even if a female gets married after the age at which she would normally have
finished a particular level of schooling, the sooner she marries after reaching that
age, the less likely she will to attain that level in the first place. Field and Ambrus
(2008) as well as Brien and Lillard (1994) do not look at the indirect disincentive
to female education that marriage exerts via division of labour in marital union.
This study contributes to the analysis of the above effect by developing a the-
ory for jointly explaining both female education and anticipated age at marriage.
Building on the model of Jafarey (2011) it shows that the earlier the anticipated
age at marriage the less schooling a female will receive, despite the fact that there is
no direct time conflict between marriage and education in this model.4 Therefore,
4This model rules out child marriage by assuming that schooling and marriage take place in
25
this study; first develops a theoretical model for jointly determining age at marriage
and female education. Second, it tests the causal effect of age at marriage on female
education using data from a household survey in Nepal.
2.2.5.3 Social institutions and age at marriage
Despite the fact that marital anticipation affects female education, casualty between
these two variables is not straightforward because of endogeniety. Various cultural
factors can influence anticipation of age at marriage. In south Asian countries, some
ethnographers have pointed out social institution such as dowry plays an important
role in determining female marriage age. The types of dowry prevalent in south
Asia is effectively a groom price which is found to be positively correlated with
educational attainment and social standing of boys (Das, 2009). A case study of
rural south Asia shows dowry amount is not only related to grooms own level of
education but also with their household wealth (Dalmia and Lawrence, 2005).
Dowry practicing parents will have less incentive to keep their daughter unmar-
ried for older age since an older girl is likely to have more matured and educated
boy as her match that will eventually put upward pressure on dowry amount at the
time of marriage. A younger girl, on the other hand, matches with a less qualified
boy which commands the less amount of dowry (Dhital, 2012). It shows that the
institution of dowry compels parents to get their girls married as younger as possible
which lowers female’s age at marriage in dowry practicing societies.
Taking into account the impact of social institution such as dowry and other
socio-cultural factors this study endogenize the age at marriage by introducing vari-
ation in the individual ability to benefit in terms of earning power from schooling
adjacent periods of life. However, by introducing a continuing time scale within each period this
study is able to treat both education and age at marriage as continuous variables. Since the data
set employed in this study depicts a considerable ratio of child marriage, it also tests this empirical
model on the sub-set of females who got married after completing childhood.
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and showing that females who are more likely to benefit will postpone marriage
relative to their counterparts who are less likely. Since theoretical framework devel-
oped in this study suggests that females may select into early marriage on the basis
of idiosyncratic and unobservable differences in ability, the least-squares estimates
will be potentially biased. Thus two-stage least square regression model is used in
estimating the impact of marital anticipation on female education.
Nepal is well suited for this study because it has considerable variation in age
at first marriage across ethnic groups and communities. In particular, members of
the Maithili community, which is concentrated in the regions bordering India, have
been identified by ethnographers as practicing an extreme form of dowry culture
which leads them to marry their daughters young. The particular dowry practice,
locally known as Tilak Pratha, which they practice in an extreme form, is effectively
a groom price. In order to find a suitable groom, a Maithili girl requires not just
physical attributes and a suitable family background, she also needs to pay Tilak
money, which increases along with the educational qualification and social standing
of the boy (Das, 2009). One reason for their strong adherence to this practice is the
geographical and cultural proximity of Maithilis to India.
The practice of Tilak Pratha induces Maithili parents to marry their daughter
as soon as possible since older girls likely to reinforce larger amount of Tilak money
relative to younger girls. Survey data used in this study shows a significant variation
in marital behaviour as well as educational attainment between Maithili and non-
Maithili girls.
Figure 2.1 below shows a comparison of age at marriage between Maithili and the
others. It shows that the average age of marriage for Maithili community is 15.78
years, almost 2 years lower than the non-Maithili. Similarly, 65% of Maithili women
get married before 16 years of age, whereas the average percentage of marriage for
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non-Maithili for this age is 42%.5 This indicates that dowry culture might have a
significant role in lowering females’ age at marriage within a Maithili community.
Figure 2.1: Age at marriage comparison
One of the instrumental variables will therefore be a dummy variable indicat-
ing membership of the Maithili community. However, since there is the possibility
that the Maithili community’s cultural attitudes are directly biased against female
education (relative to those of other communities), a second instrument, namely
the average age at marriage within the respondent’s ethno-regional group has been
utilized. The second instrument captures joint ethnic and regional variation with
regards to marital behaviour and is less likely to be affected by the prevailing cul-
tural attitudes of the respondent’s own reference group towards female education.
In a two-stage regression it is found that being a member of the Maithili community
lowers age at marriage approximately by one year and the effect of this on female
education is to lower it by approximately 0.4 years of schooling.




This section outlines a framework for jointly determining a female’s education and
her planned age at marriage. Suppose that a female, indexed by i, is poised to
enter adulthood. She has already gone through a period of childhood, in which
she has received a level of education, ei, which for theoretical purposes, is a non-
negative, continuous variable. Suppose that her childhood education affects only
her adult welfare. In other words, any costs (either explicit or in terms of foregone
opportunities) or benefits from education have no effect on her as a child.
Suppose that her time in adulthood is continuous and normalised to the unit
interval and that within this interval, she goes through two sub-intervals, single and
married. Let ti < 1 be the point of time when she marries, thus it is also the length
of time she spends as single and 1− ti is the length of time she is married.
6
Following from the above, assume that adult utility can be described by an
indirect utility function, V , that varies with each sub-interval of adult life:
V ji = V (ei, X
j
i , Zi),
where V ji is her utility in each stage j, j = (s,m), s = single and m = married;
ei is her educational level, X
j
i is a set of household, community and environmental
characteristics specific to stage j in i’s life, and Zi is a set of factors that are common
to both stages in i’s adulthood. Zi could index her ability to benefit from education
and convert it into market earnings as well as the innate attitudes of her family
and community towards her marriage age and her education. Note that since ei
is determined before reaching adulthood, it is not indexed by j. I assume that
V ji is increasing in ei at ei = 0, concave in ei, and reaches a maximum at some
6Alternating stages of matrimonial status as could happen with divorce or widowhood are ruled
out.
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stage-specific level of education, e¯ji > 0.
It is also assumed that e¯si > e¯
m
i for all i.
7 The last two assumptions are needed
to ensure an interior optimum for ei.
In addition, it is assumed that there exists a social norm regarding the ideal age of
marriage. Let this be denoted by t∗, which applies to all females.8 Marrying sooner
or later than this ideal imposes utility costs in the form of ‘loss of face’. There is a
long-standing literature in both demography and sociology that have investigated the
existence of social and cultural norms regarding age at marriage. While sociologists
such as Settersten and Hagestad (1996) and Neugarten et al.(1965) were interested
in the broader issue of age norms for various “life-course” transitions, demographers
are specifically interested in age at marriage and the length of the reproductive
cycle in women (see Billari et al., 2002). Both Neugarten et al. (1965) and Billari et
al. (2002) discuss survey evidence on the existence of popular perceptions regarding
ideal ages and/or age limits for marriage, the latter from 1960’s USA and the former
from 1990’s Italy. 9
7These assumption are based on Jafarey (2011) where childhood time is explicitly modelled as
a choice between developing labour market skills and household skills. While the former requires
only schooling time as an input, the latter requires an optimal mix of time in school and time spent
at home acquiring domestic training. Too much or too little schooling can result in sub-optimal
levels of household skill and this in turn leads to a inverted U-shaped relationship between V j and
e. Since it is assumed, also based on Jafarey(2011), that a female’s burden of housework increases
after marriage, this leads to the implication that e¯s.e¯m.
8In order to economise on notation, I have left implicit an additional feature of framework which
will be used in the empirical part. That is that each female belongs to some reference group, which
determines her own ideal age at marriage. But this ideal might vary from group to group.
9According to the data cited by Billari et al. (2002), older women perceived age limits for mar-
riage more frequently than younger ones and all age groups believed more strongly in a minimum
age than a maximum. For example, 11% of women born between 1945-1947 believed in an upper
age limit but only 5% of women born in 1973 did so. These are results from modern Europe.
Casual evidence suggests that such culturally influenced age limits are far stronger in traditional
South Asian ones than in modern European ones. Unfortunately, similar survey evidence from Asia
is not available but even in the 1960s survey data from the USA, Neugarten et al. (1965) reported
that 80% of male and 90% of female respondents believed that men should marry between the
ages of 20-25 and 85% of male and 90% of women set the analogous age range for women between
19-24.
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i , Zi)− δ(ti − t
∗)2,
which is maximised by the appropriate choice of ei and ti.
Her educational choice is characterised by the following first order condition













while that for t is









For the first order condition for e to hold, it must be the case that ∂V m/∂e < 0 and
that ∂V s/∂e > 0. Thus the optimal level of e lies between e¯m and e¯s. Note that at
the optimal choice of e, Λ > 0.


















Since Λ > 0 at the point of optimality, e will increase with t.
Turning to the choice of t, it can be solved explicitly from the first-order condi-
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tion.
t = t∗ +













In other words, a female delays getting married if her utility from remaining single
exceeds utility from being married and expedites marriage otherwise.









Thus t depends positively on e.10
2.3.1 Applicability of theory
Theoretical framework developed in this study shows a positive relationship between
the anticipated age at marriage and female education in presence of labour market
discrimination against women. The main argument is that married female will spe-
cialize, to some extent, in household chores in marital union in face of labour market
discrimination and thus an anticipation of age at marriage can impose disincentive
to acquire education in her childhood. Empirical tests validate this hypothesis.
However, this framework focuses on parental decision on investing in girls’ ed-
10The above analysis is based on separation of decision making: the educational level is deter-
mined taking age at marriage as given; while age at marriage is determined taking education as
given. Theoretically an alternative formulation could be to have the educational decision made
prior to the age-at-marriage one and taking into account the dependence of the latter on the for-
mer. This alternative is unlikely to affect the qualitative predictions of the model and besides it
makes more sense in the context of most South Asian countries to assume a separation of authority
between mothers, who might exert greater influence on marital decisions and fathers, who might
control the allocation of household resources over children’s education.
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ucation since education takes place in their childhood. Therefore, the parental
anticipation of their daughters’ age at marriage is shown to have backward effects
on females schooling investment. It seems that members of household who allocates
household resources (parents) should have control over their children’s marital de-
cision to this theory to hold. However, theory can analogously applicable even if
female invest on her education by herself as long as she expects to face labour market
discrimination. It is because a rational female anticipates specialising in household
works in marital union since releasing her spouse in labour market will yields the
higher level of utility. This in turn induces female, who anticipate marriage, to
invest less on human capital relative to those who expect to remain single.
It shows that theoretical framework developed in this study can be generalized
and is expected to explain an ever explored causing factor of anti-bias in female
education. However, further test of this hypothesis employing data from different
regions and cultural contexts will be an additional advantage to make this theoretical
conclusion more robust.
2.4 Data
This paper employs data from the 2003 National Living Standard Survey of Nepal,
carried out by its Central Bureau of Statistics with the technical support of the
World Bank and UK Department of International Development. The survey fol-
lows the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey Strategy and applies
a two-step stratified sampling scheme. It took place over 269 Primary Sampling
Units, covering 73 out of a total of 75 districts in Nepal and comprises information
related to demography, education and literacy, health and maternity, and other in-
formation at the household and individual levels. A total of 5240 households and
28110 individuals were included in the sample, and 5028 married females. The data
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cover the five administrative regions of Nepal: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-
Western and Far-Western, and an additional category of Abroad for those who were
not residing in Nepal at the time of the survey (mostly in India).
The inclusion of all married females to estimate the effect of age at marriage
on education may lead to the sample selection bias since unmarried females will be
excluded. Table 2.4 reports females’ marital status for different age groups. The
table shows that the likelihood of marriage increases monotonically until 30 years
old at which less than 2.5% will remain unmarried. Therefore, this study considers
two sub-samples, Sample2549 and Sample3049, for the age range of 25-49 and 30-
49 years old, in order to consider a sample where potential selection bias because
of marriage is minor. These sub-samples thus contain married, divorced, separated
and widows in those age ranges. The upper limit of 49 is arbitrarily imposed to
exclude potential selection bias because of mortality.
The survey contains two types of educational information on individuals: (1) the
highest level of completed schooling, and (2) a categorical question about whether
the individual (i) never attended school, (ii) attended in the past and (iii) is cur-
rently attending school. Only 28% (from the Sample2549 sub-sample) answered
question (1). For those respondents who did not answer question (1) but answered
question (2-i), their educational level is imputed as zero. This increased the sam-
ple size considerably from 1079 to 3760 for Sample2549 and from 684 to 2818 for
Sample3049. The measure of educational achievement derived from question (1) is
defined as Educ1, and the measure derived by adding to Educ1 the imputed values
for those who answered question (2-i), as Educ2.
The variables used in the econometric analysis are presented in Table 2.7. The
average school attainment for married women was 7.51 years using Educ1 and fell
dramatically to 2.16 years when Educ2 is used. Geographically the distribution of
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married women was 22%, 34%, 25%, 7% , 4% and 8% from the Eastern, Central,
Western, Mid-western, Far-western regions and Abroad, respectively, and 80% live
in rural areas. They belong to fifteen different ethnicities.
The upper part of Table 2.8 shows the distribution of marriage age across the
sample: 45% were married at or before the age of 16 years. Another 39% were mar-
ried between 17 and 20. Only 2% of the sample got married after the age of 27 years.
There is also a considerably lower age at marriage within the Maithili community
as compared to the non-Maithili communities. The lower part of Table 2.8 presents
details of the educational background of married females. The majority of married
women, 71%, do not appear to have any formal schooling. Of the remainder, only
10% attained primary school, 4% secondary school, 7% high school and 8% received
higher education.11
2.5 Econometric model and instrumental variables
Establishing a causal relationship between female age at marriage and female school-
ing is not straightforward because of potential endogeneity. In the context of tra-
ditional South Asian cultures, there are two potential sources of endogeneity, both
arising from the fact that both schooling and marital decisions are effectively in the
hands of the girls’ parents.
The first is the girl’s own ability to benefit from education. Parents invest in a
daughter’s education according to her expected future labor market earnings, which
in turn depends on labor market conditions for female employment and her individ-
ual ability to acquire and use human capital. As the theoretical model suggests, if
a girl’s parent judge her to be of relatively low ability, they may decide both not to
school her much, to make better use of her time, and to marry her at an early age
11These figures are reported from Sample2549.
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compared to other girls within her community.
The second is the possibility that in traditional South Asian societies, parents are
heavily influenced by social norms that favor early marriage and disfavor schooling
of females. Thus social norms could induce a positive relationship between the two
variables.
For both reasons, there is a possibility of bi-directional causality between these
two variables. Longitudinal data that span enough years could account for such
anticipation effects, but are unfortunately not available; only ex-post decisions re-
garding education and the age at marriage can be observed. Given these limitations,
OLS estimates of the effects of age at marriage on education are likely to be biased
and to be unreliable for this reason.
These issues are addressed using instrumental variables (IVs) to predict a fe-
male’s age at marriage on the basis of her own, her household’s and her commu-
nity’s characteristics. Hypothesis, as reflected in the theoretical model, is that those
social norms of the ethnic community to which a female belongs that are impor-
tant in influencing her marital outcome do not directly influence her education.12
Indeed, there is evidence from attitudinal surveys that even in communities which
have very low rates of female education, all else equal, parents would like to have
their daughters receive at least high school-level education (Keiko and Yoshinory,
2006).
This study uses two IVs. The first, taken from ethnographic studies, is the in-
fluence of the dowry culture. As stated in the Introduction, the practice of dowry is
not only stricter in the Maithili community than in other Nepalese communities, the
Maithili custom of linking the value of the dowry to the grooms’ economic status en-
12This does not preclude community-level norms that also directly affect education, such as a
particular community’s bias against female education which are controlled for by ethnicity dum-
mies.
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courages parents to marry their daughters young. Thus membership of the Maithili
community is used as a dummy variable in the age at marriage regression with the
expected sign being negative. Note that the survey does not contain information
about the dowry paid by the females’ parents in the past. Looking at expenses
in the current year, Table 2.5 shows that Maithili households report higher dowry
and wedding expenses (the latter together with other ceremonies) as a proportion
of wealth (proxied by land holding) and income.
However, in using a single community, this instrument could suffer from the po-
tential bias that Maithilis both marry their daughters young and have especially
strong unobservable biases against educating their daughters. There is also the pos-
sibility of an income effect from large dowries, as argued by Dhital (2012), whereby
faced with the choice of paying for their daughters’ education or saving up for their
dowry, parent choose the latter. By contrast, Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) argue
that dowry size is a function of differences in individual and household character-
istics between grooms and brides. This suggests that the lower the gap in such
characteristics, the smaller will be the dowry payment. This would actually en-
courage investment in daughters’ education. These possibilities have received some
attention in the literature and from the limited number of empirical studies on it,
the results are mixed.
Dalmia and Lawrence (2005) employ household survey data from the Indian
states of Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka, and find that, contrary to their own argu-
ment, brides’ human capital was positively correlated with the amount of dowry.
The authors themselves pointed to two types of possible confounding biases in their
data. First, in a polygamous marriage market, a relatively large number of women
might have been competing for a limited number of eligible men, and both the edu-
cational level of women and the dowry might have reflected this asymmetry between
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men and women. Second, both variables might have been positively correlated with
household wealth.
Another study carried out by Anderson (2004) estimated the effects of brides’
education on dowry payments (parental characteristics and distance to school were
used as IVs in the education regression). Employing data from Pakistan this study
found a positive relationship between the brides’ education and dowry size. However,
when the average level of education was controlled for, the estimated coefficient on
bride’s education became statistically insignificant. These studies make it appear
that dowry size might not directly discourage female schooling. Nonetheless in light
of this and the possibility of a Maithili-specific bias, this study employs a second
IV.
The second instrument is the average age of marriage for the respondent’s ref-
erence group. This group is defined as the intersection of the ethnic and regional
community to which she belongs. Assumption is that the average age of marriage of
females in the reference group proxies for the culturally derived ideal age of marriage
to which the respondent is expected to aspire. To the extent that there is regional
variation in this variable within the same ethnic group, it is hypothesised that this
reflects peer-group effects on expected age at marriage but that the innate cultural
attitudes towards female education, which might be present within her ethnic group
as a whole, have been washed out by this variation.13 Moreover, a statistical test
(Sargan test) carried out in this study has confirmed the exogoneity of IVs.
This study uses three different IVs models: (1) IV1: a Maithili-community binary
variable, (2) IV2: average age of females within the ethnic-regional grouping to which
13It is assumed that there is no systematic correlation between a particular ethno-regional com-
munity’s (unobservable) cultural norms towards an appropriate age of female marriage and an
appropriate level of girls’ schooling, apart from how the former might influence the latter. Note
also that, unlike cultural norms regarding age-at-marraige, there is no any literature, at least to
my knowledge, which suggests the existence of cultural norms regarding an appropriate level of
female schooling, even in cultures that might be generally biased against it.
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the respondent belongs, and (3) Two IVs: both. In the first-stage of each regression,
age at marriage is regressed on the appropriate IV(s) (and other control variables),
and in the second-stage, educational attainment as measured by Educ1 and Educ2
is regressed on the predicted age at marriage and other control variables.
The two stage regression model can be expressed as,
Educi = β0 + β1Magei + β2Xi + ui, (2.1)
Magei = δ0 + δ1Zi + δ2Xi + vi, (2.2)
where Educ is years of schooling and Mage is age at marriage associated with fe-
male i. X comprises a set of exogenous covariates, representing individual as well as
household characteristics such as age, father’s education, mothers education, house-
hold wealth (proxied by price of landholding) and household income. In addition, to
capture the possibility of cultural and ethnic variation in valuing female education
ethnic dummy variables are also used as explanatory variables. Finally, as there
could be a possibility on regional variation on the degree of development which may
affect incentive to invest on female education via differences in labour market op-
portunities, access to credit market as well as supply of educational establishments
across regions, urban and regional dummy variables are included in X. See the
Appendix 1 for the complete list of variables and their definition. Z is the IV set
(IV1, IV2 or Two IVs). u and v are the idiosyncratic error terms associated with
female i.
This study is unable to use some of the important exogenous factors in explaining
female educational attainment due to the lack of enough information in detecting
female’s parental households in the data set used.14 For instance, household size
14The survey provides information on parent’s identity code and their level of education com-
pleted but does not provide household number which constrain to detect parental household of a
married female.
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and the number of siblings may impose financial constrain on parental decision in
investing in their children’s education. Similarly, number of female sibling may
affect not only on resources available for educational investment but also on her age
at marriage. However, household income have been used as explanatory variables
as the proxy for the wealth status of parent’s household under the assumption of
assortative mating.15
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Baseline regression results.
Tables 2.10 and 2.12 present the first-stage and Tables 2.11 and 2.13 second-stage
baseline regressions, for each sub-sample, respectively. White robust standard errors
are reported. Regional and ethnicity dummy variables are included but coefficients
not reported.
The first column in Tables 2.11 and 2.13 shows the OLS coefficients. They imply
that increasing age at marriage by 1 year is likely to increase female’s educational
level by .315 years using Educ1 and .193 years using Educ2 for the sample of 25-49
years-old and .269 years using Educ1 and .159 years using Educ2 for the sample of
30-49 years-old.
Next consider the three IV models for each subsample where Mage is treated
as an endogenous variable. IV1 uses only the Maithili dummy as an instrument;
IV2 uses only the average age at marriage by ethnicity and region; and Two IVs
uses both instruments together. As expected in IV1, due to the presumed effect
of a strong dowry culture, membership to the Maithili community has a significant
and negative relationship with age at marriage. IV2 models show a positive effect
15Assortative mating implies for homotypic preferences (preferences for self’s type) in marriage
market.
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of average regional and ethnic average marriage age on individual marriage age.
All these coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The calculated F-statistics
are no less than 11 for the largest 25-49 years old sample indicating strong joint
significance of the estimated coefficients, but the same statistic is smaller when the
smaller sub-sample of 30-49 years old is used, epecially in Educ1 sample. When
both IVs are used, the Sargan over-identifying restriction test p-values cannot reject
the null hypothesis of validity of the IVs.
Turning to the second-stage results, IVs models shows in general a positive im-
pact of delaying age at marriage (Mage) on education although the level of signifi-
cance varies across models and samples. In most cases, the IV estimates are larger
than the OLS ones. This is consistent with the theoretical model and the expecta-
tion that ability is positively correlated with both age at marriage and education.
That is, parents might delay their daughter’s marriage if she has high ability. This
could be either by extending the search time for a suitable groom or by benefiting
longer from her contribution to their own household income. The standard errors
also increased considerably, which determines less precise estimates and thus greater
variance in significance levels. For the larger sample of 25-49 years old, IV1 has a
coefficient of Mage of .335 (not statistically significant), IV2 .456 and Two Ivs .411
(both significant at 5%) in Educ1, and .564, .324, and .361 (significant at 1%),
respectively, for Educ2.
For the smaller sample of 30-49 years old, Educ1 models have no statistically sig-
nificant results, while for Educ2 the coefficient estimates are .346 for IV1 (significant
at 5%), .175 for IV2 (significant at 10%) and .212 (significant at 5%). Regarding
the other explanatory variables, a quick overview shows that the results are more
or less as expected. In the first-stage, father’s education, urban and land holding
increase age at marriage whereas in the second-stage father’s education and urban
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increases education. Although not reported, regional and ethnicity dummies have a
significant effect on the individual age of marriage and education.
2.6.2 Robustness and validity of the estimated results
This sub-section outlines potential sources of bias in baseline results and attempts
to address them. Results are present for the sub-sample of 25-49 years old females
only.
First, there is the possibility that poverty drives parents both to keep their daugh-
ters out of school and to marry them young so that the burden of maintenance falls
on their husbands and in-laws. Moreover, poor parents could be more susceptible
to trading off girls’ education for the sake of accumulating a sufficient dowry, even
in communities that do not practice dowry culture as strictly as Maithilis do.
Second, a potential detrimental effect of early marriage on female education may
arise because, unlike our theoretical model in which marriage happens only after the
age of schooling has passed, a significant proportion of Nepalese girls get married
during childhood and could therefore be obliged to abandon schooling and take up
household duties. Both of these sources of bias could affect both our IVs.
A third possible source of bias, affecting only the Maithili instrument, is that
this might reflect regional variations in marriage practice, especially regarding age at
marriage, rather than an effect of dowry culture specific to Maithilis. This possibility
arises because Maithilis are concentrated in certain regions of Nepal that border
India; to be precise in four of the six regions of survey data used: Eastern, Central,
Western and Abroad. Since cultural practices in Nepal do vary by region and the
concomitant degree of urbanization, this could arise as a source of bias.
First, consider the possibility that poverty underlies the observed relationship
between female education and age at marriage. This issue is addressed by running
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regressions on a restricted sub-sample of households that belong to the upper half
of the wealth distribution (proxied by land holding). The results appear in Tables
2.14 and 2.15. Results show that the first-stage coefficients of the instruments in-
creased in value and remain significant at the 1% level across all IV models in Educ1
sample. In the second-stage regression the coefficient of age at marriage increased
for IV1 and dropped in value and/or significance for IV2 and three IV models. For
Educ2, a marginal decrease is observed in the second-stage regression in the three
IV models. The p-value of the Sargan tests and the F-statistics confirm the validity
of the instruments in this sub-sample. The important point is that by and large the
qualitative results continue to hold at similar levels of significance, especially in the
larger sample.
Secondly, there is the possibility that the detrimental effect of early marriage on
female education arises because of child marriages. To filter out this effect, if any,
two regressions estimates on sub-samples of females who got married after reaching
the age of 14 and 15 have been carried out. The reasons for these cutoff ages
are, respectively, 15 is the age set by the International Labor Organization (ILO)
convention as the minimum age of employment and one reason for this is that it
is the age by which most children will have completed secondary school, while 16
is age at which childhood ends according to Nepal’s Children Act, 1992. If child
marriage is the main driving force behind low female education it can be expected
insignificant effects of age at marriage on education in these sub-samples. The
results for the first sub-sample appear in Tables 2.16 and 2.17. Overall the results
are similar in magnitude and significance to the corresponding baseline regression
models, showing a positive effect of age of marriage on education. The Sargan test
rejects the exogeneity of IVs in the Educ2 case. Analogous results are observed in
the second sub-sample (female married at the age of 16 and above) despite the fact
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that age at marriage coefficient in the Educ1 sample is statistically significant only
at 10% level while it was significant at 5% level in the baseline regression (see Tables
2.18 and 2.19).
The third potential source of bias is that the Maithili instrument might reflect
regional variations in marriage practice rather than the effect of Maithili dowry
culture. Maithilis are concentrated in regions of Nepal that border India and it is
known that cultural practices in Nepal vary by region and the concomitant degree
of urbanization. This possibility is addressed by estimating similar models on a sub-
sample that comes from regions in which the Maithili community are concentrated.
This sub-sample includes the Eastern, Central, Western and Abroad regions but
excludes the Mid-Western and Far Western regions. The results appear in Tables
2.20 and 2.21. The estimates reported in Table 2.21 are similar to the corresponding
baseline models.
2.7 Conclusion
This study investigated the impact of planned age at marriage on female education
on the basis of a theoretical framework for jointly determining both variables which
is then has been tested using household data from Nepal. In light of the framework,
instruments are developed that could control for the potential endogeneity of main
explanatory variable and then employed an instrumental variables procedure for
identifying its impact on female education.
Results suggest that a strict adherence to dowry practices, as in the Maithili
community, lowers age at marriage while the average age of marriage of one’s ethno-
regional group increases it. It is found that marital behaviours that favour early
marriage significantly reduce female educational attainment. While the results dif-
fered slightly across different instrumental variables and samples, a consensus es-
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timate would be that each year’s delay in marriage increases female education by
0.4 years. This figure is roughly in line with but slightly higher than that found by
Field and Ambrus (2008) for Bangladesh.
All models on sub-samples of the data are tested in order to control for potential
bias. These were the possibilities that (i) the positive association of female education
with age at marriage could reflect the results of a coping mechanism amongst the
poorest households; (ii) the high incidence of child marriage in Nepal could have
induced estimated coefficients through a more direct ex post mechanism rather than
the more indirect ex ante mechanism stressed by the theory; (iii) the concentration of
Maithilis in certain regions of Nepal could have led to results which reflect regional
variations rather than the dowry culture of Maithilis. Overall robustness results
continue to suggest a negative impact of early marriage on female education.
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Table 2.1: Regional literacy rate (%) by gender
Year 1980 1995 2000
Male Female Male Female Male Female
World 77.2 61.9 83.6 71.2 85.2 73.6
Developing countries 68.9 46.8 78.9 61.7 81.2 65.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 51.8 29.2 66.6 47.3 70.9 50.3
Arab state 55 26.2 68.4 44.2 72.2 50.1
Latin America 82.1 77.5 87.7 85.5 89 87.4
Eastern Asia/Ociana 80.4 58 90.6 76.3 92.8 80.6
Southern Asia 52.8 24.5 62.9 36.6 66.6 40.7
Least Developed countries 48.3 24.9 59.5 38.1 62.9 42.4
Developed countries 98 95.4 98.9 98.4 99.1 98.8
Source: UNESCO, cited from Yakozeki (2004).
Table 2.2: Percentage of female education by educational level and by region
Educational level Primary Secondary Tertiary
Year 1960 1980 2000 2025 1960 1980 2000 2025 1960 1980 2000 2025
World 43 45 47 47 41 43 45 46 34 43 44 44
Developing 39 44 46 47 29 39 44 46 26 35 40 41
Sub-Saharan 34 43 44 45 25 34 40 40 11 21 28 27
Arab States 34 41 45 46 26 37 45 46 17 31 40 42
Latin America 48 49 49 49 47 50 51 50 30 43 47 47
Eastern Asia 39 45 48 50 30 40 47 51 24 24 32 32
Southern Asia 36 42 45 46 25 36 41 44 26 33 39 41
LDCs 32 40 44 44 18 31 39 39 16 26 31 31
Source: UNESCO, cited from Yakozeki (2004).
46
Table 2.3: Gender Parity Index (GPI) on educational enrollment in south Asia: 2002
Country/region Pre-primary Primary Secondary Upper secondary
World .99 .93 .93 .92
SAARC .98 .86 .82 .76
Bangladesh 1 - 1.21 .93
Bhutan - .92 92 .74
India 1.03 .87 .78.69 -
Maldives .99 .96 1.17 .88
Nepal .85 .86 .78 .68
Pakistan - .68 - -
Sri Lanka - .99** 1.01** 1.14
Source: Institute for statistics, UNESCO.
Note: - Indicates data not available and ** indicates GPI based on previous year.
SAARC represents eight countries in south-Asia: Sri Lanka, Bhutan, India, Mal-
dives, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.
Table 2.4: Females’ marital status by age group (in %)
Age group Married Divorced Separated Widow Unmarried
<= 15 2.76 0.10 - 0.05 97.09
16-20 42.98 0.19 0.51 0.13 56.20
21-24 76.08 0.10 0.52 0.21 23.09
25-29 90.76 - 0.84 0.65 7.74
30-34 93.74 - 1.76 2.09 2.41
35-39 93.35 0.18 0.72 3.60 2.16
40-44 89.49 0.26 2.37 5.78 2.10
45-49 83.22 0.34 2.37 12.37 1.69
Total∗ 59.51 0.14 1.15 8.91 30.29
Notes: ∗ all ages, including age> 49.
Table 2.5: Wedding expenses: Current year (in ’000)
Maithili Non-Maithili
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
D-cost 19.39(38.13) 20.84(39.92) 7.04(11.86) 5.66(26.70) 5.55(28.7) 5.99(21.90)
Obs. 57 48 9 764 582 182
Wed-exp 7.62(20.96) 7.75(21.41) 5.38(11.10) 8.41(32.37) 6.43(16.15) 19.31(72.50)
Obs. 232 220 12 1776 1503 273
D-cost/Lnholding .219 .251 0.060 .020 .029 .015
D-cost/Hincome .005 .015 .0004 .0005 .0005 .0005
Wed-exp/Lnholding .088 .092 .041 .044 .040 .054
Wed-exp/Hincome .004 .004 .003 .001 .001 .0007
Note: D-cost=dowry paid, Wed-exp= marriage, birth and other ceremonies expenses. These figures represent
aggregate household data. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics: 1
Ethnicity Mage Educ Wedding cost (’000) Dowry cost (’000)
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Brahmin 17.28(3.08) 20.28(4.89) 7.72(3.20) 10.57(2.96) 10.85(30.43) 5.71(7.75) 6.57(26.55) 6.98(24.79)
Chetri 17.49(3.08) 18.44(3.47) 6.59(3.12) 8.30(3.22) 5.94(14.21) 8.64(12.32) 3.47(12.93) 1.89(2.74)
Newar 18.67(3.22) 20.50(3.60) 7.45(3.59) 9.21(3.45) 12.53(22.48) 11.54(26.33) 8.62(49.45) 8.09(27.30)
Magar 17.51(2.88) 19.33(0.77) 5.77(2.73) 7.40(3.36) 3.66(5.72) 1.45(1.48) 1.63(5.21) 2.90(2.28)
Tharu 16.17(2.59) 16.50(2.12) 6.26(3.00) 4.00(2.82) 2.81(5.03) 0.00(0.00) 2.31(5.24) 0.80(0.00)
Tamang 17.60(3.11) 17.55(1.94) 5.09(3.12) 7.80(3.35) 3.52(4.01) 2.25(8.02) 1.49(1.61) 2.43(1.79)
Kami 16.79(3.05) 19.6(4.39) 5.34(2.93) 5.42(2.76) 2.73(4.51) 6.00(4.24) 2.46(6.09) 2.33(2.30)
Yadav 15.01(2.62) 17.33(1.52) 6.03(2.57) 0.00(0.00) 3.18(5.67) 0.00(0.00) 12.15(26.67) 0.00(0.00)
Muslim 15.21(2.52) 16.71(2.26) 4.39(2.89) 6.00(2.16) 5.91(11.49) 6.62(9.13) 14.48(23.16) 13.04(24.67)
Rai 19.36(3.80) 20.57(3.15) 5.95(3.14) 7.50(3.41) 6.18(14.56) 0.00(0.00) 2.11(2.31) .50(0.00)
Gurung 19.05(4.13) 20.50(2.94) 6.28(3.42) 8.80(2.77) 3.01(4.75) 3.53(2.54) 1.61(1.67) 1.10(1.14)
Damai 17.01(3.55) 18.33(1.52) 5.44(2.52) 6.60(1.03) 5.13(8.97) 22.16(43.57) 8.45(15.15) 0.00(0.00)
Limbu 20.59(5.18) 0.00(0.00) 6.22(2.86) 0.00(0.00) 19.68(24.42) 0.00(0.00) 0.40(0.00) 0.00(0.00)
Sarki 15.66(2.79) 14.00(0.00) 4.83(2.71) 0.00(0.00) 3.02(5.00) 2.75(1.06) 1.35(1.80) 0.00(0.00)
Otherethnic 16.26(2.96) 17.71(3.83) 6.16(3.30) 8.09(3.35) 6.46(18.23) 12.18(19.47) 12.93(43.49) 9.72(34.15)
-Standard errors in parentheses.
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Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Comparison of age at marriage and educational distribution
Sample2549 Sample3049
Variable All Non-Maithili Maithili All Non-Maithili Maithili
Age at marriage
Average 17.44(.059) 17.71(.064) 15.78(.127) 17.34(.078) 17.61(.077) 15.48(.157)
Married ≤16 .45(.008) .42(.008) .65(.021) .47(.009) .44(.009) .69(.024)
Married 17-18 .25(.007) .25(.007) .22(.018) .24(.008) .25(.008) .20(.021)
Married 19-20 .14(.005) .15(.006) .09(.012) .14(.006) .15(.007) .08(.014)
Married 21-22 .07(.004) .08(.004) .02(.006) .07(.004) .07(.005) .02(.006)
Married 23-24 .04(.003) .04(.003) .01(.0050 .03(.003) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Married 25-26 .03(.002) .03(.003) .005(.002) .03(.003) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Married ≥27 .02(.002) .02(.002) .005(.002) .02(.002) .03(.003) .005(.002)
Education
No formal schooling .71(.007) .69(.008) .87(.014) .76(.008) .73(.008) .92(.014)
Primary [1-5] .10(.004) .11(.005) .06(.010) .09(.005) .10(.005) .04(.009)
Secondary [6-7] .04(.003) .03(.003) .03(.007) .03(.003) .03(.003) .01(.006)
High school [8-10] .07(.004) .08(.004) .02(.006) .06(.004) .07(.005) .01(.005)
Higher education [≥11] .08(.004) .09(.004) .02(.006) .06(.004) .07(.007) .02(.007)
Obs. 3760 3244 516 2818 2460 358
Notes: Grades corresponding to each educational level from variable Educ2 are presented in brackets. Standard
deviations in parentheses.

















Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: First-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample2549)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .737***(.167) .705***(.167)
Maithili -1.70***(.503) - -1.58***(.500)
Age:30-34 -.169(.272) -.083(.270) -.164(.270)
Age:35-39 -.295(.269) -.259(.268) -.305(.267)
Age:40-44 -.135(.341) -.115(.339) -.145(.338)
Age:45-49 -.722*(.381) -.683*(.379) -.747*(.378)
Feduc .094***(.025) .090***(.025) .094***(.025)
Meduc -.046(.049) -.034(.049) -.039(.049)
Urban 1.22***(.311) 1.09***(.312) 1.05***(.311)
Lnholding 1.33*(.792) 1.28*(.788) 1.26*(.783)
Hincome .011(.009) .011(.009) .011(.009)
Obs. 1079 1079 1079
R2 .1644 .1704 .1775
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .997***(.099) .976***(.099)
Maithili -.890***(.200) - -.790***(.198)
Age:30-34 -.083(.165) -.108(.163) -.127(.163)
Age:35-39 -.235*(.154) -.253*(.152) -.278*(.152)
Age:40-44 -.439***(.165) -.446***(.163) -.478***(.163)
Age:45-49 -.818**(.182) -.847***(.180) -.861***(.180)
Feduc .115***(.021) .114***(.020) .115***(.020)
Meduc -.006(.046) .002(.045) -.003(.045)
Urban 1.64***(.238) 1.44***(.237) 1.42***(.236)
Lnholding 1.33**(.673) 1.26*(.669) 1.24*(.665)
Hincome .014(.011) .013(.011) .013(.010)
Obs. 3760 3760 3760
R2 .1921 .2031 .2063
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:25-29 as base
category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 2.11: Second-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample2549)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .315***(.028) .335(.254) .456**(.199) .411**(.161)
Age:30-34 -.348*(.236) -.347*(.235) -.337(.237) -.340(.236)
Age:35-39 -.437*(.233) -.432*(.240) -.402*(.240) -.413*(.236)
Age:40-44 -.551*(.297) -.549*(.295) -.537*(.298) -.541*(.296)
Age:45-49 -1.19***(.372) -1.18***(.368) -1.10***(.357) -1.13***(.346)
Feduc .184***(.020) .183***(.031) .172***(.028) .176***(.026)
Meduc .091***(.031) .092**(.044) .097**(.044) .095**(.043)
Urban 1.86***(.279) 1.83***(.419) 1.68***(.371) 1.73***(.338)
Lnholding -.534(.679) -.563(.729) -.730(.647) -.668(.641)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.003) .001(.003) .001(.003)
IVs F-statistic [11.52] [19.30] [14.72]
Sargan test p-value {.7023}
R2 .3625 .3621 .3458 .3546
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .193***(.017) .564***(.213) .324***(.088) .361***(.083)
Age:30-34 -.649***(.156) -.627***(.157) -.641***(.146) -.639***(.147)
Age:35-39 -1.14***(.141) -1.07***(.152) -1.12***(.137) -1.11***(.137)
Age:40-44 -1.61***(.145) -1.46***(.179) -1.56***(.150) -1.54***(.151)
Age:45-49 -1.64***(.156) -1.34***(.243) -1.54***(.176) -1.51***(.175)
Feduc .385***(.023) .343***(.031) .371***(.021) .366***(.020)
Meduc .211***(.041) .211***(.043) .211***(.040) .211***(.040)
Urban 2.64***(.291) 2.02***(.424) 2.42***(.258) 2.36***(.254)
Lnholding 1.06(.807) .560(.713) .886(.758) .836(.742)
Hincome .010(.010) .005(.007) .008(.009) .008(.009)
IVs F-statistic [19.76] [101.17] [26.43]
Sargan test p-value {.1419}
R2 .4314 .2105 .2224 .4282
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous. IV1: Maithili. IV2:
Avmage. Age:25-29 as base category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included
but not reported.
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Table 2.12: First-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample3049)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .822***(.203) .785***(.207)
Maithili -1.60*(.803) - -1.30*(.794)
Age:35-39 -.151(.327) -.191(.322) -.162(.323)
Age:40-44 .021(.396) -.048(.392) .001(.397)
Age:45-49 -.545(.424) -.583(.411) -.567(.415)
Feduc .108***(.031) .106***(.031) .108***(.031)
Meduc -.063(.065) -.045(.064) -.048(.064)
Urban 1.51***(.447) 1.39***(.445) 1.37***(.450)
Lnholding .720(1.01) .672(.999) .651(.995)
Hincome .029***(.003) .028***(.003) .027***(.003)
Obs. 684 684 684
R2 .1650 .2113 .2148
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - 1.00***(.111) .974***(.111)
Maithili -1.13***(.221) - -1.01***(.219)
Age:35-39 -.145(.162) -.136(.161) -.144(.160)
Age:40-44 -.370**(.183) -.345*(.181) -.362**(.180)
Age:45-49 -.750***(.209) -.751***(.207) -.746***(.206)
Feduc .112***(.026) .113***(.026) .113***(.026)
Meduc -.024(.060) -.011(.059) -.017(.060)
Urban 1.96***(.352) 1.78***(.356) 1.75***(.356)
Lnholding .719(.789) .649(.785) .623(.774)
Hincome .036***(.003) .035***(.004) .035***(.003)
Obs. 2818 2818 2818
R2 .1956 .2104 .2071
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage. Age:30-34 as base
category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included but not reported.
53
Table 2.13: Second-stage regression results: Baseline model (Sample3049)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .269***(.034) -.054(.446) .169(.169) .125(.161)
Age:35-39 -.140(.268) -.200(.294) -.158(.268) -.167(.269)
Age:40-44 -.264(.324) -.277(.343) -.268(.320) -.270(.323)
Age:45-49 -.990**(.392) -1.17**(.482) -1.04***(.401) -1.07***(.402)
Feduc .203***(.026) .238***(.056) .214***(.031) .219***(.031)
Meduc .106***(.040) .086*(.048) .100***(.039) .097***(.039)
Urban 1.81***(.371) 2.31***(.794) 1.97***(.443) 2.03***(.441)
Lnholding -1.24(.729) -1.01(1.01) -1.17*(.794) -1.14(.825)
Hincome .006(.005) .016(.013) .009(.007) .011*(.007)
IVs F-statistic [3.98] [16.38] [9.35]
Sargan test p-value {.6029}
R2 .2739 .3594
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .159***(.018) .346**(.148) .175*(.098) .212**(.083)
Age:35-39 -.500***(.149) -.475***(.152) -.498***(.149) -.493***(.149)
Age:40-44 -.964***(.152) -.898***(.163) -.959***(.156) -.946***(.154)
Age:45-49 -1.00***(.162) .862***(.202) -.991***(.179) -.963***(.175)
Feduc .390***(.029) .369***(.033) .388***(.032) .384***(.031)
Meduc .233***(.053) .236***(.052) .233***(.052) .234***(.052)
Urban 2.64***(.353) 2.26***(.862) 2.60***(.392) 2.53***(.381)
Lnholding .936(1.27) .796(1.19) .924(1.26) .897(1.25)
Hincome .029*(.015) .023*(.015) .029*(.015) .028*(.015)
IVs F-statistic [26.30] [80.37] [51.70]
Sargan test p-value {.3055}
R2 .4256 .3939 .4253 .4230
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. Mage is treated as endogenous. IV1: Maithili. IV2:
Avmage. Age:30-34 as base category. Regional and ethnicity dummies are included
but not reported.
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Table 2.14: First-stage regression results: Upper wealth households
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .964***(.181) .940***(.184)
Maithili -2.08***(.581) - -1.79***(.586)
Age:30-34 -.223(.374) -.145(.364) -.218(.361)
Age:35-39 -.633*(.372) -.528(.367) -.598*(.365)
Age:40-44 -.544(.501) -.676(.496) -.633(.494)
Age:45-49 -.963*(.569) -1.13**(.536) -1.21**(.532)
Feduc .064(.039) .066*(.038) .074(.038)
Meduc .001(.084) -.006(.083) .000(.082)
Urban 1.58***(.578) 1.35***(.595) 1.31***(.593)
Lnholding 1.07(.806) 1.00(.795) .929(.787)
Hincome -.003(.003) -.003(.003) -.003(.003)
Obs. 530 530 530
R2 .2036 .2271 .2553
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .960***(.117) .927***(.119)
Maithili -1.22***(.260) - -1.09***(.258)
Age:30-34 -.139(.212) -.177(.209) -.185(.208)
Age:35-39 -.618***(.192) -.654***(.189) -.682***(.189)
Age:40-44 -.671***(.239) -.706***(.236) -.727***(.202)
Age:45-49 -1.10***(.272) -1.14***(.268) -1.16***(.266)
Feduc .091***(.031) .097***(.030) .100***(.030)
Meduc .043(.074) .038(.073) .038(.072)
Urban 1.96***(.604) 1.77***(.013) 1.70***(.613)
Lnholding 1.45**(.738) 1.27*(.720) 1.26*(.713)
Hincome -.006(.005) -.006(.005) -.006(.005)
Obs. 1877 1877 1877
R2 .1975 .1997 .2052
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.15: Second-stage regression results: Upper wealth households
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IVs
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .300***(.046) .500**(.246) .335**(.157) .364***(.140)
Age:30-34 -.428(.356) -.399(.358) -.435(.347) -.431(.347)
Age:35-39 -.576*(.339) -.465(.357) -.540*(.331) -.526*(.329)
Age:40-44 -1.03***(.432) -.916*(.473) -1.01**(.429) -.996**(.432)
Age:45-49 -2.02***(.496) -1.85***(.532) -2.08***(.492) -.198***(.492)
Feduc .174***(.035) .163***(.036) .175***(.035) .173***(.035)
Meduc .122***(.063) .124*(.067) .120*(.062) .120*(.063)
Urban 1.89***(.553) 1.55**(.699) 1.94***(.577) 1.89***(.569)
Lnholding -.260(.743) -.159(.850) -.316(.724) -.272(.739)
Hincome -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003) -.005*(.003)
IVs F-statistic - [12.90] [28.31] [17.31]
Sargan test p-value {.6935}
R2 .3622 .3315 .3647 .3628
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .182***(.025) .384**(.185) .313***(.118) .330***(.103)
Age:30-34 -.926***(.238) -.900***(.239) -.910***(.236) -.907***(.236)
Age:35-39 -1.44***(.211) -1.32***(.235) -1.36***(.215) -1.35***(.213)
Age:40-44 -2.09***(.207) -.196***(.245) -2.01(.202) -2.00(.217)
Age:45-49 -2.09***(.216) -1.88(.298) -1.95***(.244) -1.93***(.238)
Feduc .371***(.037) .353***(.039) .359***(.038) .358***(.037)
Meduc .272***(.074) .263***(.074) .267***(.073) .266***(.074)
Urban 1.70***(.555) 1.28*(.705) 1.43**(.605) 1.39**(.602)
Lnholding 1.98*(1.02) 1.81*(1.00) 1.75*(.958) 1.76*(.958)
Hincome -.005(.007) -.004(.007) -.004(.006) -.004(.006)
IVs F-statistic [22.19] [66.38] [40.73]
Sargan test p-value {.7318}
R2 .3786 .3464 .3650 .3613
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.16: First-stage regression results : Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 15)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .720***(.171) .712***(.173)
Maithili -.895*(.522) - -.825*(.524)
Age:30-34 -.001(.259) .028(.255) -.006(.258)
Age:35-39 -.145(.269) -.145(.267) -.172(.264)
Age:40-44 -.235(.256) -.244(.356) -.267(.356)
Age:45-49 -.371(.393) -.376(.367) -.410(.372)
Feduc .078***(.023) .078***(.023) .079***(.023)
Meduc -.016(.045) -.006(.045) -.008(.045)
Urban 1.32***(.315) 1.18***(.318) 1.17***(.319)
Lnholding 1.10*(.743) 1.03(.734) 1.02(.732)
Hincome .009(.009) .008(.009) .008(.009)
Obs. 1003 1003 1003
R2 1˙293 .1442 .1456
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .770***(.095) .751***(.096)
Maithili -.752***(.166) - -.656***(.165)
Age:30-34 .116(.144) .098(.141) .082(.141)
Age:35-39 -.057(.138) -.072(.138) -.092(.137)
Age:40-44 .038(.164) .039(.162) .009(.162)
Age:45-49 -.032(.200) -.069(.199) -.091(.198)
Feduc .085***(.020) .086***(.020) .086***(.019)
Meduc .014(.043) .022(.044) .017(.043)
Urban 1.56***(.269) 1.39***(.272) 1.38***(.271)
Lnholding 1.19*(.705) 1.10*(.699) 1.09*(.696)
Hincome .010(.011) .010(.010) .010(.010)
Obs. 3128 3128 3128
R2 .1512 .1725 .1672
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.17: Second-stage regression results: Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 15)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .294***(.031) .365(.486) .416*(.217) .410**(.199)
Age:30-34 -.459*(.245) -.462*(.243) -.464*(.243) -.464*(.343)
Age:35-39 -.498**(.242) -.490*(.245) -.484*(.243) -.485**(.242)
Age:40-44 -.632**(.307) -.617*(.320) -.606*(.313) -.607**(.312)
Age:45-49 -1.26***(.410) -1.24***(.436) -1.22***(.413) -1.22***(.411)
Feduc .187***(.021) .181***(.043) .178***(.026) .178***(.025)
Meduc .081**(.032) .082**(.033) .083**(.033) .083**(.033)
Urban 1.88***(2.88) 1.79**(.714) 1.72***(.404) 1.73***(.389)
Lnholding -.606(.603) -.687(.818) -.750(.624) -.742(.620)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.005) .001(.003) .001(.002)
IVs F-statistic - [2.93] [17.61] [10.01]
Sargan test p-value {.9232}
R2 .3479 .3441 .3368 .3379
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .198***(.023) 1.01***(.300) .366***(.129) .468***(.120)
Age:30-34 -.765***(.175) -.875***(.210) -.787***(.176) -.801***(.178)
Age:35-39 -1.27***(.158) -1.24***(.189) 1.26***(.158) -1.26***(.160)
Age:40-44 -1.76***(.168) -1.82***(.216) -1.77***(.170) -1.78***(.174)
Age:45-49 -1.81(.185) -1.80(.256) 1.81***(.190) -1.81***(.196)
Feduc .400(.025) .330***(.024) .385***(.027) .377(.026)
Meduc .190***(.046) .174***(.055) .187***(.045) .185***(.046)
Urban 2.71***(.310) 1.42**(.593) 2.44***(.367) 2.28***(.360)
Lnholding 1.12(.870) .139(.771) .922(.814) .798(.777)
Hincome .008(.010) .001(.006) .007(.008) .006(.008)
IVs F-statistic [20.45] [64.39] [38.99]
Sargan test p-value {.0193}
R2 .4465 .0997 .4318 .4086
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.18: First-stage regression results : Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 16)
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .707***(.164) .704***(.164)
Maithili -.406(.541) - -.322(.542)
Age:30-34 .328(.259) .343(.253) .327(.257)
Age:35-39 -.044(.272) -.064(.271) -.075(.270)
Age:40-44 -.173(.356) -.192(.356) -.201(.356)
Age:45-49 -.067(.407) -.074(.379) -.085(.381)
Feduc .072***(.023) .073***(.023) .073*(.023)
Meduc -.030(.046) -.022(.045) -.023(.045)
Urban 1.17***(.308) 1.07***(.310) 1.02***(.311)
Lnholding 1.05(.744) .975(.733) .969(.733)
Hincome .008(.009) .008(.009) .008(.009)
Obs. 925 925 925
R2 .1408 .1590 .1593
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .737***(.099) .726***(.099)
Maithili -.592***(.1866) - -.510***(.185)
Age:30-34 .166(.149) .155(.146) .140(.147)
Age:35-39 .062(.148) .056(.147) .036(.146)
Age:40-44 .159(.175) .140(.174) .116(.174)
Age:45-49 .203(.225) .181(.223) .160(.222)
Feduc .081(.020) .084(.019) .084(.019)
Meduc -.021(.044) -.015(.044) -.019(.044)
Urban 1.45***(.271) 1.29(.274) 1.28****(.273)
Lnholding 1.02(.713) .927(.706) .919(.704)
Hincome .009(.010) .008(.009) .008(.009)
Obs. 2636 2636 2636
R2 .1404 .1553 .1569
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.19: Second-stage regression results: Adult marriage (Mage ≥ 16)
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .272***(.034) .253(1.15) .438**(.223) .434*(.219)
Age:30-34 -.464*(.261) -.458(.487) -.522*(.272) -.521*(.272)
Age:35-39 -.426*(.249) -.426*(.246) -.421*(.251) -.421*(.250)
Age:40-44 -.601*(.316) -.604*(.357) -.573*(.324) -.574(.323)
Age:45-49 -1.38***(.451) -1.38***(.450) -1.37***(.439) -1.37***(.439)
Feduc .204***(.021) .206**(.086) .193***(.026) .193***(.026)
Meduc .066**(.031) .065(.045) .071***(.034) .071***(.034)
Urban 1.84***(.293) 1.86(1.39) 1.64***(.388) 1.65***(.386)
Lnholding .580(.684) -.572(1.42) -.764(.615) -.760(.616)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.011) -.000(.002) -.000(.002)
IVs F-statistic - [0.56] [18.62] [9.49]
Sargan test p-value {.8674}
R2 .3417 .3514 .3224 .3233
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .184***(.025) 1.58***(.556) .398***(.151) .514***(.147)
Age:30-34 -.953***(.194) -1.21***(.297) -.992***(.197) -1.01***(.199)
Age:35-39 -1.36***(.180) -1.48***(.269) -1.38***(.180) -1.39***(.183)
Age:40-44 -1.88***(.189) -2.14***(.328) -1.92***(.195) -1.94***(.200)
Age:45-49 -2.11***(.213) -2.43(.408) -2.16***(.225) -2.19***(.233)
Feduc .434***(.025) .319***(.055) .416***(.028) .407***(.028)
Meduc .145***(.046) .169***(.074) .148(.046) .150***(.047)
Urban 2.84***(.389) .788(.937) 2.52***(.385) 2.35***(.387)
Lnholding .983(.839) -.471(1.01) .765(.771) .643(.737)
Hincome .007(.009) -.005(.009) .005(.008) .004(.007)
IVs F-statistic - [10.07] [54.49] [30.08]
Sargan test p-value {.0035}
R2 .4557 .4350 .4063
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.20: First-stage regression results : Four regions
Variable IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ1
Avmage - .665***(.186) .660***(.185)
Maithili -1.55***(.518) - 1.53***(.515)
Age:30-34 -.065(.295) .024(.293) -.063(.294)
Age:35-39 -.281(.289) -.233(.289) -.272(.288)
Age:40-44 -.107(.359) -.060(.358) -.086(.356)
Age:45-49 -.708(.413) -.657*(.412) -.728(.411)
Feduc .093***(.027) .089***(.027) .094***(.026)
Meduc -.033(.051) -.019(.051) -.023(.051)
Urban 1.15***(.324) 1.05***(.325) 1.01***(.324)
Lnholding 1.23*(.660) 1.18*(.659) 1.14*(.657)
Hincome .011*(.007) .011*(.007) .010*(.007)
Obs. 960 960 960
R2 .1896 .1928 .2005
Dep.var. Mage, sub-sample for Educ2
Avmage - .921***(.127) .951***(.127)
Maithili -.747***(.211) - -.838***(.209)
Age:30-34 -.087(.188) -.077(.186) -.104(.186)
Age:35-39 -.327*(.176) -.318*(.174) -.344*(.174)
Age:40-44 -.467**(.188) -.452**(.187) -.489**(.187)
Age:45-49 -.916***(.206) -.912***(.205) -.927***(.204)
Feduc .118***(.022) .119***(.022) .120***(.022)
Meduc -.006(.048) .006(.048) .001(.047)
Urban 1.62***(.250) 1.45***(.250) 1.41***(.250)
Lnholding 1.28**(.649) 1.16**(.645) 1.14*(.644)
Hincome .013*(.007) .012*(.007) .012*(.007)
Obs. 3063 3063 3063
R2 .2067 .2170 .2211
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Table 2.21: Second-stage regression results: Four regions
Variable OLS IV1 IV2 Two IV
Dep.var. Educ1
Mage .316***(.030) .422*(.287) .503**(.245) .469**(.187)
Age:30-34 -.472*(.253) -.474*(.253) -.476*(.257) -.475*(.255)
Age:35-39 -.519**(.249) -.493*(.258) -.473*(.260) -.481*(.255)
Age:40-44 -.522*(.310) -.513(.310) -.507*(.314) -.510*(.312)
Age:45-49 -1.40***(.407) -1.34***(.400) -1.28***(.393) -1.31***(.378)
Feduc .194***(.021) .185***(.034) .178***(.032) 181***(.028)
Meduc .073**(.031) .076*(.045) .078*(.045) .077*(.045)
Urban 1.86***(.290) 1.73***(.443) 1.64***(.408) 1.68***(.360)
Lnholding -.639(.656) -.779(.678) -.876(.656) -.837(.621)
Hincome .001(.003) .001(.007) -.001(.007) -.001(.006)
IVs F-statistic - [9.00] [12.76] [10.90]
Sargan test p-value {.8301}
R2 .3674 .3578 .3377 .3474
Dep.var. Educ2
Mage .194***(.019) .575**(.272) .316**(.124) .370***(.109)
Age:30-34 -.845***(.178) -.820***(.181) -.837***(.168) -.833***(.169)
Age:35-39 -1.38***(.164) -1.27***(.188) -1.34***(.161) -1.33***(.162)
Age:40-44 -1.79***(.170) -1.62***(.216) -1.74***(.176) -1.71***(.176)
Age:45-49 -1.94***(.179) -1.60***(.316) -1.83***(.216) -1.78***(.211)
Feduc .387***(.025) .342***(.038) .372***(.025) .366***(.024)
Meduc .195***(.042) .196***(.046) .196***(.043) .196***(.043)
Urban 2.64***(.301) 2.01***(.511) 2.44***(.303) 2.35***(.290)
Lnholding .900(.761) .400(.724) .754(.600) .681(.601)
Hincome .010(.010) .005(.008) .008(.006) .008(.006)
IVs F-statistic [12.49] [52.49] [34.36]
Sargan test p-value {.3740}
R2 .4545 .3538 .4441 .4329
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant
at 5%, * significant at 10% level. IV1: Maithili. IV2: Avmage.
-Age:25-29 as base category.
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Chapter 3
Earnings and Caste: An
Evaluation of Caste Wage
Differentials in the Nepalese
Labour Market (joint with
professor Gabriel Montes-Rojas
and professor Saqib Jafarey)
3.1 Introduction
A caste system allocates social labour on the basis of a hierarchy of caste classifica-
tions and this restricts occupational mobility in two self-perpetuating ways (Banerjee
and Knight, 1985). First, caste classification discourages low-caste workers from de-
veloping their human capital in line with occupations assigned to the higher castes.
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Second, it subjects backward castes to informational and network disadvantages be-
cause of their exclusion from certain sectors of employment. Thus, a caste-based
division of labour can perpetuate itself through the inter-generational transmission
of low educational and occupational status from one generation to the next even
once discrimination per se is abolished (Borjas, 1994; Darity and Mason, 1998).
This study first examines caste differences in access to large firms and better
occupations in Nepal, a country in which, until 1963, an age-old, caste-based social
division of labour was imposed by the national legal code Muluki Ain. The new
Muluki Ain of 1963 discarded this caste system. However, caste-based discrimination
was itself declared illegal only after the promulgation of the new Constitution of
the Kingdom of Nepal in 1990, which made the practice of untouchability illegal.
Since then, several policies have been implemented to reduce the impact of such
discrimination, including positive discrimination and the establishment of a Dalit
Commission. The Second Amendment of the Civil Service Act, 1993, reserves 45%
of total vacancies in the public sector for backward castes, female, disabled and
remote inhabitants. The effects of such policies are not known, partly due to a lack
of rigorous research on the subject. This study partly aims to fill this gap.
Secondly, this study examines whether caste differences in labour market out-
comes can be attributed to the difference in accessibility discussed above particularly
focusing on access to large firms. In doing so, it follows the modern empirical litera-
ture and distinguish between pre-market and current market labour discrimination.
The first type of discrimination captures the effects of the propagation mechanisms
mentioned above that contribute to the persistence of wage inequality even if ac-
tive discrimination is no longer practiced by employers. The second type represents
active discrimination by employers. The Oaxaca decomposition method (Oaxaca,
1973; Blinder, 1973) is the most commonly used technique for disentangling the
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two effects. Empirical studies based on the Oaxaca decomposition have focused on
human capital endowments as the sole proxy for pre-market effects (Grimshaw and
Rubery, 2002). In addition, Darity and Mason (1998) identifies group differences
in access to better paying industries and occupations as major contributors to the
persistence of labour market discrimination. Empirical work carried out by Mad-
heswaran and Attewell (2007) and Banerjee and Knight (1985) estimate such effects
in the Indian labour market by incorporating occupation in the wage differential
decomposition method.
This study goes further in capturing the effects on wage inequality by introduc-
ing firm characteristics to supplement educational and occupational differences. In
imperfectly competitive markets, firms may remunerate their employees differently,
even if they have similar levels of education and work in the same occupation (Vi-
etorisz and Harrison, 1973). In such a situation, employer characteristics such as
size, profitability and reputation might matter as much in explaining wage differ-
ences as employee characteristics such as education and occupation. This study
proxies better paying employers by the size of their firms. The empirical literature
provides evidence that larger firms hire higher quality workers (Brown and Medoff,
1989; Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991; Hettler, 2007).
Accordingly, this study expands the Oaxaca method and estimates three separate
decomposition models: one using occupation, another using firm size, and a third
in which occupation is interacted with firm size. A relatively larger coefficients for
access to job components in the third decomoposition model (interaction between
occupation and firm size) implies that differences in access to large firm positively
contributes on differences in labour market outcomes across castes. Similarly, a
relative reduction in it’s magnitudes in the latter period of analysis indicates the
effectiveness of government policies of positive discrimination in promoting access
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to public sector job by historically backward castes.
Results indicate that caste wage discrimination is indeed present in the Nepalese
labour market, with intermediate (Matwali) and low (Pani Nachalne) castes earning
significantly less than the higher (Tagadahari) castes. Moreover, lack of access to
employment in certain occupations and larger firms is found as a major factor behind
the caste wage differential together with years of schooling.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews previous lit-
erature on labour market discrimination. Section 3.3 describes the historical and
institutional basis of caste classification in Nepal. Data and estimation strategy are
discussed in Section 3.4 while Section 3.5 states the econometric models. The main
econometric results are presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Labour market discrimination: Basic concepts
Labour market discrimination is defined as the market valuation of workers’ personal
characteristics, such as age, ethnicity, sex etc., which is not related to productivity
(Arrow, 1971). Autor (2003) describes it as the situation of minority workers being
treated less favourably than the workers from dominant groups with identical pro-
ductivity characteristics. Therefore, labour market discrimination can explicitly be
defined as a situation in which a person who provides labour market services and
is equally productive in a physical and material sense is paid less in a way that is
related to caste or ethnicity (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
Discrimination in the labour market reinforces income inequality across groups in
societies (Cain, 1984). It can lead to the occupational and industry-type segregation
of labour forces (Autor, 2003). Since workers from different social groups are not
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paid according to their marginal productivity (MP) it can also be considered as an
underlining factor of market failure and thus to produce economic inefficiency in an
economy.
Despite these negative impacts, labour market discriminations have been con-
stantly witnessed in virtually all regions in the world irrespective of their levels of
socioeconomic development. This has led to the widening interest of researchers to
investigate underlying factors of labour market discrimination and its persistence.
As a result a bulk of literature on this subject, theoretical as well as empirical, has
already been documented.
The classical view of economics highlights that the total output of an economy
will be distributed to the factors of production, labour and capital, according to
their MP. If this classical view holds then the group differences in wage earnings arise
from differences in MP, actual or perceived by employers. Additionally, employers
may depict varied tastes over identically productive workers from different groups.
Difference in perceived MP as well as varried tastes by employers over the workers
from different social groups fabricates the labour market discrimination.
A hypothetical example bellow illustrates the effect of discrimination on hourly
wage rate between the workers from dominant and minority ethnic groups employing
a simple labour demand and supply framework. Labour supply for the both types
of worker in this example is assumed to be fixed.
Figure 3.1 depicts two types of labour supply namely dominant and minority
with identical productivity characteristics. In this example, employer’s perceived
MP for minority workers is less than that for workers from the dominant group.
It can also be assumed that employers have distaste over minority workers. As a
result, demand for minority workers, Q∗m, is lower than the demand for dominant
workers Q∗d although availability of labour (labour supply) is same for both groups.
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Figure 3.1: A basic model of labour market discrimination, Adapted from Riley
(2012)
A relatively less demand for minority workers leads to a lower equilibrium wage
rate, w∗(min) for them compared to the equilibrium wage rate associated with the
workers from dominant group, w∗(dom). It compels minority workers either to
increase their productivity level relative to dominant worker in order to achieve the
same rate of wage or accept a lower wage rate than dominant workers for identical
levels of productivity.
3.2.2 Theories of discrimination in labour markets
Various approaches have been documented in explaining discrimination in the labour
market which can broadly be classified into competitive and collective models. How-
ever, the majority of studies in the labour market discrimination are based on com-
petitive model where employers maximize their utility not only from financial profits
but may also include the economic value of “taste” (Autor, 2003). Widely used com-
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petitive models of discrimination are taste discrimination (Becker 1957, 1971) and
statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1971).
3.2.2.1 Taste discrimination
The theory of taste discrimination (Becker 1957, 1971) incorporates employers’ prej-
udicial behaviour in hiring and wage setting process for their employees. Employers
are assumed to possess varied tastes over different groups of employee in this frame-
work. In other words, employers’ distaste against particular group of workers enters
into their utility function as disutility. This model can be explained by a simple
formulation of the behaviour of profit maximizing firm.
Let a firm produces its output utilising single factor of production, labour, which
comprises of workers from minority (discriminated-against) and dominant ethnic
groups. Firm’s objective function can be characterized as,
U = PF (Nd +Nm)− w(Nd +Nm)− δNm (3.1)
where, p is the price level, F is production function, Nd and Nm are number of
workers representing respectively from dominant and minority groups. w and δ rep-
resent wage rate and discrimination coefficient, respectively. This equation shows
that firm’s profit depends on total revenue generated from output produced, wage
paid to labours (comprising of two types of labours) and the discrimination coeffi-
cient associated with minority workers, δNm.
First order condition (FOC) gives the optimal number of labour from each group
that firm will be willing to buy in order to maximize profit
∂U
∂Nd





= pF ′(Nm)− wm − δ = 0 (3.3)
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 show that prejudiced employers will hire worker from mi-
nority groups only if wd ≥ wm + δ which indicates labour market discrimination
against the minority group of workers. However, under the assumption of competi-
tive labour market and constant return to scale (CRS) non-discriminatory employers
will hire workers for minority groups to expand their business. In equilibrium dis-
criminatory employers will pay the price of their distaste since they cannot pass
this cost to the customers. This in turn leads prejudiced employers into insolvency
with entry of non-discriminatory employers in labour markets or they no longer
discriminate in order to survive in the competitive market. Therefore, under a com-
petitive market, taste discrimination is not likely to be persist rather it seems to be
a short-run phenomenon.
Additionally, the fraction of prejudiced employers should be sufficiently large in
order to produce wage discrimination in the labour market. If labour market com-
prises of a small number of discriminatory employers, workers from minority groups
may choose to work for other non-discriminatory employers and thus discriminatory
effect will be competed away. It is likely to create incentive for segregation rather
than to produce labour market discrimination. Therefore, as long as the both groups
of workers possess a similar average level of productivity they will eventually be paid
the same wage. Resulting difference will only be the segregation of workforce, i.e.,
black workers will work for black employers and white workers for white employers




The majority of literatures in labour economic focus on statistical discrimination
(Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1971) than the theory of “taste discrimination” (Becker, 1957,
1971) in explaining observed wage gaps in the labour market (Autor, 2003). The
premises of this approach is that employers possess limited sources of information
in predicting the productivity of potential employees that compels them to rely
on some easily observable group characteristics such as race, gender, ethnicity and
caste in inferring the productivity of prospective workers. Therefore, employers con-
sider group association rather than individual attributes while perceiving employees’
productivity in this framework.
The notion of statistical discrimination can be explained by a simple algebraic
formulation. Suppose that dominant and minority workers have individual test
score sj (j=d,m). If test score perfectly explains the individual productivity they
will eventually be paid according to their MP. However, employers lack information
on exact productivity associated with prospective employees and therefore take into
account their perceived average productivity, S∗j , which varies across groups. Ex-
pected productivity and thus the wage that employers will be offering to the both
types of workers now can be expressed as,
Wd = αSd + (1− α)S
∗
d (3.4)
Wm = αSm + (1− α)S
∗
m (3.5)
where, α represents the correlation between actual productivity and test score.
These equations show that not only the perceived mean productivity associated
with different groups of workers but also variance of true productivity affects the
wage rate. More importantly, since the productivity is perceived by employers but
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not real they will know employees’ actual productivity in due course of action and
thus will eventually update their belief. This, once again, shows that labour market
discrimination does not persist for the long-run.
3.2.2.3 Customer discrimination
If the majority of customers show prejudiced behaviour over minority groups they
will be biased in buying goods and services produced by minority workers. In other
words customers perceived utility adjusted price (adjusted for the discriminatory
coefficients) for the goods and services sold by minority workers will be less than
that of goods and services sold by the workers from dominant groups. Employers
thus have to charge fewer prices for the commodity produced by minority workers
in order to compensate customers disutility. This in turn will be transmitted into
the wage rate of minority workers since employers will not be willing to borne out
such cost from their own profit. This shows that labour market discrimination can
also be aroused from the prejudiced behaviour by customers. However, there will
be a possibility that minority workers might chose to work for employers where
customers direct contact is not essential in order to avoid the impact of customers
distaste on their wage. It implies that customer discrimination may lead to the
workforce segregation but not necessarily to the labour market discrimination.
3.2.3 Empirical evidence of labour market discrimination
A range of empirical studies have shown evidences that gender or ethnic discrimina-
tion exists in labour markets. A comparative study of 7 Latin American countries
(Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru) shows significant
labour market discrimination based on ethnicity that is mainly coming from differ-
ences in educational attainment (Atal et al., 2009). In Bolivia indigenous Spanish
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speaking workers were found to earn less relative to their non-indigenous counter-
parts of which more than 50 percent attributable to the pre-market discrimination
(Atal et al., 2009). A study of racial and gender wage disparities in urban Sao
Paulo, Brazil, found that ethnic minorities (Afro-Brazilian) and women receive lower
salaries compared to their white male peers (Lovell, 2006). Differences in human
capital endowments explained only a small part of the wage gaps. This study iden-
tified an increasing trend in the unexplained portion of wage gaps over time. Lerrea
and Torres (2006) examined socioeconomic and ethnic determinants of earnings in
Ecuador. They conclude that indigenous workers receive 55 percent less wages than
non-indigenous workers. In line with others findings, their study also finds that most
of the wage differential to be explained by differences in educational levels. Differ-
ences in levels of schooling as well as disparities on returns to education associated
with different ethnicities are found in Guatemala (Patrinos, 1997). Queche receives
low return to education compared to Mam counterparts in the Guatemalan labour
market. A study carried out in South African labour market pointed out 30 − 50
percent racial wage gaps ( between black and white workers) where roughly 40− 50
percent of which is due to the unequal endowments and possibly clustering of black
workers in particular occupation and industries (Szelewicki and Joanna, 2009).
3.2.4 Persistence of labour market discrimination
As stated before, theories of taste discrimination and statistical discrimination are
two major theoretical explanations for labour market discrimination. The former
explains that employers directly hold preferences about the ethnic background of
their employees (Becker, 1957, 1971) while the latter highlights on employers in-
complete information about workers’ productivity and statistical priors about how
productivity varies with ethnicity (Aarrow, 1971; Akerlof, 1984; Phelps, 1972). Both
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of these theories are based on a neoclassical model that implies that competition
will lead to the elimination of race or gender discrimination in the long run. Under
perfect competition and different degrees of prejudicial tastes, employers with the
least taste for discrimination will hire members of a minority group but pay them
a lower wage than equally qualified non-minorities (Chase, 2000). By paying less
than the equilibrium wage, those employers earn profits in the short run. In the
long run, however, taste discrimination disappears with insolvency of prejudiced
firms and new entries of less prejudiced competitors into the market. Similarly, if
group differences in ability are perceived to exist by employers but are not real, as
the theory of statistical discrimination assumes, employers will update their beliefs
over time (Darity and Mason, 1998). However, evidences from empirical works car-
ried out in various regions and over different points of time have shown that labour
market discrimination persists. It indicates that traditional approaches, taste dis-
crimination as well as statistical discrimination, fail to explain the persistence nature
of labour market discrimination and necessitates alternative approaches to analyse
this phenomenon.
3.2.4.1 Labour market imperfection
Wage rate in the labour market is not always set according to workers productivity as
the classical theory of marginal productivity explains. In fact, it can be influenced by
various non-market mechanisms. For instance, trade union can influence employer to
fix their wage higher than the equilibrium level. Similarly, monopsony in the labour
market can discriminate certain groups of workers paying them less than their MP.
In monopsony, single buyer can offer wage less than MP to certain groups of worker.
This situation is likely to prevail when a large firm dominates the local labour market
(Chase, 2000). Additionally, institutional factors which restrict occupational and
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geographical mobility of workers might reinforce monopsony. Caste-based social
division of labour or an official imposition on geographical restriction of workers’
mobility are some of its examples. A case study of Latvian labour market during
post- communist transition shows that Russians suffer labour market discrimination
between 5.5% to 7.3% relative to Latvians assuming the former to have lower labour
supply elasticity as the effects of monopsony (Chase, 2000).
An additional factor to perpetuate labour market discrimination is imperfect
competition across employers (Botwinick, 1993; Darity and Williams, 1985). These
authors argue that, in the absence of current discrimination, perfect competition
would drive employers to offer workers of a given educational level and occupation
the same wages, under imperfect competition, more profitable employers would be
able to offer higher wages to employees, despite similarities in education, occupation
and industry-type. This approach emphasizes how inequality across different groups
of workers in access to jobs with employers who pay higher wages (Darity and Mason,
1998) can persist over time as a result of past discrimination and suggests that the
wage structure across social groups should be studied as a joint function of individual
and employer characteristics.
3.2.4.2 Induced deficiency in human capital endowment
Labour market discrimination can have a prolonging effect on the labour market
outcome of discriminated-against groups via pre-market effect. In other words,
workers from discriminated groups may inherit low level of human capital endow-
ment relative to those who enjoyed labour market premia in the past. There-
fore, some authors have looked into the persistence of discrimination caused by
“pre-” or “extra-market” processes, which reduce the earning power of previously
discriminated-against groups (Madden, 1975). According to this view, the main
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type of ‘pre-market’ effect is the inter-generational transmission of low levels of edu-
cation. The reason is that when a generation of workers grows up suffering directly
from discrimination, not only is their own education undermined, but even if the
discrimination ends during their lifetime, they have both less incentive (via higher
discounting of the returns to education) and fewer means (via lower income) to in-
vest in the education of their own children (Agee and Crocker, 1996). Carneiro et
al. (2005) argue that future expectation of labour market outcome formed by past
experience induces parents as well as children to invest less in skills development
activities. Moreover, because less educated parents are less capable of helping their
offspring with schoolwork than are their more educated, higher income counterparts,
children from disadvantaged groups are likely to fare worse in schooling outcome
than their privileged counter-parts (Bond, 1981). Ermisch and Francesconi (2001)
also demonstrate that parental educational background is a significant determinant
of a child’s educational achievement.
Other authors have emphasized the effect of that low levels of inter-generational
transmission of educational attainment have on limiting occupational mobility across
generations (Checchi, 1997). This can become an additional factor along with low
educational endowments per se in reinforcing persistence of labour market discrim-
ination. Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) and Banerjee and Knight (1985) both
find evidence in favour of this hypothesis. Therefore, induced or inherent deficiency
within the groups that experience the inferior economic outcome can be viewed as a
main cause of perpetuating labour market discrimination (Darity and Mason, 1998).
3.2.5 Labour market discrimination and caste system
While considerable attention has been paid to labour market discrimination based
on race and gender, less attention has been paid to the issue of caste even though
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caste-based discrimination might be more powerful and persistent than racial dis-
crimination. Racism emerged in countries that were either colonized or partici-
pated in the slave trade during the colonial era, while caste-based societies have
existed for centuries before colonialism (Deshpande, 2011). Moreover while, apart
from the master-slave division of slavery, the colonial powers did not impose strict
occupational restrictions on the subject population, caste-based stratification was
inherently associated with an occupational division of labour.
Akerlof (1984) describes a caste-segregated society as being more self-perpetuating
than one in which current discrimination is of the ‘tastes’ or ‘statistical’ variety. The
reason for this is a self-enforcing mechanism inherent in the caste system, whereby
third parties punish any employer-employee pair who deviates from the caste divi-
sion, by casting out both from normal society. He shows that caste equilibrium exists
in which no single member of either the dominant or disadvantaged group is willing
to break away from the caste division of labour, despite the presence of potential
bilateral gains between employers and employees from doing so. In practice, mem-
bers of disadvantaged castes also adhere to the caste structure out of self-fulfilling
sense of fatalism (Kuran, 1987). Thus, even after countries such as India and Nepal
legally outlawed caste discrimination, the tendency for caste discrimination to per-
sist through decentralized behaviour continued.
3.2.6 Empirical studies on caste discrimination in labour
markets
Das and Dutta (2007) estimated the caste wage differential in both regular and
casual jobs in the Indian labour market. Their results showed that a substantial
differential existed between Scheduled Castes (SC) and General Castes (GC) in reg-
ular jobs, but not in casual ones, with almost two third of the differential in regular
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jobs being attributable to endowment effects. However, while their endowment vari-
able included both educational and occupational proxies, amongst others, it did not
explicitly differentiate between different types of endowment; therefore, their study
cannot explicitly report the impact of specific types of endowment differences on the
caste wage differential.
In a similar study of the wage differential between Scheduled and non-Scheduled
caste migrants in Delhi, Banerjee and Knight (1985) found that low-caste workers
were more likely to be engaged in traditional low-paid jobs. By extending the
conventional decomposition methodology to include occupational access as part of a
worker’s pre-market endowment, they found that a significant part of the caste wage
differential was attributable to difference in access to better paid occupations. In a
study of regular salaried jobs in India, Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) found that
endowment differences were more significant than current market discrimination in
explaining the caste wage differential, and further, that the most important type of
difference in endowments was the difference in occupation across castes.
These studies highlight the fact that pre-market effects of discrimination are
more important than current market discrimination in explaining the persistence
of the caste wage differential in India, with the difference in access to better paid
occupations as a major factor in promoting pre-market differences.
3.2.7 Contribution of this study
Studies on caste wage differential have taken into account the modern empirical
literature on the subject, which distinguishes between ‘current market’ and ‘pre-
market’ labour discrimination. The later type of effect is known in the literature to
contribute to the persistence of wage inequality even if active discrimination is no
longer in current practice by employers. The Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method
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is the most commonly used technique for disentangling ‘pre-market’ from ‘current
market’ discrimination. Conventional Oaxaca decomposition methodology focuses
on the human capital endowment (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2002). Therefore, the
majority of empirical works consider productivity characteristics (education, expe-
rience) as the sole proxy for pre-market effects. Additionally, Darity and Mason
(1998) identifies ‘group’ differences in access to better paying jobs within industries
and occupations as major contributive factors of persistence in labour market dis-
crimination. Empirical work carried out by Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) and
Banerjee and Knight (1985) estimate such effects in the Indian labour market by
incorporating occupation in the wage differential decomposition method.
This study questions the adequacy of using only education and occupation as
proxies for pre-market effects in countries that have imperfectly competitive markets
for both labour and goods and services. The reason is that, in imperfectly compet-
itive markets, there might exist a hierarchy of employers that pay differently to
workers of the same educational level and occupational classification. For instance,
in Nepal, where the public sector is a significant employer of white-collar workers
(Moore, 2006) jobs are categorized by grade, with each grade associated with its
own point in the overall pay scale. Engineers, doctors, administrators or accoun-
tants falling into a given grade all receive similar wages. However, the private sector
may display segmentation within the same market, so that different firms might dis-
play different levels of both profitability and ability to pay higher wages (Bluestone,
1974; Vietorisz and Harrison, 1973).
This study hypothesize that workers from marginalized castes inherit limited
occupational choices as well as unequal access to better firms, proxied by firm size.
In such a situation, workers’ characteristics such as education and occupation might
matter less than employer characteristics in explaining observed differences in labour
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market outcomes. Acknowledging this, better paid jobs proxied by firm size has
been employed in this study to analyse the source of caste wage differential. The
empirical literatures have provided evidences that larger firms hire higher quality
workers (Borwn and Medoff, 1989). Similarly, Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991)
and Hettler (2007) have shown a positive relationship between firm size and the
wage rate.
This hypothesis is tested by analysing the caste differences in the probability of
obtaining better occupations and being employed in large firms. Accordingly, this
study first evaluates caste differences in the probability of obtaining better occu-
pations and access to large firms. Secondly, it expands the Oaxaca decomposition
method to use occupation, firm size and their interaction as indicators of caste-
specific ‘endowments’ rather than as control variables. Therefore, three separate
decomposition models are estimated in investigating the sources of caste wage dif-
ferentials in the labour market. A larger magnitude of access to job component in
interaction model compared to other two models implies that cast wage differentials
are coming from the caste differences in access to larger firms. Therefore, main
methodological contribution of this work is to use an expanded set of proxies for
detecting the presence of such pre-market effects.
Moreover, an empirical study on Nepalese labour market has not been carried
out as yet, even along the lines of the studies on India discussed above. This is
an important gap which needs to be filled in light of the fact that Nepal is the
only country to have had a long history of a legally imposed caste based division
of labour. Caste-based social division of labour was imposed in Nepal by the na-
tional legal code Muluki Ain until 1963. The new Muluki Ain of 1963 discarded
this caste system. However, caste based discrimination was itself declared illegal
only after the promulgation of a new Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal in 1990
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(this made the practice of untouchability illegal). Since then, several policies have
been implemented to reduce the impact of such discrimination, including positive
discrimination and the establishment of a Dalit Commission. The Second Amend-
ment of the Civil Service Act, 1993, reserves 45% of total vacancies in the public
sector for backward castes, female, disabled and remote inhabitants.1 The effects of
such policies are not known, partly due to the lack of rigorous research on the sub-
ject. Thus, an additional scope of this study is to offer a statistical analysis on the
effectiveness of these policy interventions. A relative decrease in wage differential
due to the group difference in access to better paid jobs, larger firm, will indicate
the positive contribution of this policy.
Econometric results indicate that wage discrimination is indeed present in the
Nepalese labour market, with intermediate and low castes earning significantly less
than the higher castes (section 3.3 offers a precise classification of the different castes
used in this analysis). Moreover, lack of access by intermediate and low castes to
employment in larger firms is found as an important factor behind the caste wage
differential along with productivity characteristics, years of schooling.
3.3 Caste system in Nepal: An overview
Nepal, along with other countries, had a caste-based social division of labour in
the past. Historically, caste classification in the Indian sub-continent was based
on the Varna system of Hindu philosophy and the Aryan division of labour. These
comprised four categories, namely Brahman, Ksyatriyas (Chhetri), Vaisyas and Shu-
dras. Together these encompassed a social division of labour as priests and teachers,
warier and royalty, merchants and money lenders, and artisans, service providers and
other menial workers, respectively ( Deshpande, 2011). Brahman, being the superior
1This ammendment was made on August, 2007.
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caste, enjoyed the best status in the Nepalese society followed by Chhetri. While
Vaisyas did not seem as privileged as Brahmans or Chhetri, they enjoyed a relatively
higher social status than Shudras on the caste based social hierarchy. Shudras were
the lowest caste, considered as untouchable by their superiors.
As a predominantly Hindu country with a significant Buddhist minority, Nepal’s
adopted the Hindu caste system came with some local variation, implemented in the
form of a legal code calledMuluki Ain. This code classified all Nepalese into different
categories irrespective of their religious backgrounds, but based on their relative
ritual purity ( Bennett et al., 2008). The official classification under Muluki Ain
consisted of three categories, namely Tagadhari (literally “twice-born”), Matwali
(literally “liquor drinking”) and Pani Nachalne (literally “impure”) (Cox, 1988).
Tagadahari included upper-caste Hindus such as the Brahmans of the traditional
Hindu caste system. Matwali, on the other hand, consisted mainly of Buddhists
and indigenous ethnic groups who practiced Animism and Shamanism, and were
considered an intermediate caste. The Pani Nachalne were the lowest caste and
included not just traditional Hindu untouchables such as Kami, Sarki, etc. but also
Muslims and Mlechha (literally ‘foreigners’), who in turn included Christians.
This is where the intersection of caste and ethnicity entered into the social hi-
erarchy of Nepal. Hofer (1979) and Gurung (2002) describe a hierarchy of ethnic
groups and their respective association with the legal caste categories. This divides
all ethnic groups into two broader categories of Pure and Impure caste hierarchies
consisting of three and two subcategories, respectively (see Table 3.1).
Figure 3.2: Caste hierarchy
Figure 3.2 portrays Nepalese caste
hierarchy. While ethnic groups be-
longing to the Tagadhari and Matwali
castes, fell under Pure (or Water Ac-
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ceptable, i.e. sharing water with them
was acceptable), the Pani Nachalne
were Impure (or Water Unacceptable).
Within these there were sub-categories:
while the Pure Matwali were divided
into Enslavable and Non-enslavable ethnic groups, the Impure Pani Nachalne were
further divided into Untouchable and Touchable, depending on whether or not they
belonged to Hindu religious groups.
In line with these classifications, this analysis aggregates caste-ethnic identity
into three broad categories, namely Tagadhari, Matwali and Pani Nachalne. How-
ever, lack of observations on the Enslavable Matwali and Touchable Pani Nachalne
groups has prevented in constructing a finer division of the social hierarchy. These
are referred as castes although from a strict point of view they correspond to caste
and ethnicity.
This study estimates the impact of labour-market endowments and job charac-
teristics, human capital (education), occupation, and firm size, on caste wage differ-
entials by applying Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique and
the model extended by Banerjee and Knight (1985). The decomposition methodol-
ogy is further expanded in this study to incorporate occupation, firm size and their
interaction into the model.
3.4 Data and estimation strategy
3.4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
This study employs two waves of the National Living Standard Survey (NLSS) of
Nepal for 2003/2004 and 2010/2011 carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics
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of Nepal with the combined support of the World Bank and the UK Department for
International Development (these surveys will be referred below as 2003 and 2010,
respectively.) The surveys follow the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement
Survey and apply a two-stage sampling scheme. 73 out of the 75 administrative
districts of Nepal are covered. A total of 5240 households in 2003 and 5998 house-
holds in 2010 were interviewed, and information recorded about 28110 and 28670
individuals in each of the respective years. The data include information on wage
employment, self-employment, sector of employment, industry type, mode of pay-
ment, labor market attachment and educational attainment at the individual level.
Since information on experience is not reported, it is proxied by age minus years of
schooling minus six, which is the average age to start school in the Nepalese educa-
tion system. For simplicity, it is assumed that every person joined the labor market
immediately after completing their schooling. An individual is defined as employed
if he/she worked at least one hour during the seven days prior to the interview. See
the Appendix 2 for the details of these classification plus definitions of all variables.
The analysis includes 785 in 2003 and 834 in 2010 male wage workers aged 19-59
years old from the non-agricultural sector.2 Descriptive statistics are presented in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The Tagadhari group represents the dominant share of employees in both periods,
accounting for 70.7% of the total employment in 2003 and 71.3% in 2010. The
Matwali accounted for 19.2% and 21.4%, and Pani Nachalne 9.9% and 7.3% in each
survey year, respectively.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show an average log hourly wage rate of 3.34 and 3.89 NPR
respectively. The USD equivalent would be .38 and .68, respectively.3 The Matwali
2The NLSS has separate questions for agriculture and non-agriculture wage employment. This
study only considers respondents in the non-agriculture employment. However, agriculture can
also be a selected as an industry in the non-agriculture wage employment questionnaire.
3Average exchange rates between NPR and USD were 73.99 and 71.80 in 2003 and 2010, re-
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and Pani Nachalne workers earn on average wage 30% and 49% less than Tagadhari
workers, respectively, in 2003. By 2010, the wage gap between the Tagadhari and
Pani Nachalne remains identical whereas it has been descreased to 20% in case of
the wage gap between the Tagadhari and Matwali workers.
Average years of education, defined as the highest level of completed years of
schooling were 7.78 in 2003 and 9.88 in 2010. The education gap between Tagadhari
and Matwali was 2.29 years in 2003 and by 2010 it had decreased slightly to 2.10
years. However, the educational gap between Tagadhari and the lowest caste Pani
Nachalne increased over this period, from 3.03 years in 2003 to 4.45 years in 2010.
The NLSS survey contains a question about the size of the firm where the wage
worker works. As described in the Appendix 2 it contains three categories: 1 em-
ployee, 2-10 employees, and more than 10 employees. This study uses the ad-hoc
classification of small, medium and large firms, respectively. This variable has a high
proportion of missing observations, i.e. non-respondents, which resulted in a par-
ticular distribution of workers across occupations. In the robustness section below
this study considers the imputation of firm size to certain occupations.
Occupations are aggregated into seven broad groups based on Nepal’s National
Classification of Occupations : professional, clerical, service, skilled, sales, agri-
worker and unskilled. The professional category includes the categories of doctor,
engineer, manager, religious and clerical comprises of categories such as clerk, typist,
book keeper, etc. Those not included in any of the six occupations are classified
as unskilled workers which in turn includes loaders, unskilled construction workers
and laborers. Similarly, eight categories of industry are constructed based on the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) reported in the survey.
In 2003, the occupational ranking is as follows: professionals is the largest cate-
spectively. Source: Nepal Rastra Bank.
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gory accounting for 38.6% of workers, unskilled is second largest with 18.4% followed
by skilled workers at 17.9%. By 2010 the rankings are 28.2% for skilled, 23.9% for
professional and 19.1% for clerical. The professional and clerical occupations, which
collectively correspond to white collar jobs, have a higher proportion of Tagadhari
workers, while the lower castes Matwali and Pani Nachalne workers are more en-
gaged in unskilled and skilled occupations. In order to highlight the role of firm
size, Table 3.5 report average wages in 2003 and 2010 by occupation in the three
firm size categories considered in this analysis. In all cases, larger firms pay higher
wages than smaller ones.
In terms of the workers’ industry, the majority of workers are in the service,
manufacturing and other industry classification.4 There are no significant differences
between the Tagadhari and Matwali workers with respect to their association to
industries. The Pani Nachalne workers are more likely to work in the manufacturing
industry.5 Information is not available to distinguish between public and private
sector employees.
In summary, the descriptive statistics indicate that caste-based disparities in
key labor market outcomes continue to play an important role in Nepal. The inter-
mediate Matwali group have managed to slightly close the gap with the dominant
Tagadhari group, while the lowest caste Pani Nachalne appears to have fallen fur-
ther behind. However, the descriptive statistics alone cannot tell the key drivers of
these disparities.
4Note that there is a significant change in the industry classification between 2003 and 2010
regarding the Other category, which represents industry not responded or responded as other.
5Workers from this caste do not have representation in the FRE industry in both periods and
FRE, mining and agricultural industries in 2010.
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3.4.2 Methodology
Probit and multinomial regression models are widely used methodologies in em-
pirical works in order to estimate the probability of an observation with certain
characteristics will obtain specific outcome from given alternatives. The former
model is used when there is only two possible outcomes and thus is also known as
an ordinal or binary response model while the latter is used when there are more
than two categorical variable as possible outcomes. This study uses both models
for the first part of study in analysing caste differences in access to large firms and
better occupations.
Following the analysis of caste differences in access to large firms and better
occupation this study evaluates whether such differences are contributing factors in
producing caste differentials in labour market outcome. Mincerian wage equation is
the one of the most widely used methodology in empirical economics which defines
workers’ labour market outcomes as the function of their productivity character-
istics. In this case, estimating a wage equation using productivity characteristics
along with caste binary variables as explanatory variables can be used in analysing
wage differentials across castes. However, this single equation technique can produce
biased results since it assumes a similar wage structure for all castes (Madheswaran
and Attewell , 2007). The second approach is to use a decomposition technique de-
veloped by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) which decomposes wage gaps between
groups of workers into the endowment and coefficient effects. The former is known
as the pre-market effect while the latter is considered as current market effect in the
labour market literature.
However, some authors have argued that occupational distribution plays an im-
portant role in explaining a worker’s wage. Individuals occupational choice may
depends on expected life time earnings, cost involved in acquiring skills suitable for
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a particular occupation (Boskin, 1974), race, sex, education and experience (Schmidt
and Strauss, 1975), employers willingness to hire or individual desires to work on that
occupation (Brown et al. 1980). Accordingly several empirical works have incorpo-
rated occupational differences across groups of worker and have treated occupational
attainment as an endowment while estimating labour market discrimination. This
approach is also known as the expanded decomposition technique which allows dis-
tinguishing between wage and job discrimination. The conventional Oaxaca (1973)
decomposition disentangles gross wage differential into wage explained and wage un-
explained (discrimination) components whereas the expanded decomposition tech-
nique decomposes it into four components: wage explained, wage unexplained, job
explained and job unexplained. The latter two components correspond to the effects
of group differences in access to better occupations on gross wage differentials.
This study intends to contribute to the literature by incorporating firm size
distribution along with productivity and occupational characteristics in estimating
the source of caste wage differential .6 Therefore, this study estimates augmented
Mincerian wage equations separately for different castes followed by an expanded
decomposition technique to estimate different sources of wage differentials.
3.4.3 Variables specification
In the first part, a binary variable for firm size and a categorical variable to represent
seven types of occupation are used as dependent variables in order to analyse caste
differences in access to larger firms and occupation, respectively. The logarithm
of hourly wage is used as the dependent variable in the second part of the study.
6However, the explained and unexplained components of job effects are not estimated since main
focus of this study is to evaluate the impact of access to large firm on caste wage differentials rather
than to focus on caste wage discrimination. Therefore, explained component of job characteristics
(occupation and firm size) includes both the explained and unexplained components in expanded
decomposition technique discussed above.
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Worker’s individual characteristics that might influence wage such as education,
experience and experience square are included as predictors. Since marital prospect
can influence an individual’s attitudes toward work (a common belief is that married
men hold stronger attitude toward work than the single men) a married dummy
variable has also been included as an explanatory variable. Empirical studies have
shown that the rate of wage can significantly vary across regions. Therefore, regional
dummies are used as additional control variables.7 Other predictors used in this
analysis are rural, occupation, firm-size and industry-type dummy variables (see
Appendix 2 for details of variable specification).
Commonly used control variables in wage equations such as age and gender
dummy variables are not used in this analysis. Age variable is dropped because
of multicollinearity since experience in this study has been proxied by age minus
years of schooling minus six (which is an average years to start school in Nepalese
education system). Gender dummy variable is not applicable since this study uses
a sample of only working-age male workers.8
Although it has been argued that caste system restricts occupational mobility it
may not completely explain an individual worker’s occupational association. In this
situation occupation variables may be endogenous. However, this is not considered
as a crucial limitation at least for this study since its main focus is to estimate the
source of caste wage differential arguing that differences in access to larger firm as its
contributing factor. Additionally, several sudies have used occupational categories
as predictors while estimating the wage differentials across groups of workers (see for
7As very few respondents reported their work place in the first survey and the second survey
does not have such information a regional dummy variable (individual’s household belonging to
particular administrative region) is used as proxy for work place.
8Female are excluded in this analysis for two reasons. First, female labour force participation
is negligible in developing countries like Nepal. Secondly, they are mostly in informal employment
(domestic workers) and thus may not be relevant in assessing the firm size effect on wage differential
as this study is focused on.
89
example Banerjee and Knight, 1985; Hinks and Wastson, 2001 and Madheswaran
and Attewell, 2007). Thus it compares the impact of access to occupation, large
firm and larger firm with better occupation on caste wage differentials.
3.5 Empirical model
This study first evaluates the caste differences in access to large firms and occu-
pations. It then estimates whether caste wage differentials can be attributed to
these differences in accessibility particularly focusing on the access to large firms. A
probit model is estimated to look into the caste differences in access to large firms
whereas a multinomial analysis has been carried out to estimate the accessibility in
better occupation by castes. Oaxaca decomposition model is employed to estimate
the latter effects. Considering caste categories j= t,m, p (Tagadhari= t, Matwali=
m and Pani Nachalne = p), these models can be specified as,
P (y = 1|X) = αij +Xij + λCij + uij (3.6)
where, y is a binary variable carrying value one for a large firm and zero otherwise.
Xij comprises a set of explanatory variables including education, experience, expe-
rience square, marital status and rural dummies, land holding, regional, occupation
and industry- type dummies associated with individual i. Cij represents individual
i’s association with caste j and thus the sign and significance of λ indicates the caste
difference in the probability of access in large firms. uij represents unobserved error
terms.
P (y = s|X) = αij +Xij + λCij + uij (3.7)
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where, y is a categorical variable to represent seven different occupations (s=1,2.....7).
In this equation Xij includes only productivity characteristics (education and ex-
periance), rural dummies and land holding. Regional, firm size and industry-type
dummy variables are not used in order to achieve conversence to estimate the multi-
nomial model.
In the second part it proceeds to estimate the source of caste wage differentials.
An expanded Mincerian log wage equation can be specified for each caste as,
wij = βjEij + δjSij + γjXij + ǫij, (3.8)
where wij is the log hourly wage of individual i of caste j, Eij represents years of
schooling completed, Sij is a set of variables containing job characteristics such as
occupation and/or firm size (see below), Xij is a set of covariates comprising of a
constant, experience, experience square land holding, marital status, regional, rural
and industry dummies, and ǫ is the unobserved component in the wage equation.
The gross logarithmic caste wage differentials in observable variables can be
viewed as the sum of caste differences in educational effects, access to job effects and
the effects of other control variables including constant terms and can be specified
as,
wt − wm = (βtEt − βmEm) + (δtSt − δmSm) + (γtX t − γmXm), (3.9)
wt − wp = (βtEt − βpEp) + (δtSt − δpSp) + (γtX t − γpXp), (3.10)
where ·j is the mean of variable · for caste group j.
Considering Tagadhari workers as the dominant/reference group and Matwali
and Pain Nachalne workers as the non-dominant/comparison groups caste wage
differentials among these groups can be decomposed into explained and unexplained
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components by employing the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition
methodology. The explained component (explained by personal characteristics) cor-
responds to the mean wage that non-dominant group would receive if they were paid
according to dominant groups wage structure. The unexplained component, in the
other hand, is the difference in wage structure between these two groups evaluated
by the mean of non-dominant groups personal characteristics and thus reflects the
part of the wage gaps attributable to market discrimination.
In the conventional Oaxaca methodology, the gross difference in mean log wages
between the two groups can be decomposed into explained differences in the indi-
vidual productivity characteristics (i.e. differences in E, S and X) and unexplained
differences in the market valuation of such individual productivity characteristics
(i.e. differences in β, δ and γ),
wt − wm = βt(Et − Em) + (βt − βm)Em
+ δt(St − Sm) + (δt − δm)Sm
+ γt(X t −Xm) + (γt − γm)Xm, (3.11)
wt − wp = βt(Et − Ep) + (βt − βp)Ep
+ δt(St − Sp) + (δt − δp)Sp
+ γt(X t −Xp) + (γt − γp)Xp. (3.12)
This study estimates the full decomposition model in equations (3.11) and (3.12)
to evaluate the sources of caste wage differentials. For each decomposition, the first
term denotes the wage difference attributable to the difference in observable charac-
teristics between the two groups evaluated according to the dominant group’s wage
structure. The second term represents the wage difference because of differences
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in the wage structure between the two groups, evaluated at the mean level of the
comparison groups. The former terms represent the explained components of the
wage differential whereas the latter terms are the unexplained components. These
are also known respectively as pre-market discrimination and current market market
discrimination.
The decomposition in E analyzes differences in education, which in the tradi-
tional Oaxaca decomposition is the main component of human capital.
The decomposition in S shows group differences in access to better jobs and this
is the main contribution of this study. As argued in Banerjee and Knight(1985),
the choice of occupation can influence the wage a worker receives and that this is
important for the rigid caste structure in India. Their methodology isolates the
effect of productivity characteristics and occupational distribution on wages ( see
also Hinks and Wastson, 2001, for a related analysis). As it is argued above, access
to jobs in medium and large firms can play a considerable role in producing wage
differentials across groups of workers and this is particularly important for developing
countries in which the average firm size is smaller than in developed countries. In
order to evaluate the effect of occupation and firm size on caste wage differentials
three models are considered . First, it applies the occupation decomposition, S =
{occupation}; second, only apply the firm size decomposition, S = {firm size}; and
finally, it considers decomposing the full interaction between occupation and firm
size, S = {occupation × firm size}. These models are referred as Occupational,
Firm size and Interaction decomposition models, respectively.
Finally, the decomposition in X studies other characteristics such as industry,
rural/urban or regional distribution of workers cannot be ruled out while estimating
the sources of wage differentials across castes.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Analysis of access to large firms and occupations
3.6.1.1 Access to large firms
Since this studies argues that caste-differences in access to large firms could be an
important factor to produce caste wage differentials a multivariate probit analysis is
carried out to see whether these differences exist in Nepalese labour market. Results
are presented in Table 3.6. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients.
Columns 1 and 2 in this Table presents marginal effects with and without interaction
terms (caste and education variables), respectively for 2003. Same results are listed
in columns 3 and 4 for 2010. This probit model has a dependent variable carrying
value one if firm size is categorised as large and zero otherwise. Independent variables
are same as used in other models.
Results show that educational attainment positively affects access to larger firm
in both years. Land holding and rural dummy variables have impact on access to
large firms only in 2003. Land holding has a positive coefficient while the rural
dummy coefficient is negative. It shows that individuals from rich households are
likely to get jobs in large former whereas those born in rural areas are less likely rel-
ative to urban-born individuals. However, both coefficients are not significant in the
latter period which might indicate the expansion of larger firms in rural areas over
time. Similarly, regional variables, central and western regions, positively affect an
individual’s probability of being employed in large firms in the first period of anal-
ysis. These results were expected since both regions are more urbanized compared
to far western region (reference category) and most of the industries are located
in these regions. In the latter period, central region continues to show positive
and statistically significant coefficients while coefficients for western region is not
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statistically significant. Eastern region shows positive and statistically significant
coefficients in this period. This indicates that there is a significant shift in industrial
establishments across regions over the period of analysis.
Occupational and industry-types distribution of workers are not generally seen
as important factors for being associated with large firms. Finally, coefficients for
caste dummy variables show that disadvantaged castes are less likely to be employed
in larger firms relative to the dominant caste in 2003. In the latter period both caste
variables are negative. However, the Matwali coefficient is not statistically signifi-
cant. It indicates that the lowest caste (Pani Nachalne) continues to be constrained
to work in small firms whereas there might be some improvements in case of inter-
mediate (Matwali) caste. Moreover, when interaction terms (interaction between
castes and education) are included as additional explanatory variables caste coeffi-
cients remain negative and statistically significant in 2003 but not in 2010. It implies
that low caste worker’s limited access to larger firm has been perpetuated because
of the low level of human capital endowment in them.
3.6.1.2 Access to occupations
As in access to large firm, low castes are also seen to be engaged in low paid manual
jobs especially in 2003. For instance, marginal effects reported in Table 3.7 show
that both the Matwali and Pani Nachalne castes are less likely to have professional
occupation compared to the dominant caste. Both lower castes are likely to have oc-
cupations categorised as service, agri-worker and skilled. However, caste coefficients
associated with service and agri-worker occupations are statistically insignificant.
In the second period, the Matwali coefficients continue to show negative signs for
professional and clerical occupations but positive signs for agri-worker and skilled
occupations. The Matwali coefficients for clerical, sales and skilled are statistically
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significant. The former two coefficients are negative while the latter has a positive
sign. It shows that the Matwali workers are less likely to have clerical and sales
occupations but more likely to work as skilled worker relative to workers from the
Tagadhari group which is consistent to the results obtained in 2003. None of the
coefficients associated with the Pani Nachalne caste appear statistically significant
in this period. It was not expected since the lowest caste is more likely to face
occupational constraints relative to intermediate caste. However, investigating the
underlying factors for these contradicting results is beyond the scope of this study.
Overall, these results indicate that impact of occupational distribution on caste wage
differentials is decreasing over time.
3.6.2 Analysis of sources of wage differentials
3.6.2.1 Baseline regression analysis
Regression analysis was carried out to estimate the underlying wage equations for
each sample period. The estimates are listed in Tables 3.8 for 2003 and 3.9 for
2010. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report results of separate regressions for each of the
three castes, followed by the pooled sample results in column 4 with caste dummy
variables, where the Tagadhari caste represents the reference caste.
Returns to education for the pooled sample are positive, increasing with time,
0.017 (significant at 5%) and 0.066 (significant at 1% level) in 2003 and 2010, respec-
tively. However, they vary considerably across caste groups. In 2003, the Tagadhari
caste has positive and significant returns, Matwali depicts a negative but statisti-
cally not significant education coefficient. The Pani Nachalne has a positive but
statistically insignificant coefficient in this period. In 2010, these coefficients in-
creased markedly for each group and are statistically significant. The Tagadhari
and Pani Nachalne have identical return to education. However, these vary in the
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level of significance. The Tagadhari coefficient is significant at 1% level while the
Pani Nachalne coefficient is signficant only at 10% level. The Matwali has the
lowest, but still fair, return to education which is significant at 1% level.
Firm size plays a crucial role in determining wages in the Tagadhari and Mat-
wali sub-samples. For example, in 2003, those belonging to the Tagadhari group
and working in medium-sized and large-sized firm were likely to earn a premium
of respectively 35.4% and 57.3% compared to those working in small firms. The
same measures account for 56.9% and 54.3% for the Matwali sub-sample. Firm size
coefficients other than the medium firm in the Matwali sub-sample are similar in the
latter period. These coefficients are statistically not significant in the Pani Nachalne
sub-sample.
The results for occupational effects (with reference group = unskilled workers)
show mixed significance across sub-samples. For instance, professional, clerical and
skilled occupations are the main contributors of the Tagadhari worker’s wage in
2003. Occupational categories other than professional and sales do not show any
significant impact on Matwali worker’s wages in this period. None of the occupation
coefficients are found statistically significant in the Pani Nachalne sub-sample.
In the second period, professional occupation continues to have a positive impact
on the Tagadhari worker’s wage whereas professional, clerical and skilled occupations
seem to have positive impact on the Matwali worker’s wage. As in 2003, none of the
occupations seem to have significant impact on wage earning by the Pani Nachalne
workers.
Industry-type effects (with reference group = Agriculture) are not consistent
across sub-samples and reflect variability in the base category.
In the pooled regression using caste dummies in column 4, the coefficients on the
dummies are negative for both castes in 2003. However, the Matwali coefficient is
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not statistically significant in this period. In contrast, both caste dummy coefficients
became positive although still not significant in 2010. This shows that in order to
explore the sources of caste wage differentials, the Oaxaca decomposition model is
necessary.
3.6.2.2 Decomposition results
Three different decomposition models are employed to study the sources of wage
differentials. These models are hereafter referred as the Occupational, Firm size
and Interaction decomposition models. Each model consists of three components;
namely (1) explained and unexplained wage differences attributable to differences in
education endowments, (2) explained and unexplained wage differences attributable
to differences in job characteristics (firm size and/or occupation), (3) explained and
unexplained wage differences attributable to differences in other variables including
the constant term.
The results are presented in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 for the years 2003 and 2010,
respectively. These tables report only the summary results. Detailed decomposition
results are not presented in order to save space but can be provided upon request.
The decomposition results show that wage gaps attributable to differences in
human capital endowments (i.e. education, explained, βt(Et − Em) and βt(Et −
Ep)), generally considered as being the main source of wage gaps among workers,
explains less than half of the wage differentials in 2003 but more than three-fourths in
2010. For 2003 and for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage differential, the Occupational
model shows that differences in education endowments are 0.060 out of a total
wage gap of 0.299, and this corresponds to 0.096 and 0.057 for for the Firm size
and Interaction models. For the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential, the
Occupational model shows that differences in education endowments are 0.080 out
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of 0.493, and this corresponds to 0.128 and 0.076 for the Firm size and Interaction
models. In 2010, the Tagadhari - Matwali wage differential decreases to 0.199, and
this is explained by differences in education endowments by 0.179, 0.213, 0.150 for
the Occupational, Firm size and Interaction decomposition models, respectively.
Moreover the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage differential is 0.489 in 2010, and this
is explained by differences in education endowments by 0.380, 0.454, 0.319 for the
Occupational, Firm size and Interaction decomposition models, respectively.
The wage gaps arising from differences in job characteristics (i.e. job, explained,
δt(St−Sm) and δt(St−Sp)) are statistically significant, and they show a consistent
positive effect. The results show that the largest effect is obtained when using
the Interaction decomposition model. Overall, this shows that access to jobs in
better occupations and higher paying firms plays a non-trivial part in explaining
the wage gaps across castes. In 2003, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage differential,
differences in occupation explain a gap of 0.127, differences in firm size explain 0.077
and the interaction of the two 0.180 (out of 0.299); while for the Tagadhari - Pani
Nachalne wage differential, each model explains 0.128, 0.063, 0.191 (out of 0.493),
respectively. In 2010, for the Tagadhari - Matwali wage differential, differences in
occupation explain a gap of 0.041, differences in firm size explain 0.032 and the
interaction of the two 0.084 (out of 0.199); while for the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne
wage differential, each model explains 0.088, 0.078, 0.227 (out of 0.489), respectively.
The differences in endowments in variables other than education, occupation and
firm size (i.e. others, explained, γt(X t − Xm) and γt(X t − Xp)) generally appear
as statistically insignificant. Moreover, the unexplained differences in wage gaps
attributable to education (i.e. differences in returns to education), job characteristics
(occupation and/or firm size), and other components are in general not statistically
significant, although some of them are large in magnitude. Note that the latter
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contains industry as one component which preliminary estimations show it is not
relevant for the decomposition.
One important point to arise from this analysis is that the Tagadhari - Matwali
wage differential decreased in 2010 whereas the Tagadhari - Pani Nachalne wage
differential remained constant. The underlying reason could be that there is a
slightly reduction in the gaps in human capital endowment in the former comparison
group which has been widened in the case of the latter group. The Matwali group
have improve their access to better jobs with a relative improvement in educational
attainment in the latter period. For instance, Interaction decomposition results
shows that the job-explained component of the Tagadhari- Matwali wage differential
has decreased to 0.084 in 2010 relative to 0.180 in 2003 while it has increased in the
case of Tagadhari- Pani Nachalne wage differential. This indicates that although
government introduced a policy of affirmative action providing quotas in public
sector jobs, the Pani Nachalne group might not have been able to take this advantage
because of a lack of minimum level of education required for public sector jobs.
3.6.2.3 Robustness: Imputation of missing firm size
Preceding analysis was restricted to a subset of workers who had explicitly reported
the firm size of their employer. This exclusion had resulted in a higher proportion
of workers in the professional and clerical occupations than in the overall sample.
It could therefore be suspected that the estimated decomposition results may be
attributable to group differences in access to white collar jobs rather than group
differences in access to larger firms. Thus this study proposes another firm size
measurement that might still suffer from measurement error but that serves to eval-
uate the robustness of the previous results. Note that both, previous and new, firm
size variables are (imperfect) proxies for the quality of the firm and the job.
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In order to test for this possible bias, an extended sample is constructed by im-
puting a large firm size when missing for certain occupations where the size can be
detectable from the work description reported in the survey questionnaire but im-
puting the rest to small firm. Work descriptions given by production/operation
department managers, architect, engineers, nursing/midwifery professionals, pri-
mary and secondary education teachers, other teaching professionals, business pro-
fessionals, computer technicians, optical/electronic equipment operators, modern
health associates, administrative personal, secretaries/clerks, library/mail clerks,
cashier/tellers clerks, client information clerks, travel attendants, housekeeping and
restaurant workers are considered as working for the large firm. The rest of workers
with missing firm size are imputed as small firm, except for agricultural, fishery,
brick/glass workers and porters for which firm size cannot be clearly assigned and
they are therefore excluded from the imputation exercise.
Table 3.12 reports the original and imputed firm size distribution. It should be
noted that the imputation exercise increases mostly those assigned to small firms.
This imputation leads to a significant increment in the sample size (from 785 to
1357 in 2003 and from 834 to 1110 in 2010) and a reduction in the proportion of
white collar jobs. The proportion of professional and clerical workers is reduced to
23.37% and 7.59% from 38.30% and 12.08% in 2003, respectively, and to 19.91%
and 14.59% from 23.86% and 18.71% in 2010. Tables 3.13 and 3.14 presents the
distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry, before and after the
imputation exercise.
Decomposition results for the extended sample are listed in Tables 3.15 and 3.16.
If the difference in access to white collar occupations was driving the baseline results
is valid, then it is expected that the explained components of access to jobs will be
smaller in the extended sample than in the baseline sample, particularly for 2003
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where the proportion of white collars jobs has been significantly reduced in the
extended sample. In 2003, the results for the Job-Explained component increases
while the Education-Explained component is slightly reduced. For instance, in the
Interaction model, the Job-Explained increases to 0.211 from 0.180 in the Matwali
and to 0.225 from 0.191 for the Pani Nachalne groups. In 2010, on the contrary, the
Job-Explained component decreases although the Interaction model still continues
to have the largest effect. Overall the results are qualitatively similar to those of
the original sample, and thus, they confirm that access to jobs in larger firms play
an important role in explaining caste wage differentials.
3.7 Conclusion
This study investigated the sources of caste wage differentials in Nepal by expanding
the conventional Oaxaca methodology to include both occupational and firm size
effects. The study covered two different surveys over a time span of seven years
and included a period of radical political change in Nepal. These changes led to the
adoption of policies designed to equalize labour market outcomes in the country.
It finds that caste wage inequality is present in the Nepalese labour market in
both years, and it has remained constant between the two periods particularly for
the lowest caste. At the same time, results indicate that differences in human capital
endowments are important for explaining wage inequality, but so are occupational
and firm size effects, especially when the the latter two are taken together. Within
the components of discrimination that are related to access to better jobs results
indicate that such access continues to exist for reasons other than differences in
human capital for both Matwali and Pani Nachalne disadvantaged groups. This
suggests that discriminatory behaviour by employers continues to exist in Nepal.
Overall, this suggests that the government’s policy of trying to reverse historical
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caste labour market discrimination by imposing quotas in public sector employ-
ment has not been enough to overcome other barriers that prevent under-privileged
workers from accessing such jobs.
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Table 3.1: Nepal social hierarchy: 1854
Hierarchy Habitat Belief/Religion
A.Water acceptable(pure)
1.Tagadhari: Wearer of the sacred thread
“Upper Caste” (Brahmin) Hills Hinduism
“ Upper caste” (Madhesi) Tarai Hinduism
“ Upper Caste” (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hindusim
2. Matwali:Alcohol drinkers(non-enslavable)
Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar Hills Tribal / Shamanism
Thakali, Rai, Limbu Hills Tribal / Shamanism




Kumal , Tharu Inner Tarai Animism
B. Water unacceptable (impure)
1. Pani Nachalne:Touchable
Dhobi, Kasai, Kusule, Kalu Kathmandu Valley Hinduism
Musalman Tarai Islam
Mlechha(Foreigner) Europe Christianity etc.
2. Pani Nachalne: Untouchable(achhut)
Badi, Damai ,Gaine Hill Hinduism
Kadara, Kami, Sarki(Parbatiya) Hills Hinduism
Chhyame, Pode (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hinduism
Source: Adapted from Bennett et al.(2008).
Table 3.2: Distribution of workers by age categories






Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics: 2003
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne
Caste 1.00 .707(.016) .192(.014) .099(.010)
Lhwage 3.34(.033) 3.45(.039) 3.15(.073) 2.96(.099)
Education 7.78(.172) 8.53(.201) 6.24(.361) 5.5(.557)
Experience 20.69(.411) 20.22(.475) 21.38(.946) 22.65(1.50)
Experience2 560.66(20.32) 534.35(22.81) 591.60(48.35) 687.62(80.33)
Married .825(.013) .810(.016) .880(.026) .820(.043)
Rural .798(.014) .761(.018) .934(.020) .794(.046)
Lnholding(’00000) 7.34(.733) 8.44(.994) 6.08(1.04) 2.01(.308)
Small firm .059(.008) .043(.008) .106(.025) .077(.030)
Medium firm .419(.017) .383(.020) .497(.040) .526(.056)
Large firm .522 (.017) .574(.021) .397(.039) .397(.055)
Eastern .121(.011) .096(.012) .139(.028) .253(.049)
Central .421(.017) .447(.021) .374(.039) .333(.053)
Western .136(.012) .125(.014) .189(.031) .116(.036)
Mid-western .070(.009) .066(.010) .083(.022) .077(.030)
Far-western .046(.007) .047(.008) .063(.019) -
Abroad .206(.014) .219(.017) .152(.028) .221(.046)
Unskilled .184(.013) .161(.015) .278(.036) .167(.042)
Professional .386(.017) .451(.021) .245(.035) .192(.044)
Clerical .122(.011) .133(.014) .073(.021) .128(.038)
Service .057(.008) .045(.008) .086(.022) .090(.032)
Sales .047(.007) .054(.009) .026(.013) .038(.021)
Agri-worker .025(.005) .014(.004) .046(.017) .064(.027)
Skilled .179(.013) .142(.014) .246(.035) .321(.053)
Agriculture .022(.005) .019(.005) .026(.013) .026(.018)
Mining .014(.004) .013(.004) .020(.011) .013(.012)
Manufacturing .193(.014) .152(.015) .238(.034) .397(.055)
Construction .034(.006) .029(.007) .066(.020) .012(.012)
Trade .093(.010) .107(.013) .060(.019) .064(.027)
FRE .034(.006) .045(.008) .013(.009) -
Servicesec .451(.017) .471(.021) .444(.040) .321(.053)
Others .159(.013) .164(.015) .133(.027) .167(.042)
Obs. 785 554 153 78
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
“-” indicates no observations.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: 2010
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne
Caste 1.00 .713(.015) .214(.014) .073(.009)
Lhwage 3.89(.029) 3.96(.034) 3.76(.059) 3.47(.102)
Education 9.88(.129) 10.66(.131) 8.56(.304) 6.21(.573)
Experience 19.56(.392) 19.27(.457) 20.77(.892) 18.91(1.48)
Experience2 510.11(17.95) 495.00(20.51) 569.31(42.33) 487.58(70.51)
Married .792(.014) .790(.016) .810(.029) .766(.055)
Rural .731(.015) .710(.018) .815(.029) .786(.052)
Lnholding(’00000) 29.92(3.98) 36.80(5.15) 14.74(6.84) 6.00(1.95)
Small firm .030(.006) .023(.006) .052(.016) .067(.032)
Medium firm .332(.016) .290(.018) .339(.035) .617(.063)
Large firm .638(.016) .685(.019) .609(.037) .316(.060)
Eastern .105(.010) .094(.012) .126(.025) .133(.044)
Central .608(.016) .652(.019) .551(.037) .350(.062)
Western .157(.012) .148(.014) .167(.028) .217(.053)
Mid-western .073(.009) .064(.010) .075(.019) .150(.046)
Far-western .038(.006) .027(.006) .052(.016) .100(.008)
Abroad .019(.004) .013(.004) .029(.012) .050(.028)
Unskilled .084(.009) .072(.010) .126(.025) .083(.035)
Professional .239(.014) .283(.018) .149(.027) .067(.032)
Clerical .191(.013) .224(.017) .086(.021) .166(.048)
Service .127(.011) .115(.013) .121(.024) .267(.057)
Sales .066(.008) .071(.010) .046(.015) .083(.035)
Agri-worker .008(.003) .001(.001) .023(.011) .033(.023)
Skilled .282(.015) .231(.017) .448(.037) .300(.059)
Agriculture .007(.002) .008(.003) .005(.005) -
Mining .008(.003) .008(.003) .011(.008) -
Manufacturing .129(.011) .106(.012) .149(.027) .300(.059)
Construction .035(.006) .027(.006) .052(.016) .067(.032)
Trade .079(.009) .081(.011) .051(.016) .133(.044)
Servicesec .193(.013) .179(.015) .247(.032) .183(.050)
FRE .065(.008) .074(.010) .057(.017) -
Others .481(.017) .515(.020) .425(.037) .317(.060)
Obs. 834 594 179 61
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
“-” indicates no observations.
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Table 3.5: Wages by occupation and firm size
Year: 2003 Year: 2010
Occupation Small firm Medium firm Large firm Small firm Medium firm Large firm
Unskilled 2.26(0.772) 2.90(0.941) 3.09(0.608) 3.26(.769) 3.37(0.617) 3.64(0.715)
Professional 3.08(1.50) 3.48(0.907) 3.91(0.874) 4.50(1.27) 4.50(0.936) 4.52(0.762)
Clerical 2.16(1.26) 3.14(0.628) 3.78(0.761) - 3.86(0.846) 4.02(0.638)
Service 2.65(0.951) 3.02(1.06) 3.19(0.393) - 3.19(0.704) 3.83(0.723)
Sales 2.59(0.260) 2.65(0.868) 3.13(.291) 3.09(0.580) 3.23(0.460) 3.66(0.640)
Agri-worker 3.06(.659) 3.14(1.03) 3.67(0.792) 3.17(2.52) - 3.41(0.431)
Skilled 2.77(0.490) 3.14(0.897) 3.15(0.793) 3.07(0.430) 3.28(0.720) 3.96(0.650)
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
“-” indicates no observations.
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Table 3.6: Probit regression results
Dependent variable: dummy=1 for large firm, 0 otherwise
Variables Year: 2003 Year: 2010
1 2 3 4
Education .009**(.004) .007(.005) .035***(.006) .040***(.008)
Experience .011*(.007) .013*(.007) .006(.006) .006(.006)
Experience2 -.000(.000) -.000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Married -.053(.061) -.052(.062) .039(.058) .041(.058)
Rural -.158**(.069) -.164**(.069) -.031(.042) .032(.042)
Lnholding .365***(.120) .373***(.120) -.011(.015) -.011(.015)
Eastern .075(.102) .066(.104) .222***(.057) .218***(.057)
Central .195**(.089) .194**(.089) .123*(.059) .116*(.059)
Western .201**(.091) .194**(.092) -.112(.090) -.113(.090)
Mid-western .088(.109) .092(.108) -.026(.103) -.023(.104)
Abroad .076(.096) .073(.096) .092(.120) .079(.122)
Professional .098*(.060) .101*(.060) -.156*(.086) -.165*(.087)
Clerical .039(.074) -.040(.074) -.031(.082) -.033(.082)
Service .112(.086) .124(.087) .009(.085) .005(.085)
Sales -.382***(.076) -.382***(.076) -.483***(.113) -.485***(.113)
Agri-worker -.183(.125) -.170***(.127) .272*(.085) .251*(.100)
Skilled -.009(.063) -.002(.063) -.048(.073) -.050(.073)
Mining .310(.157) .324*(.148) .136(.223) .135(.222)
Manufacturing .052(.150) .065(.150) .162(.145) .153(.145)
Construction -.214(.157) -.204(.159) .120(.163) .119(.160)
Trade -.134(.157) -.129(.157) .146(.162) .140(.161)
FRE -.013(.182) -.002(.181) .018(.176) .014(.173)
Servicesec -.192(.143) -.190(.142) .142(.149) .134(.150)
Others .017(.149) .025(.148) .221(.168) .216(.165)
Matwali*Education - .005(.011) - -.009(.011)
Pani Nachalne*Education - .021*(.013) - -.016(.015)
Matwali -.154***(.049) -.196**(.083) -.047(.047) .037(.109)
Pani Nachalne -.154**(.063) -.270***(.092) -.207***(.080) -.073(.138)
Pseudo R2 .1156 .1179 1629 .1640
Log likelihood ratio -480.75 -479.50 -457.02 -456.40
Obs. 785 785 834 834
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
-Far-western, Unskilled, Agricultural and Tagadhari are omitted categories for region,
occupation, industry-type and caste dummy variables, respectively.
-These coefficients correspond to marginal effects.
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Table 3.7: Multinomial regression results
Dependent variable: Occupational categorical variable
Year: 2003
Professional Clerical Service Sales Agri-worker Skilled
Education .034***(.004) .009***(.003) -.003***(.001) -.001(.001) -.003***(.001) -.012***(.002)
Experience -.003**(.002) -.001(.001) .000(.000) .000(.000) .001(.001) -.001(.001)
Rural .015(.047) -.053(.047) .079**(.036) -.002(.020) .021**(.009) -.050(.039)
Lnholding .439***(.145) .269***(.071) -.382***(.123) -.073(.122) .039(.028) -.73*(.159)
Matwali -.164***(.044) -.030(.033) .030(.022) -.029*(.017) .021(.016) .119***(.043)
Pani Nachalne -.185***(.056) .036(.048) .020(.027) -.016(.023) .040(.029) .167***(.058)
Log likelihood ratio -1154.62
Obs. 785
Year: 2010
Education .046***(.009) .033***(.007) -.025***(.004) -.003(.003) -.001(.001) -.034***(.007)
Experience .002***(.000) .002**(.001) -.005***(.001) -.003***(.001) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural -.010(.010) -.045(.029) .032(.033) .015(.033) -.001(.004) .048(.042)
Lnholding -.002(.003) .010(.023) .014(.024) .001(.008) .000(.000) .013(.016)
Matwali -.007(.010) -.154***(.038) -.028(.033) -.038*(.023) .007(.007) .188***(.047)
Pani Nachalne .010(.028) .031(.075) .048(.055) .001(.041) .007(.009) -.055(.073)
Log likelihood ratio -1150.02
Obs. 834
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
- Unskilled and Tagadhari are base categories for occupation and caste variables, respectively.
-These coefficients correspond to marginal effects.
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Table 3.8: Regression results: 2003
Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Dummy
1 2 3 4
Education .025***(.009) -.017(.024) .006(.036) .017**(.007)
Experience .025*(.015) .004(.026) -.038(.036) .025**(.011)
Experience2 -.000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) -.000(.000)
Married .079(.107) .384*(.249) .543**(.248) .140*(.091)
Rural .015(.164) -.095(.264) -.116(.353) -.040(.136)
Lnholding -.121(.133) -.192(.327) .244(4.60) -.144(.123)
Medium firm .354*(.199) .569**(.267) -.413(.430) .319**(.141)
Large firm .573***(.198) .543**(.263) .291(.476) .540***(.142)
Eastern .074(.229) -.114(.271) -.357(.271) -.041(.175)
Central .275(.195) .177(.252) -.359(.369) .194(.155)
Western .172(.204) .916***(.343) dropped .291*(.170)
Mid-western .268(.225) .109(.295) -.027(.606) .210(.178)
Abroad .218(.205) .441*(.284) -.248(.428) .172(.165)
Professional .639***(.114) .667***(.238) .144(.405) .668***(.094)
Clerical .309**(.126) .104(.331) .507(.439) .410***(.111)
Service .088(.198) .239(.297) .035(.465) .121(.158)
Sales .082(.215) .512*(.277) -.505(.522) .125(.170)
Agri-worker .414(.453) -.255(.355) -.122(.579) .382*(.214)
Skilled .200*(.132) .196(.193) .424(.479) .301***(.100)
Mining .086(.282) -.260(.586) .088(.536) -.017(.248)
Manufacturing .231(.277) -.759**(.327) .300(.422) .015(.196)
Construction .359(.292) .302(.398) 1.42***(.453) .240(.215)
Trade -.074(.283) -.738**(.356) .140(.477) -.208(.204)
FRE .901***(.303) -.802(.601) - .691***(.247)
Servicesec .274(.256) -.311(.339) -.026(.379) .088(.184)
Others .191(.268) .405(.439) .628(.573) .339(.195)
Matwali - - - -.076(.080)
Pani Nachalne - - - -.201*(.110)
Constant 1.53***(.406) 2.07***(.551) 2.86***(.813) 1.71***(.303)
R2 .2717 .3683 .4109 .2613
Obs. 554 153 78 785
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
-Small firm, Far-western, Unskilled, Agricultural and Tagadhari are omitted categories for
firm size, region, occupation, industry-type and caste dummy variables, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Regression results: 2010
Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Dummy
1 2 3 4
Education .077***(.012) .057***(.018) .077*(.041) .066***(.009)
Experience .015(.012) .077***(.021) .044(.044) .035***(.010)
Experience2 .000(.000) -.001***(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000)
Married .208*(.144) -.067(.155) .166(.308) .139*(.087)
Rural -.009(.071) -.038(.119) -.153(.326) -.022(.060)
Lnholding .024(.023) -.033*(.022) -.898(.862) .010(.020)
Medium firm .305**(.146) .304*(.205) -.258(.780) .264*(.137)
Large firm .492***(.149) .580***(.189) .150(.825) .485***(.138)
Eastern .142(.146) -.387(.393) -.233(.676) .008(.138)
Central .205*(.121) -.125(.344) .282(.674) .188*(.123)
Western .016(.148) -.359(.356) .019(.667) -.008(.138)
Mid-western .260(.197) -.546(.388) .409(.678) .147(.169)
Abroad .306(.309) -.913**(.376) .081(.794) .008(.212)
Professional .444***(.138) .561***(.204) .372(.790) .545***(.108)
Clerical .146(.123) .306*(.206) -.217(.685) .229**(.098)
Service .055(.136) .223(.223) -.326(.501) .139(.105)
Sales -.666***(.198) -.851***(.318) .290(.710) -.426**(.171)
Agri-worker .160(.140) -.256(.414) -.460(.538) -.375(.260)
Skilled .060(.120) .323**(.156) -.134(.561) .190*(.088)
Mining -.758**(.347) .079(.363) - -.478(.338)
Manufacturing -.290(.318) .534*(.360) .671(.666) -.026(.305)
Construction -.258(.352) .810**(.353) .387(.880) .040(.322)
Trade .164(.327) 1.05***(.361) - .290(.315)
Servicesec -.462(.314) .355(.331) .247(.630) -.213(.303)
FRE -.042(.327) .774**(.360) - .190(.315)
Others -.248(.311) .624*(.329) -.118(.496) -.014(.301)
Matwali - - - .043(.056)
Pani Nachalne - - - .064(.113)
Constant 2.18***(.383) 1.49***(.616) 2.24*(1.35) 1.92***(.380)
R2 .3691 .4951 .3236 .3716
Obs. 594 179 61 834
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
-Small firm, Far-western, Unskilled, Agricultural and Tagadhari are omitted categories
for firm size, region, occupation, industry-type and caste dummy variables, respectively.
However, Trade industry is omitted in the Pani Nachalne sub-sample since it has no
observation on base category, Agricultural industry.
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Table 3.10: Oaxaca decomposition results: 2003
Tagadhari vs. Matwali
Education Job Other
Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Occupational .299*** .060** .198* .127*** 0.029 .016 -.131
(.089) (.023) (.153) (.036) (.044) (.027) (.200)
Firm size .299*** .096*** .161 .077*** .059 .041 -.135
(.086) (.026) (.127) (.025) (.418) (.029) (.297)
Interaction .299*** .057** .265* .180*** .201 .014 -.418
(.089) (.023) (.153) (.044) (.259) (.027) (.604)
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne
Occupational .493*** .080** .104 .128*** .178 .041 -.038
(.118) (.032) (.196) (.042) (.493) (.044) (.378)
Firm size .493*** .128*** .230* .063** .361 .114** -.403
(.114) (.036) (.152) (.028) (95.99) (.045) (.419)
Interaction .493*** .076** .289* .191*** -.270 .044 .163
(.119) (.031) (.191) (.055) (.478) (.044) (.864)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
Table 3.11: Oaxaca decomposition results: 2010
Tagadhari vs. Matwali
Education Job Other
Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Occupational .199*** .179*** .126 .041 -.192 .009 .036
(.071) (.037) (.180) (.031) (.108) (.029) (.232)
Firm size .199*** .213*** .202 .032** -.095 -.003 -.150
(.070) .040) (.166) (.015) (.064) (.030) .334
Interaction .199*** .150*** .131 .084* -.780* .002 .612
(.071) (.034) (.187) (.043) (.501) (.027) (.791)
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne
Occupational .489*** .380*** .084 .088* -.068 .044 -.039
(.122) (.071) (.310) (.046) (.071) (.055) (.528)
Firm size .489*** .454*** .027 .078*** .801 .092* -.963
(.118) (.075) (.246) (.029) (1.22) (.055) (.592)
Interaction .489*** .319*** .019 .227*** -.394 .028 .290
(.128) (.067) (.318) (.064) (.493) (.053) (1.25)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
112
Table 3.12: Firm size distribution (before and after imputation)
Year: 2003 Year: 2010
Reported Imputed Total Reported Imputed Total
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Small firm 46 5.85 546 95.62 592 43.63 25 2.99 247 89.49 272 24.50
Medium firm 332 42.37 - - 333 24.54 278 33.29 - - 278 25.05
Large firm 407 51.78 25 4.38 432 31.83 532 63.72 28 10.14 560 50.45
Total 785 100 571 100 1357 100 834 100 276 100 1110 100
Table 3.13: Distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry (before
and after firm size imputation): 2003
Reported Imputed Total
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Unskilled 145 18.45 99 17.34 244 17.98
Professional 301 38.30 16 2.80 317 23.37
Clerical 95 12.08 8 1.40 103 7.59
Service 46 5.85 28 4.90 74 5.45
Sales 37 4.71 10 1.75 47 3.46
Agri-workers 20 2.54 15 2.63 35 2.58
Skilled 141 18.07 395 69.18 537 39.57
Industry Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Agriculture 17 2.16 20 3.50 37 2.73
Mining 11 1.40 6 1.05 17 1.25
Manufacturing 152 19.34 172 30.13 324 23.88
Construction 29 3.69 299 52.37 328 24.17
Trade 71 9.03 16 2.80 87 6.41
FRE 27 3.44 4 0.70 31 2.28
Service sector 351 44.78 32 5.60 384 28.30
Other 127 16.16 22 3.85 149 10.98
Total 785 100 571 100 1357 100
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Table 3.14: Distribution of male wage workers by occupation and industry (before
and after firm size imputation): 2010
Reported Imputed Total
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Unskilled 75 8.99 2 0.73 77 6.94
Professional 199 23.86 22 7.97 221 19.91
Clerical 156 18.71 6 2.17 162 14.59
Service 107 12.83 58 21.01 165 14.86
Sales 55 6.59 3 1.09 58 5.23
Agri-worker 6 0.72 6 2.17 12 1.08
Skilled 236 28.30 179 64.86 415 37.39
Total 834 100 276 100 110 100
Occupation Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Agricultural 7 0.84 18 6.52 25 2.24
Mining 6 0.72 3 1.09 9 0.81
Manufacturing 109 13.07 65 23.55 174 15.68
Construction 28 3.36 117 42.39 145 13.06
Trade 66 7.91 8 2.90 74 6.67
FRE 158 18.94 30 10.87 188 16.94
Service sector 55 6.59 5 1.81 60 5.41
Other 405 48.57 30 10.87 435 39.19
Total 834 100 276 100 1110 100
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Table 3.15: Oaxaca decomposition results with imputed firm size: 2003
Tagadhari vs. Matwali
Education Job Other
Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Occupational .268*** .063** .059 .138*** .011 -.053* .050
(.053) (.028) (.066) (.034) (1.83) (.035) (.135)
Firm size .268*** .107*** .071 .083** .025 -.032 .014
(.053) (.028) (.063) (.035) (.070) (.038) (.107)
Interaction .268*** .044* .073 .211*** .026 -.086** .000
(.053) (.028) (.063) (.047) (.145) (.039) (.199)
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne
Occupational .387*** .082** -.000 .148*** .021 -.039 .175
(.069) (.036) (.070) (.036) (.284) (.042) (.172)
Firm size .387*** .140*** .085 .097** -.031 .010 .086
(.068) (.037) (.065) (.042) (.300) (.043) (.119)
Interaction .387*** .057* .042 .225*** .030 -.069* .102
(.070) (.036) (.071) (.052) (.037) (.044) (.224)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
Table 3.16: Oaxaca decomposition results with imputed firm size: 2010
Tagadhari vs. Matwali
Education Job Other
Total Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained
Occupational .216*** .202*** .029 .041* -.299 .001 .242
(.061) (.035) (.137) (.026) (.327) (.027) (.225)
Firm size .216*** .245*** .137 .013 -.101 -.011 -.067
(.061) (.038) (.130) (.016) (.192) (.029) (.167)
Interaction .216*** .179*** .073 .076** .131 .003 -.246
(.068) (.035) (.143) (.033) (.788) (.026) (.642)
Tagadhari vs. Pani Nachalne
Occupational .489*** .387*** .082 .086*** -.022 .034 -.078
(.084) (.061) (.162) (.033) (.021) (.047) (.443)
Firm size .489*** .469*** .081 .043 -.063 .045 -.086
(.082) (.062) (.145) (.034) (.110) (.050) (.205)
Interaction .489*** .342*** .063 .150*** 1.52 .034 -1.62
(.086) (.062) (.171) (.054) (1.98) (.048) (1.13)
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4.1 Introduction
Equity is regarded as maintaining fairness or reducing inequality in distribution so
as to maintain social justice (Braveman and Gruskin, 2003). Particularly with ref-
erence to health sector inequity, inequality in health status, access to and utilisation
of health care service across social groups has been extensively examined in the lit-
erature. The majority of these studies evaluate such inequities across social groups
ranked by income and are largely focused in developed countries (see Schoen and
Doty, 2004; van Doorslaer et al., 2000, 2006; Heyden et al., 2003).
Health care systems differ significantly between developing and developed coun-
tries, as do the underlying factors of health sector inequity (Mills and Gilson, 1988).
One discernible difference in health care systems is accessibility to health care ser-
116
vices. More unequal access to health care services across social groups can be ob-
served in developing countries than in the developed world. Another difference arises
in the composition of different sources of finance in health care services (George and
Akiko, 1999). In most developed countries, health care is mainly financed by public
sector expenditure, and to a lesser extent by private insurance (there are exceptions,
as in the US). In developing countries, the financing of health care expenditure pre-
dominantly depends on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments by households. Access to
and financing of the health care system in developing countries is therefore likely
to favour health sector inequity, possibly driving the poorest segment of the popu-
lation into higher health risk. Empirical evidence in the developing world is scant
(Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2000).
Health sector inequity in developed and developing countries has mainly been
evaluated in terms of the use of health care services, such as physician visits, hospi-
talization, ambulatory care services and health outcomes across social groups ranked
by income and other non-income socioeconomic characteristics such as race and eth-
nicities. However, scarce attention has been given in empirical studies to inequity
across castes despite the fact that a caste system is likely to boost health sector
inequities via low social capital in low castes. The caste system imposes a social
division of labour based on caste hierarchy that limits low-caste workers to work
only in unskilled manual jobs (Banerjee and Knight, 1985). This, in turn, may
lead low-caste groups into an inferior socioeconomic status. The available evidence
suggests that there is a positive relationship between socioeconomic status, mea-
sured by income, and health outcomes both in developed (Deaton, 2003; Wagstaff,
2002; van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004) and in developing countries (Lordan et
al., 2012; Van de Poel and Speybroeck, 2009). Therefore, such social hierarchy can
lead low-caste individuals to have worse health outcomes. In addition to income,
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other elements of socioeconomic status, such as education and occupation, can also
significantly influence individual’s health (Winkleby et al., 1992; Adler and New-
man, 2002). Deaton (2011) argues that childhood inequalities in social status such
as parental education and income are key drivers of adulthood health. The caste
system affects all of the above variables. To the best of my knowledge, very few
studies have focused on caste inequity in health care utilisation (see Dommaraju et
al., 2008; Roy and Howard, 2007; Van de Poel and Speybroeck, 2009) and no study
has yet explicitly examined difference in health outcomes across castes.
By acknowledging this gap in the literature of health economics this study first
evaluates the caste-inequity in health care utilization, proxied by OOP payments
for health care services. In other words, it examines whether there is a caste differ-
entials in OOP payments for health care services which cannot be explained by the
differences in need variables (types of illnesses) associated with them. Second, it ex-
amines the determining factors of caste disparities in health outcomes as measured
by self-assessed-health (SAH).1 The first effect is evaluated by employing a tobit
regression analysis. The second effect is estimated by employing ordered probit and
generalized ordered probit models. Two waves of National Living Standard Survey
(NLSS) from Nepal for the years 2003 and 2010 are used.
Furthermore, this study covers a period in which various policies were imple-
mented with the aim of providing health care services to the poor. The main initia-
tive includes the introduction of Nepal Health Sector Program-Implementation Plan
(NHSP-IP) 2004-2009, which is a strategic plan that outlines Nepal’s health policy
known as Essential Health Care Service (EHCS), whereby user fees for the poor are
abolished and primary health care services are declared universally free. Nepal’s
recent development plans, which are guiding documents for allocating the annual
1Caste categories used in this analysis are identical to one used in previous chapter. Therefore,
no detail description is given in this chapter in order to avoid repetition. See section 3.3 for detail.
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national budget to different sectoral ministries, have fully incorporated these policy
initiatives.2 Following these development plans, one could expect any caste inequity
in health care utilisation to decrease over time had these policy interventions been
effective. However, the impact of these policy interventions on caste inequity in
health care utilisation in Nepal has not been explored. This study partly fills this
gap.
The econometric analysis shows inequity in health care utilisation to exist across
castes in Nepal, albeit the evidence shows there has been a decrease in inequity.
Furthermore, it shows that low castes are more likely to have lower health outcomes
compared to the dominant caste particularly in 2003. However, since caste differ-
ences in health outcomes remain in 2010 and the abolishment of user fees does not
show a significant impact on caste differences in OOP expenses, it can be argued
that accompanying health policies are not effective enough to attain caste equity in
health care.
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous
literature particularly with reference to inequity in health care utilization and also
in difference in health outcomes. Section 4.3 explains the Nepalese health system.
Section 4.4 describes the estimation strategy. Data, descriptive statistics and vari-
ables specification are presented in Section 4.5 followed by results in Section 4.6.
Section 4.7 concludes.
2The periodic development plan is an important policy document prepared by the National
Planning Commission (NPC) of Nepal for specific periods, usually five years, that sets the priority
of the development programs for all sectoral ministries. The annual national budget is allocated
in accordance with the priority given by the plan document.
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4.2 Literature review
Past few decades have given a tremendous momentum to the literature on health
sector inequity. As a result, more than one thousand articles on this subject have
been published only in the last two decades (Williams and Cookson, 2000). These
studies can broadly be divided into two strands. The first strand of literature eval-
uates health sector inequity across social groups ranked by income while the second
strand focuses on inequity across social classes such as caste, race, ethnicity and
gender. These two types of studies are different not only on conceptual grounds
but also in methodologies used. The estimation of concentration index is the widely
used approach in the former types of studies while regression analysis, decomposition
technique or both have been employed frequently in the latter strand of studies.
4.2.1 Socioeconomic inequity in health care utilisation
Despite a substantial upsurge in the empirical studies related to socioeconomic in-
equity in health care utilisation these are mainly focused in developed counties. A
study carried out in OECD countries reveals a pro-rich inequity in health care util-
isation to exist virtually in all these countries (van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1992).
This study defines equity in health care utilisation if the people with identical needs
for health care are treated alike.
Chen and Escarce (2004) examine income related inequality in medical expendi-
ture in the United States of America (USA) controlling for need variables proxied
by age. Income related inequality is assessed in four different age categories: all
adults, working-age adult, seniors and children (with age from 5 to 17 years). Es-
timated concentration index of inequality for the same age categories was found as
.087, .099, .147 and .067, respectively. These results indicate that income related
inequity in health care expenditure exists in the USA which favours rich people. The
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magnitude of inequity is the highest among seniors relative to other age categories
in comparison.
An analysis carried out in Norway by Grytten et al. (1995) contradicts with the
conclusion of studies in OECD and in the USA. Looking at the services provided
by primary care physicians, this study reveals no significant income effect on its
utilisation. This indicates the presence of equality in health care utilisation across
income groups. However, these authors acknowledge the possibility of control in the
supply of services that might have limited the consumption of health care services
for those who wished and were able to afford more amount and high-quality health
care services.
Evidence from Asian regions, with some variation in magnitudes, supports the
finding of above studies. Lu et al. (2007) investigate horizontal inequity (HI) in
health care utilisation in three high-income Asian countries: South Korea, Taiwan
and Hong Kong. In line with other studies, this study estimates concentration in-
dexes for utilisation of (visit to) five different categories of health care providers:
western doctor, licensed traditional medicine practitioner (LTMP), dental practi-
tioners, emergency room (ER) visits and inpatient admissions. South Korea is
shown to maintain equity in health care utilisation while Taiwan and Hong Kong
depict a slightly pro-rich bias, particularly in the use of outpatient service and visit
to western doctor, respectively.
Other authors have carried out comparative studies in health sector inequity over
time. Honda and Ohkusa (2003) examine health inequity employing Comprehen-
sive Survey of Living Condition in Japan (CSLCJ) for the periods of 1992, 1995 and
1998. This study estimates concentration indexes for health care utilisation proxied
by physician visits. They find a pro-rich inequity in health care utilisation before
1995 but not in the latter period. A similar study evaluates the change in equality
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in health and health care utilisation between urban and rural Chinese during the pe-
riod of economic transition (transition from command economy to market economy)
employing national survey data over the period of 1985 to 1993 (Liu et al.,1999).
In contrast to Honda and Ohkusa (2003) this study indicated a widening trend in
inequality in health status between urban and rural Chinese which is correlated with
increasing gaps in income and health care utilisation between them.
A community environment is also found to influence an individual’s access to
health care utilisation. A study carried out by Kirby and Keneda (2005) demon-
strates that living in a socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhood undermines
an individual’s probability of using health care and preventive services but increases
the likelihood of having unmet medical need. These authors argue that when disad-
vantaged groups of people reside densely in a particular area “disadvantage” itself
becomes a community specific characteristics to which they describe as “emergent
characteristics”. Similar evidence were found in a study carried out by Deaton and
Lubotsky (2003). This study investigates the effect of racial composition on mor-
tality rate across cities and states in the Unites States. Their results do not show
any positive influence of income inequality on mortality rate conditional on racial
composition. Therefore, these authors conclude that a positive correlation between
income inequality and mortality rate was confounded by the racial composition.
Empirical studies in inequality in health care utilisation are limited in the con-
text of developing or low-income countries (Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2000). However,
available studies do show a positive correlationship between socioeconomic variables
and the utilisation of health care services. Makinen et al. (2000) evaluate the
probability of obtaining care and receiving medicine in eight developing and tran-
sitional countries (Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay,
South Africa, Thailand and Zambia). They find a pro-rich bias in receiving care.
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However, this study did not find wealthy people to utilize private health care ser-
vices.
Another study compares the effect of socioeconomic characteristics and access
factor to health care providers on the use of two types of preventive services, im-
munisation and physical examination, among pre-school children from low-income
urban areas in the USA (Wan and Gray, 1978). Access factor is defined as the source
of regular use of care and health insurance status associated with children. Utilising
data from community health survey this study concludes that the impact of social
and access factors on utilisation of both types of services were similar. This study
reveals a significant difference in the impact of demographic variables (age, sex and
race) on the use of these services. Demographic variables depicted a stronger influ-
ence on the immunisation utilisation but only a moderate impact was found with
reference to physical examination.
The second strand of empirical studies focuses on inequity in health care utili-
sation by other non-income socioeconomic characteristics such as gender race and
ethnicities. The majority of these studies have focused on racial and ethnic differ-
ential in health care utilisation particularly with reference to inequity in the USA.
van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1992) examine the difference in the amount of
physician visit across Hispanic, black non-Hispanic and white non-Hispanic children
in USA and evaluate its determinants employing Health Interview Survey (HIS),
1979. This study finds a significant difference in physician visit across these social
groups. Additionally, it suggests that financial circumstances play an important role
in minority groups when it comes to whether or not visit a physician. In addition,
parental perception on health care need for their children influences this decision in
case of dominant groups.
Evidence from empirical works bolster that difference in health care utilisation
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across social groups is persistent in the USA. Harris et al. (2005) examine the
difference in the use of mental health care across nine racial/ethnic groups: White,
African American, American Indian / Alaskan native, Asian, Mexican, Central and
South American, Puerto Rican and other Hispanic-Latino. Using data from National
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) for the period of 2001-2003, they find that
minority groups (African American, Asian, Mexican, Central and South American,
and other Hispanic-Latino) utilise less mental health care services relative to the
non-Latino white. Cook et al. (2010) provide further evidence on racial differences
in access to mental health services and total mental health expenditure in the USA.
Black and Latino-white have less access to mental health care and thus they incur
lower mental health care expenditure relative to non-Latino white.
Some authors have investigated whether residential status affects disadvantaged
and dominant groups differently with respect to health care utilisation. Berdahl et
al. (2007) examine the access to health care services by non-Latino white (Mexican)
and Latino white between the non-metro and metro areas of residence in the USA.
Two types of care services as measured by physician visits and ambulatory care
have been examined in this study. Their results show Mexican being disadvantaged
in both measures of care relative to non-Latino white in both residential areas.
However, disparities in access to health care between these two groups were greater
in non-metro areas.
D’Anna et al. (2010) investigate the effects of perceived discrimination in receiv-
ing care and examine its relationship with racial/ethnic disparities in self-reported
physical and mental health status employing data from Californian Health Interview
Survey (CHIS). Two types of discrimination; discrimination based on racial/ethnic
/language (accent) and other discrimination are considered to examine such effects.
Findings from this study show negative effects of the former type of discrimination on
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self-related health status and it positively influences the functional limitation caused
by physical and mental problem in discriminated-against groups. However, these ef-
fects vary across race/ethnic groups, gender and socioeconomic position (SEP). They
find that the relationship between racial /ethnic minority status and poor health
decreases as the level of SES increases.
4.2.2 Health sector inequity in low-income countries
Inequity analysis in health care utilisation can be viewed differently in developing
than in developed countries because of the differences in their mix in finance and
provision of health care. On the supply side, inequality in access in developing coun-
tries can occur because of the uneven distribution of health care providers across
regions as well as the discriminatory behaviour against minority groups by health
care providers. For instance, Garimoi (2009) points out a better health condition
of urban relative to rural population even within a similar level of household in-
comes, indicating that uneven distribution of health care providers between urban
and rural areas can reinforce rural-urban inequity in health outcomes. Discrimina-
tory behaviour against minority groups by health care providers may also influence
inequity in health care utilisation even if the provision of health care services is
fairly distributed (Dommaraju et al., 2008; Babu et al. 2001). On the demand side,
differences in ability to pay undermine health care utilisation by poor and minority
groups. Leon and Walt (2001) argue that unequal access to health care between
poor and rich is a contributory factor in producing health inequality in low-income
countries.
Another contributing factor of health sector inequity in low-income countries
different from that in developed countries is in the mix of the financing sources.
In developed countries, health care is generally financed from four sources: taxes,
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social insurance, private insurance and OOP payments (Wagstaff and Doorslaer,
2001). The contribution of each source to the total health care finance varies across
countries. In developed countries, the majority of the population are employed in
the formal sector and their contribution via general taxation or social insurance
contribution, as well as via private insurance, will cover any future treatments. As
a result, they are less likely to face OOP payments when they are in need of health
care services. In developing countries, on the other hand, most of the population
relies on subsistence agricultural work for their livelihood and are less likely to afford
private health insurance. Private health insurance is basically negligible. Even in
a rapidly growing economy like India more than 95% of the population does not
have private health insurance (Ghosh, 2011). Additionally, low levels of tax revenue
are a constraint to the governments of these countries for allocating part of their
budget to the provision of health care services. For instance, the contribution of
the public sector on total health care expenditure in some sub-Saharan countries
is lower than 25% and the coverage of private insurance is limited (WHO, 2009).
According to WHO (2009), OOP payments stand as the single largest source of
health care financing in low-income countries and thus is an important factor to
take into account in the equity analysis of health care utilisation.
4.2.3 Wealth, health care utilisation and health outcomes
A low level of health care utilization by minority groups and deprived communities,
which can partly be attributed to their lower level of wealth, can lead to a relatively
inferior level of health outcomes in them. Banerjee et al. (2004) investigate the
correlation between wealth and health (self-reported health status as well as some
direct measures of health such as body mass index hemoglobin level etc.) employing
data from Indian village, Rajasthan. Their finding indicated that individuals from
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the lower third per capita income have, on average, lower levels self-reported health
status as well as other direct measures of health than those in the upper third
per capita income. This study also shows the quality of health care services to
appear positively correlated with individual health after controlling for access factor
(distance), wealth and demographic characteristics (age gender). An international
comparison of socioeconomic status and health supports the conclusion derived in
Banerjee et al. (2004). For instance, Anne and Deaton (2005) compare similar health
measures between people from an Indian village, Rajasthan and the African city,
Khayelitsha, where the latter being relatively well in terms of socioeconomic status.
Their results show African to have better height and body mass index compared to
Indians. However, they did not find subjective measures of health to be better among
African relative to Indians. Authors acknowledge this as a contradicting result and
argue that there are tendencies of better off people to report inferior health than
the poor people especially in developing countries. Positive correlationship between
health and wealth suggests that an economic growth alone may not lead to the
expected level of improvement in public health of a country in the absence of other
factor such as education and institutional improvements (Deaton 2006). Therefore,
not only the growth but an equitable distribution of income enhances public health.
Comparing income inequality and health outcomes across 22 developed countries,
The Equality Trust (an organization based in the UK) finds a higher infant mortality
rate and lower life expectancy in countries with more unequal income distributions
(The Equality Trust, 2013).
Deaton (2011) argues that childhood inequalities in social status such as parental
education and income are the key factors associated with adulthood health. There-
fore, public intervention that lessens the inequalities in parental circumstances may
lead to the reduction on health inequalities. There are several empirical studies that
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show deprived communities and minority ethnic groups are likely to have poorer
health outcomes such as life expectancy, child mortality rate and self-assessed health
status relative to the wealthiest or dominant group. For instance, African Ameri-
cans are found to have poorer health and higher mortality rates relative to whites
in the United States (Hummer, 1996; Kriger, 1987). In the United Kingdom, mi-
grants of South Asian descent have an ischaemic heart disease-related mortality rate
that is 1.5 times higher than that of the rest of the population (Charturbedi, 2003).
Mortality rate is higher among Scheduled Castes (SCS) and Scheduled Tribes (STS)
relative to the remaining population in India (see Baru et al., 2013; Subramanian et.
al., 2006).3 As in India, the privileged Tagadhari caste in Nepal have shown better
health indicators, measured as life expectancy and child mortality rates, relative to
those discriminated against groups such as Dalit and indigenous people (Bennet,
2005).4
4.2.4 Caste and health outcomes
An important but as yet less explored aspect of inequity analysis across social groups
is caste inequity in health. Although the caste system has been abolished in many
countries, including Nepal, it is believed to perpetuate social inequality in countries
with a historically caste-based society through the intersection of different socioeco-
nomic spheres such as economic, cultural, social and political.5 A caste system has
embedded a rigid social hierarchy that is stronger than social classifications such
as ethnicity or race ( Cox, 1944; Jeffrey, 2001). A caste system imposes a social
division of labour that limits low castes to low-paid manual jobs. This is something
3Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are two groups of historically disadvantaged people
recognized in the constitution of India.
4Dalit and indigenous people represent the Pani Nachalne and Matwali castes, respectively, in
the caste categories of this study.
5For instance, the ownership of agricultural land is still dominated by high castes in India
(Jaffrey, 2001).
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not likely to appear in other forms of social classifications. The direct implication of
this is that low castes are indirectly discouraged from obtaining a better education
and consequently have a lower income, therefore reinforcing the deficiency in health
variables. Low castes may also face direct occupational effects on their health since
they will be constrained to manual and more hazardous jobs. In India, lucrative
white-collar jobs are in the hands of the high-caste population (Jaffrey, 2001). Fig-
ure 4.1 shows that more than 80% of white-collar (professional and clerical) jobs
have been occupied by the dominant caste in Nepal.
Figure 4.1: White-collar jobs by dominant caste
Source: NLSS 2003 and 2010.
Inequity in health care utilisation across castes becomes acute as OOP stands as
the main source of health care financing. As low-caste groups end up with a rela-
tively inferior socioeconomic status they possibly forgo medical treatment or choose
poor-quality health care providers because of the impact that OOP expenditure has
on poverty. Kawachi et al. (2005) argue that inferior social capital in disadvantaged
groups relative to dominant groups contributes to differences in health care utilisa-
tion. Additionally, Deaton (2011) argues that childhood inequalities, inequalities in
parental circumstances such as income and education, as a key factor to influence
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an individual’s adulthood health. Therefore, caste-based stratification may depict
even a stronger impediment in utilising health care services and thus boosts inequity
in health outcomes relative to that arising in ethnic/racial groups.
There are few studies on caste inequities in health carried out in India and
Nepal. Roy and Howard (2007) look into the share of OOP payments over household
consumption and show that it increases with ability to pay. However, by comparing
this relationship with social codes, these authors show that SCS and STS spend less
in OOP payments compared to others. Dommaraju et al. (2008) evaluate the effect
of caste on child mortality rate and the utilisation of maternal health care services
in rural India. They show that low-caste children face a higher risk of death, while
low-caste women are less likely to use antenatal health care services compared with
the upper castes. Child malnutrition in India is also more common in SCS and
STS than in the rest of the population. Lower wealth, education and use of health
care services in these groups relative to that in dominant groups are found as major
factors that influence child nutritional outcome (Van de Poel and Speybroack, 2009).
To sum up, previous studies show that inequity in health care utilisation ex-
ists in all regions irrespective of their level of socioeconomic development. More
importantly, attention has not yet been given to caste inequity in health in Nepal,
a country that has experienced an age-old legally imposed caste-based division of
labour. Nepal, being one of the poorest countries in the world and one where health
care expenditure predominantly depended on OOP payments, is striving for health
care reform that promotes equity. Furthermore, none of the previous studies has
examined, at least to my knowledge, the determinants of health outcomes across
castes to see whether disadvantaged castes end up with inferior health outcomes
compared to dominant castes.
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4.3 Health care system in Nepal
Nepal has a commitment of providing primary health care (PHC) for all segments
of the population (Subedi, 1992). Nepal’s first long-term health plan (LTHP, 1975-
1990) was designed to ensure access to PHC for the entire population, particularly
targeting the rural population who had limited access to modern urban health care
facilities. LTHP had several strategic approaches - development of infrastructure,
community participation, multi-sectoral coordination, mobilizing resources, and de-
centralization of planning and management of health care - all in order to achieve
universal coverage of PHC services (WHO, 2007). The second long-term health plan
(II-LTHP, 1997-2017) further focused on socially marginalized and underprivileged
groups of people such as women, children, the rural population and the poor. The
II-LTHP explicitly defined 20 essential health care services (EHCS) to be provided
for the effective delivery of PHC to these target groups (ibid).
Nepal’s recent periodic development plans set the priority of the sectoral pro-
grams and provided a base for allocating funds across ministries from the national
budget and integrating the health policies described above. For instance, the ninth
plan (1996-2001) set poverty eradication as its main development objective and in-
troduced target programs to reduce poverty. This periodic plan vowed to improve
equity while implementing health-related programs. In particular, economically and
socially disadvantaged castes and communities were described as the target groups
in implementing the health sector programs. This plan employs an integrated ap-
proach for health care services to be provided by district hospitals, primary health
care centres, health posts and sub-health posts. Health posts and sub-health posts
are the lowest level of health care providers and are extensively networked through-
out the country. These provide primary care and referral services at village level.
The objective of poverty alleviation was further emphasized in the tenth plan
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(2002-2007) by declaring poverty eradication as the sole development objective.6 In
particular, it acknowledges gender and caste/ethnic disparities in poverty and again
includes them in the target group.
There have been several policy interventions within the tenth periodic plan to
achieve EHCS goals effectively. One of these was the introduction of the Nepal
Health Sector Program-Implementation Plan (NHSP-IP) 2004-2009. NHSP-IP has
two features. First, it aims to improve coverage and increase the quality of EHCS
while at the same time promoting access. Second, additional actions are laid over the
EHCS program by providing financial support to the poor and vulnerable segment of
the population (Ministry of Health/Nepal, 2006). In particular, NHSP-IP imposes
new actions over EHCS such as the identification of the poor, expansion of EHCS,
subsidized drugs and services and the introduction of social safety net programs.
As a result, for instance, free treatment was provided to the poor to tackle diseases
such as leprosy, TB, HIV/AIDS and malaria.
In addition, user fees for primary health care services provided by health posts
and sub-health posts were abolished in 2007 throughout the country for the poor
(those falling under the income poverty line) and for the entire population in the
22 districts with the lowest human development indicator (HDI). It was extended
to primary health care centres in 2009. The poor were also offered outpatient,
inpatient, emergency services and essential medicines at district-level hospitals free
of cost (Ministerial Leadership Initiatives, 2010).
Despite all these provisions, health care services in Nepal are still paid for by users
6The tenth plan was itself the replication of country’s strategic plans in alleviating poverty,
which is also known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The implementation of
target groups programs were more explicitly explained in this plan document. This had four pillars
of development strategies to achieve the objective of poverty alleviation: (a) pro-poor economic
growth, (b) equitable access to social and economic infrastructures for poor and marginalized
groups, (c) social inclusion and target programs and (d) improved governance. Pillars (b) and (c)
clearly indicate the national initiative to empower socially and economically disadvantaged groups.
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both in the public and private sector, although the cost of utilisation significantly
varies between them. The private sector is more expensive relative to the public
sector; therefore, the poor and disadvantaged are less able to utilize private health
care services and rely mainly on care provided by the public sector (WHO, 2007).
4.3.1 Health care providers
Nepal had adopted a system of public-private partnership in providing health care
services. The private sector provides health care services through hospitals, nursing
homes and clinics. However, these are mainly focused in the capital (almost half
of them are based in Kathmandu), regional headquarters and other urban areas.
Figure 4.2 below shows that more than 50% of private health care providers are
Figure 4.2: Regional distribution of health care providers
situated only in the central region, while only 1% are based in the far western
region. Public sector health care providers are almost proportionately distributed
across all regions. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also provide health care
services, albeit on a negligible scale. If economically disadvantaged people are less
able to afford private health care services, given that private health care providers
charge higher rates, equity in the utilisation of health care services predominantly
relies on provision by the public sector to make sure services are provided across
income groups and also across regions (urban versus rural presence of providers).
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4.3.2 Health Care Finance
The health care sector in Nepal is financed by the government and households OOP
expenses (Hotchkiss et al., 1998). However, OOP expenditure is predominant in the
share of health care expenditure. In 2002/3, OOP expenses accounted for 62.5% of
total health care expenditure, whereas governmental contribution was 16.8%. The
remaining health care expenditure was borne by External Development Partners
(EDPs) (WHO, 2007). The share of OOP expenses has marginally decreased over
time. It accounted for 60.5% of total health care expenditure in 2009 relative to
62.5% in 2003 (Ministry of Health and Population, 2009).7 The OOP expenses
come from relatively well-off people. The richest 5% spent 7.2% of their household
budget, whereas the poorest 5% spent only 2.6% (WHO, 2007).
Figure 4.3: Total health care expenditure growth rate (2000-2009).
Total health expenditure (THE) is increasing over time. Figure 4.3 shows that
the highest growth rate was achieved in 2003/04, while the lowest was in 2006/07.
On average, the THE growth rate over the period of 2000/01 to 2008/09 was 11.8%.
However, the average growth rate in real terms for the same period accounts for less
than half of the nominal rate.
Share of government spending on total health care finance was in increasing
7A comparison of OOP expenses on a yearly basis is not possible since OOP expenses can only
be extracted from the National Household Surveys conducted in 2003 and 2010.
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trend until financial year 2003/04 but has been decreased in the consecutive years.
Eventually there is approximately 5% reduction in the government contribution on
THE over the period of 2000/01-2008/09 (decreased to 23% in 2008/09 from 27.5%
in 2000/01). Total health care expenditure in relation to the gross domestic products
(GDP) remains almost constant throughout the period accounting approximately
5% of total GDP (see figures 4.4 and 4.5).
Figure 4.4: Public sector contribution on
total health expenditure
Figure 4.5: Total health care expenditure
as % of GDP
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Inequity in health care utilisation
This study, first tests for the presence of inequity in health care utilisation across
castes in Nepal. It examines differences in health care utilisation, proxied by OOP
expenditure arising for those individuals that have the same needs. However, many
individuals did not have OOP expenses as they did not suffer from any illness and
thus it is imputed as zero. This imputation strategy led to a sample with many
zeros in dependent variable. A tobit regression model that accounts for many zeros
in predicting expected mean value of OOP expenses is used for this reason. This
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model allows non-respondents of OOP expenses to remain in the sample and avoids
the issue of sample selection bias. Defining caste categories j = t,m, p (t=Tagadhari,
m= Matwali and p=Pani Nachalne) a tobit regression model (Wooldridge, 2002)







0 if hc∗i ≤ 0
(4.1)
where hc∗i is the latent variable: hc
∗
i = α+ βhi + δXi + ηCji + ui; ui ∼ N(0, 1)
Need for health care utilisation is defined by binary variables that capture if
individuals had any chronic illness, non-chronic illness and were not ill. These
variables take value one if an individual falls in each categories and zero otherwise.
In addition, two other variables are constructed to capture the effect of severity of
illness for those who reported as facing chronic illness. The first variable represents
the years of chronic illness started which is divided into four categories while the
second is the work-missed days due to the chronic illness. The latter variable is
classified into three categories.8
Xi contains a set of explanatory variables including socioeconomic (income and
education), demographic (age, sex, marital status), geographical (rural/urban and
district dummies) and household size variables associated with an individual i. ui
represents the normally distributed error term associated with individual i. The
definition of the variables is described in Appendix 3.A.9
Since the government abolished user fees in some districts and the utilisation of
health care in this analysis is proxied by OOP payments, the model above is likely
8Both the year of illness started and work-missed variables are available only for those who face
chronic illness.
9Two proxies are used for income variable: per capita food and frequently purchased non-food
expenses and aggregate household data for the price of land holding.
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to produce biased results.10 Results could be misleading if there is a significant
difference among castes in utilising such free services. Information on access to free
care is not available. To correct for this potential bias, a binary variable, Lhdi,
has been included as an additional explanatory variable in the regression model.
Lhdi has a value of one if an individual belongs to one of the 22 districts of Nepal
associated with the lowest HDI and zero otherwise.
FollowingWagstaff and Doorsalaer (2002) caste-inequity in health care utilisation





αt + βthi + δtXi + ui if caste is t,
αm + βmhi + δmXi + ui if caste is m,
αp + βphi + δpXi + ui if caste is p,
(4.2)
where α is a constant term and β is the coefficients for binary variables repre-
senting need for health care utilisation (Other illness as reference category).11 If
individuals with similar needs were treated alike irrespective of their caste associ-
ation the sum of the two coefficients will be equal to each categories; αt + βt =
αm+βm = αp+βp. Alternatively, a single equation model with interaction between
caste and need variables can be estimated as,
hc∗i = π0 + π1Cji + π2hi + π3Cjihi + π4Xi + ui (4.3)
where, Cji is caste binary variables (Tagadhari, t as reference group) and null hy-
10The three-year interim plan (2007/08-2009/10) announced the abolishment of user fees for
health care services provided by sub-health posts, health posts and district-level health care centres
in the 22 districts with low HDI. The list of districts with different HDI levels is presented in
Appendix 1.B.
11Not ill variable could be a suitable reference category since chronic illness and other illness
both represents need for health care utilisation. However, this was not possible since this variable
has all zeros in dependent variables.
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pothesis of π1 = 0 and π3 = 0 can be tested for the presence of caste inequity in
health care utilisation.
4.4.2 Caste differential on health outcomes
Following the test of caste inequity in health care utilisation, this study extends
the estimation strategy to evaluate the determinants of caste differential in health
outcomes. In particular, this part looks into whether low castes end up having lower
health outcomes relative to the dominant caste. Self-assessed health (SAH) is used
as a measure of health outcome and it is dependent variable. SAH has a category s
taking value 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively for Very poor, Poor, Fair and Good in 2003
and Poor, Fair, Good and Excellent in 2010.
The definition in SAH changed between 2003 and 2010. In 2003 there were
four possible alternative responses: Very Poor, Poor, Fair and Good to assess own
health status. However, in the 2010 wave SAH was categorized as Poor, Fair, Good
and Excellent. This introduces a constraint to make a comparison and draw any
conclusion on how perceiving health across castes might have changed over time.
However, the change of wording in SAH categories only restricts to analyse the
dynamics of caste-associated SAH but still allows to evaluate the impact of caste on
health outcomes. Therefore, it is not considered as a crucial limitation, at least for
the purpose of this study.
Consider an ordered probit model (OPM) (Wooldridge, 2002) for the ordered
responses s using a latent variable model specification.
y∗i = γXi + λCj + ei, ei ∼ N(0, 1), (4.4)
where y∗i is a latent variable representing true health of an individual i that belongs
to caste j = t,m, p, Xi is the set of explanatory variables associated with individual
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i, γ is the vector of estimated parameters12, Ci are dummy variables for identifying
caste, λ represents differences in health status among castes and ei is the error term
associated with individual i.
Consider cut points (threshold parameters) µ1 < µ2 < µ3 such that
y = 1, if y∗ ≤ µ1,
y = 2, if µ1 < y
∗ ≤ µ2,
y = 3, if µ2 < y
∗ ≤ µ3,
y = 4, if y∗ > µ3.
The conditional distribution of y∗ given X and C can be computed as
P (y = 1|X,C) = P (y∗ ≤ µ1|X,C) = P (γX + λC + e ≤ µ1|X,C) = Φ(µ1 − γX − λC),
P (y = 2|X,C) = P (µ1 < y
∗ ≤ µ2|X,C) = Φ(µ2 − γX − λC)− Φ(µ1 − γX − λC),
P (y = 3|X,C) = P (µ2 < y
∗ ≤ µ3|X,C) = Φ(µ3 − γX − λC)− Φ(µ2 − γX − λC),
P (y = 4|X,C) = P (y∗ > µ3|X,C) = 1− Φ(µ3 − γX − λC)
where Φ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
Equation 4.4 assumes identical cut points for all individuals. Which implies
that estimated coefficients for response variables do not varry across sub-samples.
However, recent literature suggests that individuals heterogeneity in perceiving own
health status can affect thresholds and thus the traditional OPM might produce
spurious results (Greene et al., 2008; Pudney and Shields, 2000). In fact a test
for the parallel regression line assumption rejects the null hypothesis of equality
of coefficients across response categories. Thus a generalized ordered probit model
(GOPM) has been estimated in order to avoid possible bias in OPM.
12Omitted categories for binary variables are identically used as those in the regression model.
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GOPM allows cut points to depend on covariates,
µis = µ˜s + ψsXi + ξsCi, (4.5)
where ψs and ξs represents the influence of covariates on cut points and µ˜ repre-
sents cut points under the assumption of parallell regression line (OPM). Following
equation (4.5) the cumulative probability of GOPM can be written as
Prob(y ≤ s|X) = Φ(µ˜s + (ψs − β)X + (ξs − λ)C). (4.6)
This approach estimates 3 binary probit models. The first model (Model 1)
estimates SAH category 1 vs. SAH categories 2, 3 and 4; the second model (Model
2) estimates categories 1 and 2 vs. categories 3 and 4, and finally the last model
(Model 3) estimates categories 1, 2 and 3 vs. category 4.
4.5 Data and variable specification
4.5.1 Data
This study employs two waves of the National Living Standards Survey (NLSS) data
from Nepal carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal (CBS/N) in tech-
nical support of the World Bank. The first survey, carried out in 2003, collected
information from 5240 households (28110 individuals). The second survey, carried
out in 2010, provides information for 5998 households (28670 individuals). Both
surveys include a wide array of economic, demographic and health-related informa-
tion both at the household and the individual level. With particular reference to
health-related information, both surveys incorporate information such as whether
individuals suffer from any chronic illness, and whether household members have
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faced any diseases, injury or illness in the past month. Information is also provided
on whether the individuals who had an illness consulted health care providers and,
if so, the type of health care providers consulted. Cost incurred in receiving care
in current year is reported by cost components such as consultation fees, medicine
cost, travel cost and other expenses in both surveys. This study uses subsamples of
19490 and 20979 individuals in 2003 and 2010, respectively. There is a slight drop
in sample size used in this analysis relative to the full sample because of missing
information on SAH categories. It is mainly because of some individuals were not
presented at the time of survey and it was not possible for respondents to state other
individual’s SAH status.
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table
4.1 for 2003 and Table 4.2 for 2010. Both tables show a prima-facie evidence that
the dominant caste, Tagadhari, enjoys a relatively better socioeconomic position as
measured in log of income, price of landholding and has a higher level of educational
attainment than the other groups.13 The Pani Nachalne group, which is considered
to be the most marginalized group and was also considered untouchable (described
as “polluting” people in terms of ritual purity under the Hindu system), displays the
lowest level of socioeconomic status. The Matwali is situated on the intermediate
level.
The Tagadhari appeared to spend a considerably higher amount on health care
services than the other two groups in both periods. This group spends 9.1% (.832-
.741) more than the national average and 29.7% (.832-.535) more than the amount
spent by the Matwali group, which exhibited the lowest average amount of health
care expenditure in 2003.
OOP differentials between the Tagadhari and Matwali is further widened in
13Income is proxied by the sum of per capita food expenses and frequently purchased non-food
expenses.
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Figure 4.6: OOP Expenses by castes
2010 accounting 40% (1.61-1.21) relative to 29.7% in 2003. However, there is a
considerable contraction in the gaps of OOP expenses between the Tagadhari and
Pani Nachalne groups in this period. (see figure 4.6).14
In 2003, 59.2% of respondents reported their SAH status as Good, followed by
39% reporting Fair and 1.7% reporting Poor SAH. (SAH is categorized as Very
poor, Poor, Fair and Good in 2003). The dominant group reports present health
status as Good, slightly higher than the national average as well as than the other
groups. The Pani Nachalne group has the lowest proportion of individuals reporting
Good health.
In contrast to 2003, the Tagadhari group reported Excellent SAH lower than
other caste groups in 2010. The proportion of reporting Excellent SAH in this
period is the highest for the Matwali group. The Matwali group displays 64.8%,
33.5% and 1.6% in Excellent, Good and Fair Sah categories, respectively. Same
measures accont for 55.4%, 42.1% and 2.4% for the Pani Nachalne and 53.9%,
43.9% and 2.1% in case of Tagadhari group. A negiligble proportion of individuals
have reported their SAH status being in the lowest categories (Very poor in 2003
and Poor in 2010) in both periods. Figure 4.7 shows a caste comparison of SAH for




Figure 4.7: Comparison of health status by castes
The proportion of individuals with illnesses, which is proxied for need for health
care utilization in this model, varies across castes. The Tagadhari group reports
a higher proportion of having chronic illness in both periods relative to other two
caste groups in comparison. For instance, 7.1% and 13.3% individuals from this
caste group has reported to have chronic illness in 2003 and 2010, respectively.
These measures stand at 4.8% and 10% for the Matwali and 5.7% and 10.6% in
case of the Pani Nachalne group. On the other hand, the proportion of individuals
reporting other illness (non-chronic) is higher for both comparison groups than the
Tagadhari group in 2010. This measure is almost similar across casts in 2003.
The duration of chronic illness and work missed due to this vary across castes.
The Tagadhari group reports to face chronic illness for longer period than other
caste groups in both periods. Similarly, the Tagadhari also reports more work days
missed due to chronic illness relative to other castes. In 2003, 96.9%, 1.4% and
1.7% individuals from the Tagadhari group reported missing work by one week, one
month and more than one month, respectively. The same measure stands at 97.8%,
1.1% and 1.1% for the Matwali and 96.9%, 1.8% and 1.3% for the Pani Nachalne
caste. A similar pattern of work missed due to chronic illness across caste groups
can be observed in 2010.
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4.5.2 Variable specification
This study estimates a tobit model for assessing caste inequity in health care utiliza-
tion and ordered probit as well as generalised ordered probit models to evaluate the
impact of caste on health outcomes. The first model uses the log of OOP expenses
as the depended variable representing the sum of consultation, diagnosis, medicines
and travel cost. A direct measure of utilization such as physician visit, number
of hospital visit or use of outpatient or ambulatory care services could represent a
more appropriate measure for health care utilisation compared to the use of OOP
expenses as proxy for these measures. However, this information is not available in
data set used in this analysis. The second model uses subjective measures of health
status (SAH) as the dependent variable. SAH is extensively used in the field of
public health research and empirical evidence have shown that SAH and objective
health status are positively correlated (Wu et al., 2013). In this analysis SAH is
categorised as Very poor, Poor, Fair and Good in 2003 while there is a slight change
in the wording of SAH categories in 2010, as mentioned earlier.
The covariates are presented in Appendix 3.A. The selections of covariates are
similar to those already used in empirical works. The categorical age variables are
used to capture the age effect on the occurrences of illnesses. These samples repre-
sent individuals with all age categories. Age category less than 34 years is used as
the reference group since very few individuals in the lower age group, particularly
within the age of 20 years, have reported to face chronic illness which is an important
variable to influence both dependent variables used in this analysis.15 Two variables
are used as the proxy for household income. Lincome is the log of household gross
income proxied by the sum of food expenses and frequently purchased non-food ex-
penditure by households. Since only household consumption may not reflect their
15Reference age category includes 20.27% and 17% of individuals facing chronic illness in 2003
and 2010, respectively.
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actual wealth status an additional variable is used to control for income variation
across households. The second proxy for household income is the price of land hold-
ings by each household. These variables are crucial in explaining the OOP expenses
as well as health status since wealthier people may not only have higher ability or
willingness to pay for health care services but they may also have better knowledge
about health care. Similarly, as the number of individual in a household lessens
the resources available per person a continuous variable to represent household size,
Hhsize, has also been included as an additional covariate.
Rural and district dummies are included to capture the possible behavioural
differences in individuals living in different districts and rural/urban areas. These
variables may also capture the rural/urban and geographical heterogeneity in the
supply of health care services. Gender and marital status are also included since
both variables can influence health.
Education is used as an additional covariate because it may not only influence
efficiency in the production of health but also the propensity of seeking care. Ed-
ucation variables are computed from the highest level of schooling completed by
an individual. However, those who did not reported the highest level of schooling
completed but responded as they never attended school in the past in the follow-
ing survey questionnaire their educational level has been imputed as zero. Four
categories of the level of education are used: illiterate (individuals without formal
education), primary (individuals having 1-5 years of schooling), high school (indi-
viduals with 6-10 years of schooling) and university (individuals with more than ten
years of schooling).
Finally, other covariates in this study include three types of binary variables
to capture the need for health care utilisation. The first variable, chronic illness
variable, carries value of 1 if an individuals has reported having chronic illness and
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0, otherwise. Other illness variables contains value 1 if an individual reports having
illness other than chronic illness and 0, otherwise. Not ill variables has value 1
if an individual reports to have neither types of illness and 0, otherwise. It has
also been acknowledged that the severity of illness can have influences on health
care utilization as well as on health outcomes. Therefore, two types of additional
variables are used to capture these effects. The first represents the duration that
an individual is suffering from chronic illness which is divided into four categories:
suffered from one or less year, less than five years, less than ten years and more
than ten years. The second is the work- days missed due to the chronic illness. This
variable represents three categories: work missed less than a week, more than a week
but less than a month and work missed more than a month.
4.6 Empirical results
4.6.1 Equity analysis
4.6.1.1 Tobit regression results
This study uses censored regression model to analyse inequity in health care across
castes. Regression results are listed in Table 4.3 for 2003 and in Table 4.4 for 2010.
Results from the Tagadhari, Matwali and Pani Nachalne sub-samples are reported
in columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 in these tables represent
results from the pooled sample with caste dummies and the interaction between
caste dummies and need variables as additional covariates, respectively. Coefficients
for district dummies are not presented in order to save space.
In 2003, results show that log of income, chronic illness and the severity of illness
(captured by work missed days due to illness) have significant positive impact on
health care utilisation by each caste groups although the magnitudes of each variable
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vary across castes. Log of income coefficient is considerably high in theMatwali sub-
sample implying that this caste has higher income elasticity to health care utilisation
than the others. Chronic illness coefficient is the highest for the Tagadhari group.
The Pani Nachane group shows the lowest and statistically insignificant coefficient
for chronic illness in this period. Rural and married coefficients are statistically
significant only in Tagadhari sub-sample while Lhdi coefficient is significant only in
the Matwali sub-sample. The remaining control variables generally show statisti-
cally insignificant results. Results from pooled sample (column 4) show that both
castes, the Matwali and Pani Nachalne, have a negative and statistically significant
coefficient. In the fifth column, both castes show negative coefficients for interac-
tion term (caste dummies and need variables) indicating that low castes spend less
relative to the dominant caste for the treatment of chronic illness relative to other
illness. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant for Matwali. In the
same column caste variables show negative coefficients but only the the Matwali
coefficient is statistically significant. Therefore, in line with the hypothesis outlined
in section 4.4 results indicate a presence of caste inequity in health care utilisation
in Nepal which favours the dominant group.
Results for 2010 are presented in Table 4.4. There is a significant drop in the
impact of income on health care utilisation. These coefficients other than forMatwali
are statistically significant. Rural and married variables depict a similar trend in
influencing health care utilisation as in 2003. Additionally, household size variable
became statistically significant in this period which shows a positive impact on
health care utilisation. Lhdi coefficients other than in pooled sample are statistically
insignificant in this period.
As in 2003, the severity of illness variables (captured by work missed days due
to illness) show significant positive impact on health care utilisation in this period.
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Additionally, other proxy for severity of illness (years of illness started) also shows
a statistically significant coefficient for the Tagadhari and Matwali sub-samples in
this period. It shows that the longer the duration of illness the lower the usilisation
of health care services. It is not surprising since recent illness requires various
diagnostic and consultation cost along with other costs such as medicine and travel
expenses which may not require in the same level for the older illness. Chronic
illness coefficients considerably increased in this period relative to 2003. In contrast
to 2003, the Matwali caste shows the highest coefficients for chronic illness. In the
fourth column, caste variables show similar coefficients as in 2003 implying that
both castes in comparison utilise less health care services compared to the dominant
caste. In the fifth column, results show that interaction coefficients for both castes
are negative but this coefficient for the Matwali caste is not statistically significant.
In the same column, both castes show negative coefficients. However, the Pani
Nachalne is not statistically significant. The results for 2010 show that both castes
the Matwali and Pani Nachalne, seem to fare inequity in health care utilisation
compared to the dominant caste. Although not comparable, the magnitudes of
caste-inequity in health care utilisation between two periods indicates that it is
decreasing over time.
4.6.1.2 Marginal effects
This subsection analyses marginal effects to see how each variables are likely to in-
fluence health care utilisation. As this study aims to evaluate caste differentials in
OOP expenses for health care services marginal effects conditional on being uncen-
sored (those with positive OOP expenses) are reported in Table 4.5 for both periods.
Column 1 in this table reports marginal effects without interacting caste and need
variables followed by results from interaction model in column 3 for 2003. Same
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results for 2010 are presented in columns 3 and 4.
Results show that an increase in the log of income by 1% is likely to increase
OOP expenses approximately by 2% in 2003. The impact of log of income on OOP
expenses is dropped approximately to half in the latter period. These coefficients
are significant at 1% level. Caste variables show negative coefficients in both periods
indicating that low castes, the Matwali and Pani Nachalne, are likely to spend less
relative to the dominant caste, Tagadhari. While interaction terms are included
as additional control variables, the Matwali coefficient slightly drops in 2003 but
increases in the latter period while the Pani Nachalne coefficients become statisti-
cally insignificant in both periods. Interaction term (interaction with chronic illness)
coefficients are negative and statistically significant for the Pani Nachalne but not
for Matwali. It implies that the lowest caste, Pani Nachalne, spends less in face of
illness whereas the intermediate caste, Matwali, spends less as they face less illness
relative to the Tagadhari group.
As expected, Lhdi variable showed negative coefficients in both periods implying
that residing in the districts associated with low levels of HDI are likely to spend
less in health care utilisation relative to those who live in districts with better HDI.
These coefficients are significant at 5% level in both periods. In the latter period,
Lhdi ciefficients become positive. It was not expected since government announced
to abolish users fees in these districts. One could expect the Lhdi coefficient to
increase in the latter period as government announced to provide health care services
free of cost in these districts. It indicates that the government policy of abolishment
of user fees has not been effective.
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4.6.2 The impact of caste on SAH
In this section I proceed to examine whether there exists a caste influence on health
outcomes. The objective of this additional estimation strategy is to examine whether
historically discriminated-against groups end up in a relatively inferior level of SAH
relative to the dominant group. The ratio of OOP health care expenditure over
income instead of the log of income is used in these models (referred to as OOP
ratio). All other explanatory variables are the same as before. Results from the
OPM are listed in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 for 2003 and 2010, respectively. Each column
represents the marginal effect on the probability of reporting s, where s = Very
poor, Poor, Fair and Good for columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Results in Table 4.6 for 2003 show that OOP ratios are negatively correlated
with Good but positively correlated with Fair health status. However, these coef-
ficients are statistically insignificant. Rural inhabitants and individuals from larger
households are likely to report their health status as Fair and less likely to report
as Good. These results were expected since rural population may have less access to
health care services. In addition, both of these variables can minimise the utilisa-
tion of health care services via income effect which might led to the inferior health
status with them. Male and married people are likely to report better health sta-
tus compared to female and unmarried people. No significant difference between
the residence of low HDI districts and others is found in terms of reporting health
status.
As expected, chronically ill individuals are likely to report their SAH as Very
poor, Poor and Fair and less likely to report as Good. On the other hand, those
who were ever ill report better health status. All coefficients for age categorical
variables show a positive sign for the lower three SAH categories but a negative sign
for SAH status categorised as Good. These coefficients are statistically significant
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at 1% level. It implies that elders are likely to report inferior health status relative
to those younger than 35 years of age (reference category).
Years of illness started variables show expected but statistically insignificant
results while work missed variables are as per the expectation and statistically sig-
nificant. It shows that persons who missed work more than a week are less likely to
report their health status as Good relative to those who missed work less than a week
due to chronic illness. Finally, both cast variables depicted positive and statistically
significant coefficients for inferior SAH (Very poor, Poor and Fair) but negative
coefficients for better SAH (Good) indicating that historically discriminated-against
caste groups are likely to end up in an inferior health outcomes.
In 2010, the effects of OOP ratios on SAH show a similar effect as in 2003.
The coefficients for OOP ratio are statistically significant at 1% level in this period.
Similarly, education, age, chronic illness, not ill and severity of illness (years of illness
started and work missed variables) variables show a similar behaviour as in 2003.
The Pani Nachalne caste shows negative coefficient for Excellent SAH and positive
coefficients for lower three SAH categories. These coefficients are significant at 5%
level. In contrast, the Matwali coefficients are opposite for Excellent and negative
for all other SAH categories and are statistically significant at 1% level. These
results are indicative of a significant decrease in caste inequity in health outcomes
over time. However, the lowest caste (Pani Nachalne) still lags behind the dominant
caste in terms of health outcomes. The intemediate caste, Matwali, seems to have
a considerable improvement in health outcomes over time superseding even to the
dominant caste, Tagadhari.
As discussed in section 4.4, OPM is based on proportional odds or the parallel
line regression assumption. In other words, OPM assumes that the coefficients that
describe the relationship between dependent and response variables are constant
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across categories. However, there may be group differences in perceiving own health
status across castes. A likelihood ratio test is carried out to evaluate whether the
parallel regression assumption holds. The null hypothesis is that of identical coeffi-
cients of explanatory variables across categories. The test rejects the null hypothesis,
suggesting that the assumption of parallel line regression is violated.16 Therefore a
GOPM, that allows coefficients for explanatory variables to vary across categories,
is estimated. Results are presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, respectively, for 2003 and
2010. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients.
Consider Model 1 for 2003, which estimates a probit in which the dependent
variable equals to 1 if individuals report SAH as Very Poor and 0 if they report
Poor, Fair and Good. Due to very few respondents reporting their health status
as Very Poor, many variables have been dropped in this model, resulting in 4747
out of total 19490 observations. Coefficients for explanatory variables other than
severity of illness variables generally appear to be statistically insignificant. Severity
of illness variables show a positive coefficients indicating that individuals with severe
illness have a Very poor health status.
Model 2 estimates a probit in which the dependent variables equals to 1 if in-
dividuals report SAH as Very Poor and Poor and 0 if they report Fair and Good.
Lhdi and chronic illness variables show positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cients. Lhdi coefficient is significant at 1% level while the chronic illness coefficnt is
significant at 5% level. These results indicate that those living in districts with low
HDI and chronically ill are likely to report Very poor and Poor SAH relative to those
living in districts with better HDI and those without chronic illness. Similarly, the
coefficient for not ill variable shows an opposite sign to the coefficient for chronically
16STATA could not report likelihood ratio test for the identical coefficients for explanatory
variables while district dummies were used as covariates possibly due to the larger number of
explanatory variables (100 variables including 76 district dummies). Therefore, district dummies
are aggregated to six regional dummies as per the administrative division of Nepal.
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ill and is significant at 1% level.
Age and education variables also show expected results. These results indicate
that elders are more likely to report Very poor and Poor SAH relative to younger
people while educated people are less likely report these SAH compared to those with
no education. Years of illness started variables show unexpected but statistically
insignificant results. Work missed variables depicted positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficients implying that those who missed more days due to chronic illness
are likely to report inferior SAH. Both castes coefficients do not appear statistically
significant in this model.
Model 3 estimates the probability of reporting SAH as Very Poor, Poor and Fair
relative to Good. The probit model has the dependent variable a dummy equal to
1 if SAH is Very Poor, Poor and Fair and 0 if SAH is Good. Results from this
models follow the pattern of Model 2 in terms of the sign of estimated coefficients
but a considerable increase in magnitudes. The levels of significance have also been
considerably improved in this model. Both caste variables show positive coefficients.
However, the Matwali coefficient is not statistically significant in this model. This
indicates that historically discriminated-against castes, especially the lowest caste,
are less likely report their health status as Good compared to the dominant caste.
In 2010, the OOP ratio coefficient is statistically significant only in Model 2. As
in 2003, many variables are dropped in Model 1 and most of the coefficients are
not statistically significant. Coefficients for married dummy, education and Pani
Nachalne caste variables are statistically significant at 5% level which are consistent,
in terms of the sign, with the coefficients obtained in 2003.
In Model 2, OOP ratio, chronic illness, married and not ill dummy variables
show statistically significant coefficients (significant at 1% level). The former two
variables show positive coefficients which implies that individuals who spend a larger
153
amount of OOP for health care services and are chronically ill are likely to report
inferior SAH relative to those who spend less and are not chronically ill. Coefficients
for age variables are positive and statisically significant in general suggesting that
elders report an inferior health status compred to those younger than 35 years of
age (reference category). Consistent with the 2003 results all education variables
show negative and statistically significant results. It implies that educated people
are less likely to report inferior health status relative to those with no education.
Work missed variables show again statistically significant positive coefficients. Years
of illness started variables became statistically significant in this period. It shows
that the higher the years of illness started the lesser is likely to report inferior SAH.
Both caste variables show a positive but statistically insignificant coefficients in this
model.
Model 3 follows similar pattern of results obtained from model 2. The magni-
tudes of estimated coefficients have considerably increased. In contrast to 2003, the
Matwali caste shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The Pani
Nachalne however continues to show a positive sign, albeit less in magnitude of
the coefficient as well as the level of significance. These results suggest that caste
inequity in health outcomes has decreased over time. However, the lowest caste is
still not able catch up other castes in terms of health outcomes.
4.7 Conclusion
This study evaluates the inequity in health care utilisation and examines the determi-
nants of SAH across castes in Nepal, which had age-old legally imposed caste-based
social divisions in the past. It finds that historically discriminated-against castes
utilise considerably fewer health care services compared to the dominant caste in
both periods. This indicates low castes face financial impediments to obtaining
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health care services. Low castes may opt for lower-quality and cheaper health care
services, or they may not complete a full course of medication or treatment due to
the financial constraints they face.
An important finding of this study is that a significant portion of caste dif-
ferentials in OOP expenses for health care services cannot be explained by caste
differences in need variables. Even after controlling for illness, caste differentials
in health care utilisation remain significant in both periods with some decrease in
magnitudes. Since both samples do not include same respondents an explicit com-
parison of caste inequity between the two periods may not be possible. However,
these results are indicative of decrease in caste inequity over time.
Additionally, a positive relationship between household income and the utilisa-
tion of health care services indicates a clear link between income inequality and
inequity in the utilisation of health care services. For instance, a relative decrease
in caste differential in household income in the latter has has led to lower gaps in
the utilisation of health care services. Therefore policies that reduce variance in
household income positively contribute to the reduction of caste inequity in health
care utilisation in Nepal.
This study also finds that historically discriminated-against casts end up in infe-
rior health outcomes. Both castes showed Very poor and Poor health status relative
to the dominant caste in the first period of study. In the second period, caste in-
equities in health outcomes between the dominant and intermediate castes have been
reversed. The lowest caste indicated poor health relative to the dominant caste even
in this period albeit there is a significant decrease in its magnitudes.
Finally, whether the government health policy interventions had any effect in
reducing caste inequity should be discussed with caution. Nevertheless, this study
did not carry out a comparative analysis between the districts with low HDI, where
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government abolished user fees, and the rest of the country; it is found that OOP
expenses for health care services have relatively increased in those districts with low
HDI in the second period. This indicates that inhabitants of those districts might
not have used health care services free of cost as announced by the government.
Therefore, it can be argued that, though not precisely, the government policy of
waiving fees may not have any positive effect on health care utilisation by low
castes or by the poor segment of population.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics: 2003
Variable All Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Log OOP .741(.015) .711 .771 .832(.021) .790 .874 .535(.025) .484 .586 .734(.033) .668 .799
Lincome 9.27(.003) 9.26 9.27 9.39(.004) 9.38 9.40 9.20(.008) 9.18 9.22 8.99(.008) 8.97 9.01
Lnholding(’00000) 120(4) 112 129 165(7) 150 181 72(3) 65 78 49(2) 45 53
Rural .822(.002) .817 .827 .769(.004) .761 .777 .918(.003) .910 .925 .858(.005) .847 .869
Male .474(.003) .467 .481 .474(.004) .464 .483 .475(.007) .461 .489 .471(.008) .455 .487
Married .428(.003) .421 .435 .437(.004) .428 .447 .408(.007) .394 .422 .425(.008) .409 .441
Hhsize 6.41(.019) 6.37 6.45 6.21(.024) 6.16 6.26 6.27(.037) 6.20 6.34 7.20(.058) 7.09 7.31
Lhdi .188(.002).182 .193 6.21(.024) .205(.003) .198 .213 .118(.004) .109 .128 .224(.006) .211 .238
Age
0-34 .687(.003) .680 .693 .670(.004) .660 .678 .695(.006) .682 .708 .729(.007) .715 .743
35-44 .111(.002) .106 .115 .118(.003) .111 .123 .106(.004) .096 .114 .096(.004) .086 .105
45-54 .085(.001) .080 .088 .088(.002) .082 .093 .082(.003) .074 .089 .079(.004) .069 .087
55-64 .063(.001) .059 .066 .065(.002) .060 .069 .059(.003) .052 .065 .061(.003) .052 .068
65-74 .035(.001) .033 .038 .038(.001) .034 .042 .039(.002) .033 .044 .024(.002) .018 .028
≥ 75 .019(.001) .017 .020 .021(.001) .018 .024 .019(.001) .014 .022 .012(.001) .008 .015
Educational level
Illiterate .465(.003) .458 .472 .383(.004) .374 .392 .524(.007) .509 .537 .634(.007) .618 .649
Primary .245(.003) .239 .251 .230(.004) .221 .237 .277(.006) .264 .289 .252(.007) .238 .266
High school .187(.002) .181 .192 .230(.004) .222 .238 .162(.005) .151 .172 .091(.004) .081 .100
University .103(.002) .097 .106 .157(.003) .149 .163 .037(.002) .031 .042 .023(.002) .017 .026
Chronic illness-types
Chronic illness .062(.002) .059 .065 .071(.002) .066 .075 .048(.003) .041 .053 .057(.003) .049 .063
Other illness .112(.002) .107 .116 .114(.003) .108 .119 .101(.004) .092 .109 .120(.005) .109 .130
Not ill .826(.002) .819 .830 .815(.003) .807 .822 .851(.005) .840 .861 .823(.006) .810 .835
Chronic illness started
Illness started≤ one year .939(.001) .935 .942 .931(.002) .926 .935 .953(.003) .947 .959 .945(.003) .937 .952
Illness started≤ five years .031(.001) .028 .032 .034(.001) .030 .037 .022(.002) .017 .025 .031(.002) .025 .036
Illness started≤ ten years .018(.001) .016 .019 .020(.001) .017 .022 .013(.001) .009 .016 .017(.002) .012 .021
Illness started> ten years .012(.001) .011 .014 .015(.001) .012 .016 .012(.001) .008 .015 .007(.001) .004 .010
Work missed
Work missed≤week .971(.001) .968 .973 .969(.001) .965 .972 .978(.002) .973 .982 .969(.002) .963 .974
Work missed≤month .014(.001) .012 .015 .014(.001) .011 .016 .011(.001) .008 .014 .018(.002) .013 .022
Work missed>month .015(.001) .012 .016 .017(.001) .014 .019 .011(.001) .007 .013 .013(.001) .009 .016
Health status
Good .592(.003) .585 .599 .626(.004) .617 .635 .571(.007) .556 .585 .518(.008) .502 .534
Fair .390(.003) .382 .396 .357(.004) .348 .365 .410(.007) .396 .425 .458(.008) .442 .474
Poor .017(.001) .015 .019 .016(.001) .013 .017 .018(.001) .013 .021 .023(.002) .017 .026
Very poor .001(.000) .001 .001 .001(.000) .001 .001 .001(.000) .0001 .001 .001(.000) .000 .002
Obs. 19490 11055 4735 3700
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics: 2010
Variable All Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Log OOP 1.50(.020) 1.46 1.54 1.61(.028) 1.55 1.66 1.21(.036) 1.14 1.29 1.56(.046) 1.47 1.66
Lincome 10.02(.004) 10.01 10.03 10.10(.005) 10.09 10.11 9.95(.008) 9.93 9.96 9.86(.009) 9.84 9.88
Lnholding(’00000) 672(36) 600 743 1025(64) 898 1151 268(13) 241 294 146(7) 132 161
Rural .794(.002) .789 800 .745(.004) .737 .753 .901(.004) .893 .909 .801(.006) .788 .813
Male .460(.003) .453 .466 .462(.004) .453 .471 .458(.006) .445 .472 .454(.007) .439 .470
Married .710(.003) .704 .716 .709(.004) .700 .717 .697(.006) .685 .710 .731(.007) .717 .745
Hhsize 5.70(.018) 5.67 5.74 5.44(.022) 5.40 5.48 5.82(.038) 5.75 5.90 6.33(.043) 6.24 6.41
Lhdi .219(.002) .213 .225 .223(.003) .215 .230 .178(.005) .168 .189 .263(.007) .249 .276
Age
0-34 .664(.003) .658 .671 .642(.004) .633 .650 .674(.006) .661 .687 .721(.007) .706 .734
35-44 .113(.002) .109 .118 .123(.003) .117 .129 .108(.004) .099 .116 .093(.004) .084 .102
45-54 .091(.001) .087 .095 .095(.002) .089 .100 .089(.003) .081 .096 .084(.004) .074 .092
55-64 .067(.001) .063 .070 .070(.002) .065 .074 .069(.003) .062 .076 .054(.003) .046 .060
65-74 .042(.001) .038 .043 .045(.001) .040 .048 .039(.002) .033 .043 .034(.002) .028 .040
≥ 75 .023(.001) .019 .023 .025(.001) .022 .027 .021(.001) .016 .024 .014(.001) .010 .017
Educational level
Illiterate .362(.003) .355 .368 .304(.004) .295 .312 .395(.006) .382 .408 .492(.007) .475 .507
Primary .205(.002) .199 .210 .174(.003) .167 .181 .243(.005) .231 .255 .247(.006) .233 .260
High school .217(.002) .210 .221 .234(.003) .226 .241 .224(.005) .211 .234 .153(.005) .141 .163
University .216(.002) .157 .167 .288(.004) .279 .295 .138(.004) .128 .147 .108(.004) .099 .118
Chronic illness-types
Chronic illness .120(.002) .115 .124 .133(.003) .126 .139 .100(.004) .091 .106 .106(.004) .096 .115
Other illness .157(.002) .152 .162 .147(.003) .140 .153 .160(.005) .150 .170 .184(.006) .172 .196
Not ill .723(.003) .716 .729 .720(.004) .711 .728 .740(.006) .728 .751 .710(.007) .695 .723
Chronic illness started
Illness started≤ one year .892(.002) .888 .896 .879(.002) .873 .885 .911(.003) .903 .919 .906(.004) .897 .915
Illness started≤ five years .049(.001) .046 .052 .052(.002) .048 .056 .043(.002) .037 .048 .048(.003) .040 .054
Illness started≤ ten years .033(.001) .030 .034 .038(.001) .033 .040 .024(.002) .019 .027 .030(.002) .024 .035
Illness started> ten years .026(.001) .023 .028 .031(.001) .027 .034 .022(.002) .017 .025 .016(.002) .012 .020
Work missed
Work missed≤week .985(.000) .983 .986 .986(.001) .984 .988 .988(.001) .985 .991 .978(.002) .973 .982
Work missed≤month .012(.000) .010 .013 .012(.000) .009 .013 .009(.001) .006 .011 .016(.001) .011 .019
Work missed>month .003(.000) .002 .003 .002(.000) .001 .002 .003(.000) .001 .004 .006(.001) .003 .008
Health status
Excellent .569(.003) .562 .575 .539(.004) .529 .547 .648(.006) .635 .660 .554(.007) .538 .569
Good .409(.003) .402 .416 .439(.004) .429 .447 .335(.006) .321 .347 .421(.007) .405 .436
Fair .021(.000) .018 .022 .021(.001) .018 .023 .016(.001) .012 .019 .024(.002) .019 .029
Poor .001(.000) .000 .001 .001(.000) .000 .001 .001(.000) .000 .002 .001(.000) .000 .001
Obs. 20979 11823 5242 3914
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.3: Tobit regression: 2003
Dependent variable: OOP expenses
Variable Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne All Interaction
1 2 3 4 5
Lincome .998***(.184) 1.45***(.345) .709**(.293) .947***(.140) .944***(.139)
Landholding(’00000) .000(.000) .002**(.001) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural -.708***(.272) .312(.865) .701(.582) -.488**(.234) -.488***(.233)
Male -.100(.179) -.234(.339) .121(.302) -.097(.140) -.092(.140)
Married .482**(.214) .032(.382) .515(.361) .440***(.165) .444***(.165)
Hhsize .016(.037) .042(.076) .075(.059) .033(.029) .032(.029)
Lhdi 4.04(.376) -6.72**(2.76) .353(4.01) -3.62**(1.81) -3.28*(1.80)
Chronic illness 2.16***(.381) 1.02*(.667) -.077(.785) 1.53***(.303) 1.82***(.320)
Not ill -30.32(.) -41.44(.) -26.96(.) -30.21(.) -29.64(.)
Age:34-44 -.562*(.312) .401(.602) -.610(.494) -.351(.242) -.356*(.242)
Age:45-54 -.534*(.319) .885(.618) -.387(.504) -.232(.248) -.241(.248)
Age:55-64 -.118(.339) .353(.613) .016(.517) .169(.257) .118(.257)
Age:65-74 -.282(.378) .977(.702) -1.37*(.770) .050(.301) -.018(.301)
Age:≥75 -.399(.473) .212(.792) .972(1.06) .042(.372) -.018(.371)
Primary -.254(.254) -1.09**(.446) .374(.401) -.292*(.193) -.303*(.193)
High school -.252(.263) -.422(.559) -.711(.567) -.232(.218) -.239(.217)
University .058(.290) -.540(.905) .256(1.11) .111(.258) .109(.257)
Illness started≤ five years .023(.890) -2.02(1.83) -1.30(1.73) -.587(.726) -.578(.724)
Illness started≤ ten years .354(.901) -1.78(1.81) -1.67(1.76) -.474(.737) -.473(.735)
Illness started≥ ten years -.047(.917) -1.86(1.88) -2.38(1.79) -.746(.751) -.797(.749)
Work missed≤ month 1.78***(.361) 2.04***(.705) 2.07***(.589) 1.92***(.281) 2.01***(.281)
Work missed> month 2.49***(.338) 3.74***(.719) 3.06***(.665) 2.89***(.276) 2.91***(.275)
Matwali*Chronic illness - - - - -.476(.366)
Matwali*Not ill - - - - -.362(.)
Pani Nachalne*Chronic illness - - - - -1.44***(.377)
Pani Nachalne*Not ill - - - - -.943(.)
Matwali - - - -.734***(.189) -.551***(.227)
Pani Nachalne - - - -.562***(.215) -.037(.254)
Constant -5.83***(2.17) -9.36**(3.99) -2.51(4.00) -4.60***(1.67) -4.66***(1.67)
R2 .4544 .4595 .4791 .4536 .4541
Obs. 11055 4735 3700 19490 19490
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant
at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a year, work missed
less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively for age, education, region, illness
started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Standard errors for not ill variable is not reported since this variable has all zeros in depended
variable.
159
Table 4.4: Tobit regression: 2010
Dependent variable: OOP expenses
Variable Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne All Interaction
1 2 3 4 5
Lincome .401***(.112) .245(.193) .332*(.171) .356***(.085) .356***(.085)
Landholding (’00000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural -.560***(.197) -1.09***(.478) -.756***(.292) -.669***(.156) -.667***(.156)
Male .023(.121) -.609***(.219) -.054(.179) -.081(.094) -.106(.093)
Married .610***(.182) .820***(.307) .871***(.273) .742***(.135) .732***(.137)
Hhsize .083***(.028) -.013(.049) .089**(.041) .064***(.021) .064***(.021)
Lhdi -.252(.272) .818(.761) 1.67(.573) -.331**(.155) .092**(.236)
Chronic illness 3.41***(.290) 5.32***(.522) 2.44***(.436) 3.63***(.224) 3.74***(.238)
Not ill -33.84(.) -30.05(.) -27.76(.) -34.80(.) -34.77(.)
Age:34-44 -.072**(.196) -.263(.360) .247(.310) -.087(.154) -.082(.152)
Age:45-54 .512**(.204) -.269(.386) .298(.315) .261*(.158) .266*(.158)
Age:55-64 .620***(.218) -.464*(.421) -.527*(.345) .115(.172) .116(.172)
Age:65-74 .772***(.254) -.175(.499) -.958**(.422) .302*(.201) .298(.201)
Age:≥75 .575*(.314) .468(.625) .324(.618) .509*(.258) .499(.257)
Primary -.092(.184) .506*(.311) -.144(.263) .009(.138) -.069(.139)
High school .055(.184) .919***(.349) .050(.310) .239(.146) .234*(.146)
University .586***(.170) 1.23***(.356) .572*(.300) .701***(.137) .702***(.137)
Illness started≤ five years -.590*(.300) -1.78***(.522) .002(.464) -.688***(.234) -.691***(.234)
Illness started≤ ten years -.613*(.311) -2.73***(.606) .111(.492) -.897***(.246) -.904***(.246)
Illness started≥ ten years -.886***(.321) -2.46***(.606) .348(.550) -.970***(.256) -.992***(.256)
Work missed≤ month 2.27***(.289) 3.04***(.559) 1.74***(.377) 2.32***(.222) 2.32***(.220)
Work missed> month 2.24***(.655) 4.73***(1.02) 1.68***(.614) 2.58***(.428) 2.57***(.428)
Matwali*Chronic illness - - - - -.031(.224)
Matwali*Not ill - - - - 4.65(.)
Pani Nachalne*Chronic illness - - - - -.511**(.239)
Pani Nachalne*Not ill - - - - .391(.)
Matwali - - - -.829***(.121) -.807***(.153)
Pani Nachalne - - - -.231*(.133) -.024(.167)
Constant -1.40(1.38) -.751*(2.34) 1.50(2.73) -1.09(1.06) -1.13(1.06)
R2 .4474 .4199 .4696 .4379 .4380
Obs. 11823 5242 3914 20979 20979
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant
at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a year, work missed
less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively for age, education, region, illness
started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Standard errors for not ill variable is not reported since this variable has all zeros in depended
variable.
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Table 4.5: Tobit regression: Marginal effects
Dependent variable: OOP expenses
Variable Year: 2003 Year: 2010
1 2 3 4
Lincome .021***(.003) .022***(.003) .007***(.001) .009***(.002)
Landholding (’00000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural -.011***(.004) -.012***(.005) -.014***(.003) -.016***(.004)
Male -.002(.003) .002(.003) -.002(.002) -.002(.002)
Married .010***(.003) .010***(.004) .015***(.003) .017***(.003)
Hhsize .001(.001) .001(.001) .001***(.000) .002***(.000)
Lhdi -.066**(.029) -.066***(.029) .002**(.005) .002(.005)
Chronic illness .038***(.008) .07***(.008) .088***(.006) .106***(.007)
Not ill -3.68***(.049) -3.55***(.048) -4.41***(.039) -5.27***(.044)
Age:34-44 -.008*(.005) -.008*(.005) -.001(.003) -.002(.003)
Age:45-54 -.005(.005) -.005(.005) .005*(.003) .006*(.004)
Age:55-64 .004(.006) .002(.006) .002(.003) .002(.004)
Age:65-74 .001(.007) .000(.007) .006*(.004) .007*(.005)
Age:≥75 .001(.009) -.001(.009) .011*(.005) .012*(.006)
Primary -.006*(.004) -.007*(.004) .000(.002) .000(.003)
High school -.005(.005) -.005(.005) .005*(.003) .005*(.003)
University .002(.006) .002(.006) .015***(.003) .017***(.003)
Illness started≤ five years -.013(.016) -.014(.016) -.014***(.004) -.016***(.005)
Illness started≤ ten years -.011(.017) -.011(.017) -.018***(.004) -.021***(.005)
Illness started≥ ten years -.018(.019) -.020(.019) -.020***(.005) -.023***(.005)
Work missed≤ month .050***(.008) .053***(.008) .055***(.005) .063***(.006)
Work missed> month .078***(.008) .080***(.008) .062***(.011) .071***(.013)
Matwali*Chronic illness - -.012(.008) - -.001(.005)
Matwali*Not ill - -.009***(.000) - .115***(.002)
Pani Nachalne*Chronic illness - -.033***(.008) - -.012***(.005)
Pani Nachalne*Not ill - -.022(.000) - .086***(.001)
Matwali -.018***(.005) -.014**(.005) -.017***(.002) -.019***(.003)
Pani Nachalne -.013***(.005) -.001(.006) -.002**(.002) -.001(.004)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a
year, work missed less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respec-
tively for age, education, region, illness started year, work missed and caste variables.
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Table 4.6: Ordered probit estimation: 2003
Dependent variable: SAH categorical variable
Variable Very Poor Poor Fair Good
OOP ratio .0000(.0000) .000(.000) .007(.006) -.007(.006)
Lnholding(’00000) -.0000(.0000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural .0001***(.0000) .003***(.000) .104***(.010) -.107***(.010)
Male -.0000(.0000) -.001***(.000) -.022***(.007) .023***(.007)
Married -.0000(.000) -.001***(.000) -.022***(.008) .023***(.008)
Hhsize .0000(.000) .001***(.000) .011***(.001) -.011***(.001)
Lhdi .0000(.0000) .000(.000) .011(.011) -.012(.012)
Chronic illness .0009**(.0004) .036***(.004) .294***(.023) -.331***(.030)
Not ill -.0001***(.0000) -.006***(.000) -.115***(.010) .121***(.011)
Age:35-44 .0000(.0000) .002***(.000) .055***(.012) -.058***(.013)
Age:45-54 .0001***(.000) .006***(.001) .112***(.013) -.119***(.014)
Age:55-64 .0002***(.000) .012***(.001) .169***(.013) -.182***(.015)
Age:65-74 .0003***(.0001) .015***(.002) .193***(.017) -.209***(.019)
Age≥75 .0006***(.0002) .026***(.004) .248***(.019) -.275***(.023)
Primary -.0000(.0000) -.002***(.000) -.067***(.008) .069***(.009)
High school -.0000(.0000) -.003***(.000) -.085***(.010) .088***(.010)
University -.0001***(.0000) -.004***(.000) -.117***(.012) .120***(.012)
Illness started≤ five years .0000(.0000) .003(.005) .058(.084) -.061(.090)
Illness started≤ ten years .0000(.0000) .004(.006) .082(.085) -.082(.092)
Illness started> ten years .0000(.0000) .001(.002) .050(.085) -.055(.087)
Work missed≤month .0001*(.00005) .004**(.002) .085***(.032) -.090***(.034)
Work missed>month .0007**(.0002) .028***(.006) .254***(.024) -.283***(.030)
Matwali .0001(.0001) .001(.001) .016*(.008) -.017*(.009)




Likelihood ratio test: χ2(53) = 719.71 P value=000
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
-Other illness, age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less
than a year, work missed less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively
for illness, age, education, region, illness started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Likelihood ratio test for identical coefficients for explanatory variables across subsamples.
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Table 4.7: Ordered probit estimation: 2010
Dependent variable: SAH categorical variable
Variable Poor Fair Good Excellent
OOP ratio .0000(.0000) .001***(.000) .011***(.003) -.011***(.003)
Lnholding(’00000) -.0000(.0000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) .000(.000)
Rural -.0000(.0000) -.001(.001) -.018*(.009) .019*(.009)
Male -.0000(.0000) -.000(.000) -.005(.006) .005(.007)
Married -.0000(.0000) -.000(.000) -.008(.009) .009(.009)
Hhsize .0000(.0000) .000(.000) .001(.001) -.001(.001)
Lhdi -.0001***(.000) -.004***(.000) -.138***(.010) .142***(.010)
Chronic illness .0047***(.0013) .086***(.011) .394***(.009) -.485***(.019)
Not ill -.0001***(.0000) -.002***(.000) -.048***(.009) .050***(.010)
Age:35-44 .0001**(.00002) .001***(.000) .042***(.011) -.044***(.011)
Age:45-54 .0001***(.0000) .004***(.000) .083***(.012) -.088***(.013)
Age:55-64 .0001***(.0000) .007***(.001) .120***(.013) -.128***(.015)
Age:65-74 .0003***(.0001) .012***(.002) .169***(.016) -.182***(.017)
Age≥75 .0008***(.0002) .025***(.004) .244***(.017) -.271***(.021)
Primary -.0001***(.0000) -.002***(.000) -.074***(.009) .077***(.010)
High school -.0001***(.0000) -.002***(.000) -.069***(.010) .072***(.010)
University -.0001***(.0000) -.003***(.000) -.074***(.010) .077***(.010)
Illness started≤ five years -.0000(.0000) -.002**(.001) -.048*(.031) .050*(.032)
Illness started≤ ten years -.0000(.0000) -.001(.001) -.041(.033) .043(.034)
Illness started> ten years -.0000(.0000) -.001(.001) -.011(.034) .011(.036)
Work missed≤month .0001(.0001) .003**(.002) .072**(.029) -.076**(.031)
Work missed>month .0013*(.0007) .036***(.013) .275***(.034) -.313***(.047)
Matwali -.00004***(.00001) -.002***(.000) -.064***(.008) .066***(.008)




Likelihood ratio test: χ2(53) = 384.54 P value=000
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a year,
work missed less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively for age,
education, region, illness started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Likelihood ratio test for identical coefficients for explanatory variables across subsamples.
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Table 4.8: Generalized ordered probit estimation: 2003
Dependent variable: SAH categorical variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OOP ratio .000(.000) .000(.000) .080**(.039)
Lnholding(’00000) -.000(.000) .000(.000) -.000(.000)
Rural -.000(.000) .001(.001) .085***(.013)
Male .000(.000) .000(.000) -.031***(.007)
Married -.000(.000) -.001(.001) -.027***(.009)
Hhsize .000(.000) .000(.000) .011***(.001)
Lhdi - .955***(.049) -.214(.056)
Chronic illness .001(.001) .005**(.003) .430***(.038)
Not ill -.000(.000) -.025***(.003) -.088***(.012)
Age:35-44 .000(.000) .001(.002) .076***(.014)
Age:45-54 -.000(.000) .002(.001) .139***(.015)
Age:55-64 -.000(.000) .006***(.002) .218***(.017)
Age:65-74 -.000(.000) .005***(.002) .271***(.021)
Age≥75 - .018***(.006) .323***(.027)
Primary -.000(.000) -.001***(.000) -.059***(.009)
High school -.000(.000) -.002***(.000) -.077***(.011)
University - - -.127***(.013)
Illness started≤ five years .889***(.202) -.001(.002) .062(.112)
Illness started≤ ten years .895***(.204) -.001(.002) .133(.116)
Illness started> ten years .000(.000) -.002(.005) .070(.119)
Work missed≤month - .003*(.002) .150***(.058)
Work missed>month .007***(.011) .028***(.008) .199***(.063)
Matwali -.000(.000) -.001(.001) .012(.010)
Pani Nachalne -.000(.000) .001(.001) .045***(.012)
Log likelihood -61.14 -1164.26 -10722.59
Pseudo R2 .5273 0.3387 .1861
Obs. 4747 18585 19490
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a year,
work missed less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively for age,
education, region, illness started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Model 1 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Very poor
SAH category and zero otherwise.
-Model 2 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Very poor
and Poor SAH categories and zero otherwise.
-Model 3 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Very
poor, Poor and Fair SAH categories and zero otherwise.
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Table 4.9: Generalized ordered probit estimation: 2010
Dependent variable: SAH categorical variable
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OOP ratio .000(.000) .001***(.000) .013(.009)
Lnholding(’00000) .0000(.0000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000)
Rural .000(.000) -.002**(.001) -.045***(.012)
Male .000(.000) .001(.001) -.010(.007)
Married -.002**(.001) -.005***(.001) -.003(.010)
Hhsize -.000(.000) -.000(.000) .002**(.001)
Lhdi -.001(.001) -.001(.001) -.110***(.020)
Chronic illness .011(.012) .046***(.011) .522***(.025)
Not ill .000(.000) -.012***(.002) -.065***(.010)
Age:35-44 -.001(.001) .003***(.001) .051***(.013)
Age:45-54 -.000(.000) .001(.001) .123***(.015)
Age:55-64 .000(.000) .007***(.002) .147***(.017)
Age:65-74 .004**(.002) .012***(.004) .202***(.021)
Age≥75 .002(.003) .034***(.008) .288***(.026)
Primary -.001**(.0005) -.003***(.001) -.063***(.011)
High school -.001**(.0005) -.004***(.001) -.051***(.012)
University -.001**(.0005) -.005***(.001) -.063***(.011)
Illness started≤ five years -.001(.001) -.004***(.001) -.010(.049)
Illness started≤ ten years -.001**(.0004) -.003***(.001) -.008(.052)
Illness started> ten years -.000(.000) -.002**(.001) .038(.056)
Work missed≤month .005(.008) .010***(.004) .023(.037)
Work missed>month .004(.009) .056***(.023) .198**(.079)
Matwali .000(.000) .001(.001) -.019*(.010)
Pani Nachalne -.001**(.0002) .001(.001) .032**(.011)
Log likelihood -118.38 -1519.22 -10646.01
Pseudo R2 .2032 .3051 .2577
Obs. 5419 20662 20979
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%.
-Age less than 35 years, illiterate, far-western region, illness started less than a year,
work missed less than a week and Tagadhari are reference group respectively for age,
education, region, illness started year, work missed and caste variables.
-Model 1 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Poor
SAH category and zero otherwise.
-Model 2 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Poor and
Fair SAH categories and zero otherwise.
-Model 3 estimates a binary probit model where dependent variable being 1 for Poor,




This chapter synopsises the methodological and empirical findings generated by this
dissertation. As this dissertation is composed of three different empirical studies,
findings together with the limitation are discussed separately and agendas for future
researches are explored.
5.1 Chapter 1
This study investigates the parental plan regarding daughters’ age at marriage and
its effects on their decision to invest in daughter’s education. Unlike other studies
that argue parental anti-bias in female education and child marriage as contributing
factors to undermine female education this study concentrates on indirect disin-
centive to female education that marriage exerts via implied division of household
labour and this applies even to the female who marries post-childhood.
This study contributes to the literature by developing a theoretical framework for
jointly determining female education and planned age at marriage. The framework
is based on Jafarey (2011), in which gender wage inequality is shown to lead to
both a direct discount on female education and an indirect one following from the
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marital division of labour which allocates women to spend relatively more time in
housework and men in market work. It is shown that the earlier the planned age at
marriage the lesser incentive parents will have in investing in daughter’s education.
In addition, this framework acknowledges that the age at marriage can itself depend
on individual and cultural factors, such as a female’s ability to benefit from schooling
and/or cultural expectations regarding an ideal age for her to marry.
This hypothesis is tested using household survey data from Nepal. Empirical
evidence validates the hypothesis that female education is negatively affected by
cultural practices that favours early marriage: increasing female marriage by one
year would produce, on average, 0.4 year increment in schooling.
Addressing endogeneity
As theoretical framework developed in this study shows that a female may select
into early marriage on the basis of idiosyncratic and unobservable differences in
ability, an ordinary least square method produces bias results and thus an instru-
mental variable estimation strategy is applied to estimate the casual effect of age at
marriage on female education. Therefore, potential endogeneity is controlled for by
exploiting variations in cultural norms regarding dowry and differences in average
age of female’s marriage among ethnicities and regions as instrumental variables.
The validity of both IVs is discussed referring to available theoretical arguments
as well as empirical evidence. A statistical test has also been carried out for the
validity of IVs.
Limitation of this study
Theoretical framework outlined in this study suggests that girl’s parents invest on
her education depending on her ability to benefit from education. That is, if parents
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judge her to be of relatively low ability they may decide both not to school her to a
very high level far, and to make better use of her time or to marry her at an early
age compared to other girls within her community. This proposition is not tested
explicitly due to the data limitation. It is not possible to detect parent’s household
from the survey data used in this analysis. Future research should take this issue into
account. However, it has been argued in theoretical section that parents invest in
daughter’s education depending on her ability to acquire and benefit from education
and they marry her early if parents judge her to be of low ability. And thus an
instrumental variable strategy is used to estimate casual effect of age at marriage on
female education. Empirical results show larger values of age at marriage coefficients
compared to ordinary least square estimates in all cases. It implies that ability is
positively correlated to age at marriage.
5.2 Chapter 2
This study evaluates the sources of caste wage differentials arguing that caste-based
division of labour can perpetuate itself through the inter-generational transmission
of low level of educational endowment in low castes and caste differences in ac-
cess to large firms and better occupations. Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is widely
used methodology in disentangling pre-market and current market effects on wage
differentials which accounts for productivity characteristics as endowments while es-
timating such effects. This methodology was later expanded by Banerjee and Knight
(1985) to include occupation as an additional endowment.
This study goes further in capturing the effect on wage inequality by introducing
firm characteristics to supplement educational and occupational differences. There-
fore, an interaction model of decomposition is introduced to see the effect of caste
differences in access to larger firms on caste wage differentials. Two waves of na-
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tionally representative household survey data from Nepal are used.
Empirical results show that caste wage inequality is present in Nepalese labour
market in both periods which is increasing over time particularly for the lowest caste.
Furthermore, results show that caste differences in human capital endowments are
important for explaining wage inequality, but also so are occupational and firm size
effects, especially when the latter two are taken together.
The main methodological contribution of this study is to use an expanded set
of proxies for decomposing gross wage differentials into the pre-market and current
market effects.
Limitation of this study
This study excludes a considerable portion of wage workers while estimating the
source of caste wage differentials in the labour market. Reason behind is that the
majority of wage earners in Nepal are from agricultural labourers who did not report
the size of their employers. Additionally, those working as subsistence agricultural
labourers may not be relevant in estimating the effect of access to larger firms on
wage differentials as this study intends to. Therefore, future work that estimates
expanded decomposition methodology proposed in this study, which includes firm
characteristics along with occupational distribution and productivity characteristics
as endowments, employing data from different labour market will be an additional
advantage to generalise the finding of this study and to make it more robust.
5.3 Chapter 3
This study argues that historically discriminated-against castes inherit low levels
of social capital in low castes. These variables can have negative effects on the
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utilisation of health care services which in turn may transmit into the inferior health
outcomes in low castes.
Findings from this study suggest that caste-inequity in health care utilisation as
well as in health outcomes exist in Nepal. However, in indicates that both types
of inequity are decreasing over time. More importantly, empirical evidence suggests
that caste differences in health care utilisation is coming from the caste differences in
household income along with need variables. It indicates that policies that promote
income equality can positively contribute to the equity in health care utilisation
across castes.
Limitation
Although this study incorporates caste context into the analysis of health sector
inequity which is distinct from other varieties of social classification such as race,
gender and ethnicity, it has its own limitation. Firstly, health care utilisation in this
study is proxied by OOP payment which may not accurately represent the utilisation
of health care services both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Secondly, two
waves of survey data used in this study did not include the same respondents which
may caution to conclude about the trend of caste inequity in health care utilisation
over time. Future researches should take these issues into account. However, this
study estimates the impact of caste on health outcomes which has not yet been




Agee, M.D. and T. D. Crocker (1996). Parents’ Discount Rates for Child Quality.
Southern Economic Journal 63 (1), 36-50
Akerlof, G. A. (1984). An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Alder, N. E. and K. Newman (2002). Socioeconomic Disparities in Health: Path-
ways and Policies. Health Affairs 21(2), 60-70.
Altonji, G. J. and R. M. Blank (1999). Race and gender in the labor market. In
Handbook of Labor Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Anderson, S. (2004). Dowry and Property Rights. Website. http://ipl.econ.duke.
edu/bread/papers/working/080.pdf
Anne, C. and A. Deaton (2005). Health and Wealth among the poor: India and
South Africa Compared. Americal Economic Review 95(2), 229-233.
Arrow, J. K. (1971). The Theory of Discrimination. Website. http://www2.econ.
iastate.edu/classes/econ321/rosburg/Arrow%20-%20The%20Theory%20of%20Discrimination.
pdf
Asadullah, M. N. ((2006). Returns to education in Bangladesh. Wbsite. http:
//www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps130.pdf
Aslam, M. (2009). Education Gender Gaps in Pakistan: Is the Labor Market to
Blame?. Economic Development and Cultural Change 57(4), 747-784.
Atal, J. P., H. Nopo and N. Winder (2009). New Centuries Old Disparities: Gen-
171
der and Ethnic Wage Gaps in Latin America. Website. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2230955
Autor, D. H.(2003). Lecture Notes: Economics of Discrimination-Theory. MIT
14.661. Website. http://econ-www.mit.edu/file/554.
Babu, B.V., G.P. Chhotray, R.K. Hazra, K. Satyanarayana (2001). Community
Perception of a District Health System. Journal of Health Management 3 (1), 1-13.
Banerjee, A., A. Deaton and E. Duflo (2004). Wealth, Health and Health Service in
Rural Rajasthan. American Economic Review 94(2), 326-330.
Banerjee, B. and J. B. Knight (1985). Caste discrimination in the Indian urban
labour market. Journal of Development Economics 17(3), 277-307.
Baru, R., A. Acharya, S. Acharya, A K., Shivakumar and K. Nagraj (2010). In-
equities in Access to Health Services in India: Caste, Class and Region. Economic
and Political Weekly 38, 49-58.
Bayisenge, J. (2010). Early marriage as a barrier to girl’s education: A development
challenge in Africa. Website. http://www.ifuw.org/fuwa/docs/Early-marriage.pdf
Becker, G. and N. Tomes (1976). Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality
of Children. The Journal of Political Economy 84 (4), 143-162.
Becker, G. S. (1957). The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis. The
Journal of Political Economy 70(5),9-49.
Becker, G. S. (1971). The Economics of Discrimination 2ed edition. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Becker, G. S. (1973). A Theory of Marriage: Part I. The Journal of Political Econ-
omy 81(4), 813-846.
Becker, G. S. (1974). A Theory of Marriage: Part II. The Journal of Political Econ-
172
omy 82(2), S11-S26.
Becker, G. S. (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. The Journal of Political
Economy 82 (6),1063-1093.
Becker, G. S. (1975). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with
Special Reference to Education, 2ed Edition. Chicago: University Press of Chicago
press.
Behrman, J. R. and A.B. Deolalikar (1995). Are There Differential Returns to
Schooling by Gender? The Case of Indonesian Labour Markets. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 57(1), 97-117.
Behrman, J. R., R. A. Pollak and P. Toubman (1982). The Parental Preferences
and Provision for Progeny. Journal of Political Economy 90(1), 52-73.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of
Earnings. The Journal of Political Economy 75(4), 352-365.
Bennett, L. (2005). Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal: Following the
Policy Process from Analysis to Action. Conference paper.
Website. http://www.k4health.org/sites/default/files/Gender
Bennett, L., D. R. Dhital and P. Govindasamy (2008). Caste, Ethnic and Regional
Identity in Nepal: Further Analysis of the 2006 Nepal Demographic and Health
Survey. Website. http:www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FA58/FA58.pdf
Berdahl, T. A., J. B. Kirby and R. A. Torres Stone (2007). Access to Health Care
for Nonmetro and Metro Latinos of Mexican Origin in the United States. Medical
Care 45(7), 647-654.
Billari, F. C., A. Prskawetz, and J. Furnkranz (2002). The cultural evolution of of
age-at-marriage norms. Max Planck Institute for Demographic Re- search Working
Paper WP-2002-018. http://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2002-018.pdf.
Birdsall, N. and J. L. Londono (1997). Assets Inequality Matters: An Assessment of
173
the World Bank’s Approach to Poverty Reduction. The American Economic Review
87(2), 32-37.
Blinder, A. S. (1973). Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Esti-
mates. The Journal of Human Resources 8(4), 436-455.
Bond, G. C. (1981). Social Economic Status and Educational Achievement: A Re-
view Article. Anthropology Education Quarterly 12(4), 227-257.
Boskin, M. j.(1974). A Conditional Logit Model of Occupational Choice. Journal
of Political Economy 82, 389-398.
Botwinic, H. (1993). Persistent Inequalities: Wage Disparity under Capitalist Com-
petition. New York: Princeton University Press.
Braveman, P. and S. Gruskin (2003). Poverty, equity, human rights and health.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 81 (7), 539-545.
Brein, J. Michael and Lee A. Lillard (1994). Education, Marriage, and First Con-
ception in Malaysia. The Journal of Human Resources 29(4), 1167-1204.
Brown, C. J. Medoff (1989). The Employer Size-Wage Effect. The Journal of Po-
litical Economy 97(5), 1027-1059.
Brown, R. S., M. Moon and B. S. Zoloth (1980). Incorporating Occupational At-
tainment in Studies of Male-Female Earning Differentials. The Journal of Human
Resources 15(1), 3-28.
Cain, G. G. (1984). The economics of discrimination: Part 1. Focus 7(2), 1-11.
Cameron, L. A. and C. Worswick (2001). Education Expenditure Responses to Crop
Loss in Indonesia: A Gender Bias. Economic Development and Cultural Change
49(2), 351-363.
Carneiro, P., J.J. Heckman and D.V. Masterov (2005). Labor Market Discrimina-
tion and Racial Differences in Premarket Factors. Journal of Law and Economics
48(1) 1-39.
174
Chase, R.S. (2000). Labor Market Discrimination During Post-communist Transi-
tion: A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia’s Russian Minorities. Website.
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39765/wp381.pdf?sequence
Chaturvedi, N. (2003). Ethnic Differences in Cardiovascular Disease. Heart 89(6),
681-686.
Checchi, D. (1997). Education and Intergenerational Mobility in Occupations: A
Comparative Study. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 56(3), 331-
351.
Chen, A. Y. and J. J. Escarce (2004). Quantifying income-related inequality in
healthcare delivery in the United States. Medical Care 42(1), 38-47.
Chiswick, B. (1970). “An Interregional Analysis of Schooling and the Skewness of
Income” in Hansen Lee. W. (ed) Education, Income and Human Capital. New York.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cochrane, S. H. (2009). Fertility and Education: What do We Really Know?.
Website. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1979/01/1558317/fertility-education-really-
Cook, B L., T.G. McGuire, K. Lock and A. M. Zaslavsky (2010). Comparing meth-
ods of racial and ethnic disparities measurement across different settings of mental
health care. Health Service Research-HSR 45(3), 825-847.
Cox, O. C. (1944). Class and Caste: A Definition and a Distinction. The Journal
of Negro Education 13(2), 139-149.
Cox, T. (1988). A Current Socio-economic Status of Untouchable in Nepal. Occa-
sional Papers on Sociology and Anthropology 4, 90-109.
Dahal, D. R., T. Fricke and A. Thornton (1993). The Family Contexts of Marriage
Timing in Nepal. Ethnology 32(4), 305-323.
Dalmia, S. and P. Lawrence (2005). The Institution of Dowry in India: Why It
Continues to Prevail. The Journal of Developing Areas 38(2), 71-93.
175
D’Anna, L. H. , N. A. Ponce and J. M. Siegel (2010). Racial and ethnic health
disparities: evidence of discrimination’s effects across the SEP spectrum. Ethnicity
and Health 15(2), 121-143.
Darity, W. A. and P. L. Mason (1998). Evidence on Discrimination in Employment:
Codes of Colour and Codes of Gender. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(2),
63-90.
Darity, W. A. and R. M. Williams (1985). Peddlers Forever?: Culture, Competition,
and Discrimination. The American Economic Review 75(2), 256-261.
Das, M. B. and P. V. Dutta (2007). Does Caste Matter for the Wages in the Indian
Labor Market?. Website. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.190.3708&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Das, S. K. (2009). Exploration of Causes of Dowry System in Dhanusha District of
Nepal. Website. http://www.socialinclusion.org.np/researchdetail-238.html
Dasgupta, I. and D. Mukherjee (2003). ‘Arranged’ Marriage, Dowry and Female
Literacy in a Transitional Society. Wbsite. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=463580
Deaton, A. (2003). Health, Income and Inequality. Website. http://www.nber.org/
reporter/spring03/health.html
Deaton, A. (2006). Global Patterns of Income and Health: Facts, Interpretation,
and Policies. NBER Working Paper No. 12735. Website. http://www.nber.org/
papers/w12735
Deaton, A. (2011). What does the empirical evidence tell us about the injustice of in-
equalities? Princeton University, Working Paper No. 1284. Website. https://www.
princeton.edu/rpds/papers/What_does_the_empirical_evidence_tell_us_about_the_
injustice.pdf
Deaton, A. and D. Lubotsky (2003). Mortality, Inequality and Race in American
176
cities and states. Social Science and Medicine 56(6), 1139-1153.
Deshpande, A. (2011). The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in Con-
temporary India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Dhital, R. (2012). Child Marriage in Nepal. Website. http://www.volunteeraidnepal.
org/child-marriage-nepal
Dommaraju, P. V. Agadjanian and S. Yabiku (2008). The Pervasive and Persistence
Influence of Caste on Child Mortality in India. Population Research and Policy Re-
view 27(4), 477-495.
Doss, C. R. (1996). Testing among models of intrahousehold resource allocation.
World Development 24(10), 1597-1609.
Duman, A. (2010). Female education inequality in Turkey: factors affecting girls’
schooling decisions. International Journal of Education Economics and Develop-
ment 1(3), 243-258.
Ermisch, J. and M. Francesconi (2001). Family Matters: Impacts of Family Back-
ground on Educational Attainments. Econometrica 68(270), 137-156.
Field, E. A. Ambrus (2008). Early Marriage, Age of Menarche and Female School-
ing Attainment in Bangladesh. Journal of Political economy 116(5), 881-930.
Garimoi, C. (2009). Health equity: challenges in low income countries. African
Health Sciences 9(S2), 49-51.
George, S. and M. Akiko (1999). Health care financing and delivery in developing
countries. Health Affairs 18(3), 193-205.
Ghosh, S. (2011). Catastrophic Payments and Impoverishment Due to Out-of-
Pocket Health Spending. Economic and Political Weekly 47, 63-70.
Glewwe, P. and H. Jacoby (1994). Student Achievement and Schooling Choice in
Low-Income Countries: Evidence from Ghana. The Journal of Human Resources
29(3), 841-864.
177
Greene, W., M.N. Harris, B. Hollingsworth and P. Maitra (2008). A Bivariate La-
tent Class Correlated Generalized Ordered Probit Model with an Application to
Modeling Observed Obesity Levels. Website. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281910
Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri and M. Yorukoglu (2005). Engines of Liberation. Re-
view of Economic Studies 72(1), 109-133.
Grimshaw, D. and J. Rubery (2002). The adjusted gender pay gap: A critical ap-
praisal of standard decomposition Techniques. Website. https://research.mbs.ac.
uk/european-employment/Portals/0/docs/gendersocial/GPGpoliticalpdf
Grytten, J., G. Rongen and R. Sorensen (1995). Can a Public Health Care System
Achieve Equity? The Norwegian Experience. Medical Care 33(9), 938-951.
Gurung, H. (2002). Trident and Thunderbolt, Cultural Dynamics in Nepalese Poli-
tics. In Ethnicity, Caste and a Pluralist Society, ed. B. Krishna Battachan. Patan,
Nepal: Social Science Baha Himal Association.
Halli, S. (2003). Marriage Patterns in Rural India: Influence of Sociocultural Con-
text. Website. http://paa2003.princeton.edu/abstracts/62109
Harris, K. M. , M. J. Edlund and S. Larson (2005). Racial and ethnic differences
in the mental health problems and use of mental health care. Medical Care 43(8),
775-784.
Hettler, P. (2007). The Decomposition of Firm-size Wage Differentials. Journal of
Labor Research 28(3), 477-486.
Hinks, T. and D. Watson (2001). A multinomial logit nondiscriminatory approach to
estimating racial wage and occupational discrimination. Applied Economics 33(5),
605-612.
Hofer, A. (1979). The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the Mu-
luki Ain of 1854. Patan, Nepal: Himal Books.
Honda, C. and Y. Ohkusa (2003). Horizontal Inequity in Health Care Utilization in
178
Japan. Health care Management Science 6 (3), 189-196.
Hotchkiss, D. R., J. R. Jeffrey, K. Karmacharya and P. Sangraula (1998). Household
health expenditures in Nepal: implications for health care financing reform. Health
Policy and Planning 13(4), 371-383.
Hummer, R.A. (1996). Black-White Differences in Health and Mortality: A Review
and Conceptual Model. The Sociological Quarterly 37(1), 105-125.
Inequality Trust (2013). Inequality and Health. Website. http://inequality.org/
inequality-health.
International Monetary Fund (2003). Nepal : Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,
IMF Country Report No. 03/305. Website. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
cat/longres.aspx?sk=16894.0
Jacoby, H. G. and E. Skoufias (1997). Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital
in a Developing Country. The Review of Economic Studies 64(3), 311-335.
Jafarey, S. (2011). Glass Slippers and Glass Ceiling: An analysis of Marital Anticipa-
tion and Female Education. Website. https://manageweb.ict.uniba.it/ricerca/
dipartimenti/dse/seminari/seminari-2011/jefarey2011.pdf
Jann, B. (2008). The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for linear regression models .
The Stata Journal 8(4), 453-479.
Jeffrey, C. (2001). ‘A Fist Is Stronger than Five Fingers’: Caste and Dominance in
Rural North India. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers New Series
26(2), 217-236.
Kawachi, I. , N. Daniels and D. E. Robinson (2005). Health Disparities by Race and
Class. Why Both Matter? Health Affairs 24 (2), 343-353.
Keiko, A. and T. Yoshinori (2006). Socio Cultural Factors Affecting Girls’ Limited
Access to School Education in North West Frontier Province in Pakistan. Website.
http://edisdat.ied.edu.hk/pubarch/b15907314/full_paper/1394178079.pdf
179
King, E.M. and A.D. Mason (2001). Engineering Development Through Gen-
der Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice. Website. http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/Engendering_Development.pdf
King, E.M. and M. A. Hill (1993). Women’s Education in Developing Countries:
Barriers, Benefits and Policies. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Kingdom, G. (1998). Does the labour market explain lower female schooling in In-
dia? The Journal of Development Studies 35(1), 39-65.
Kirby, J. B. and T. Kaneda (2005). Neighborhood Socioeconomic Disadvantage and
Access to Health Care. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 46(1), 15-31.
Krieger, N. (1987). Shades of Difference: Theoretical Underpinnings of the Medical
Controversy on Black/White Differences in the United States, 1830 - 1870. Inter-
national Journal of Health Services 17(2), 259-278.
Kuran, T. (1987). Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Con-
servatism. The Economic Journal 97 (387), 642-665.
Lahiri, S. and S. Self (2007). Gender Bias in Education: the Role of Inter-household
Externality, Dowry and other Social Institutions. Review of Development Economics
11 (4), 591-606.
Leon, D. and G. Walt (2001). Poverty, Inequality, and Health: An International
Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lerner, M., B. Candida and R. Hisrich (1997). Israeli Women Entrepreneurs: An Ex-
amination of Factors Affecting Performance. Journal of Business Venturing 12(4),
315-339.
Lerrea, C. and F. M. Torres (2006). Indigenous Peoples, Poverty and Human Devel-
opment in Latin America Edited by G. Hall and H. A. Patrinos. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Liu, Y., W.C. Hsiao and K. Eggleston (1999). Equity in health and health care: the
180
Chinese experience. Social Science and Medicine 49(10), 1349-1356.
Lordan, G., E. G. Soto, R.P. C., Brown and I. Correa-Valez (2012). Socioeconomic
status and health outcomes in a developing country. Health Economics 21(2), 178-
186.
Lovell, P. A. (2006). Race, Gender and Work in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 1960-2000. Latin
American Research Review 41(3), 63-87.
Lu. J. R., G. M., Luenge, S. Kwon, Keith Y.K., Tin, E. van Doorslaer, O. O’donell
(2007). Horizontal equity in health care utilization evidence from three high-income
Asian economies. Social Science and Medicine 64, 199-212.
Madden, J. F. (1975). Discrimination- A Manifestation of Male Market Power?.
In Sex Discrimination and the Division of Labor. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Madheswaran, S. and P. Attewell (2007). Caste Discrimination in the Indian Urban
Labour Market: Evidence from the National Sample Survey. Economic and Political
Weekly 42(41), 4146-4153.
Makinen, M., H. Waters, M. Rauch, N. Alamagambetova, R. Bitran, L. Gilson, S.
Ram, G. Ubilla, D. Mclntyre and S. Pannarunothai (2000). Inequalities in health
care use and expenditures: empirical data from eight developing countries and coun-
tries in transition. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78(1), 54-64.
Matouschek, N. and I. Rasul (2008). The Economics of the Marriage Contract:
Theories and Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 51, 59-110.
Mensch, B. S., S. Singh and J. B. Casterline (2005). Trends in the Timing of First
Marriage Among Men and Women in the Developing World. Website. http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.7458&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Mills, A. and L. Gilson (1988). Health Economics for Developing Countries: A sur-
vival Kit. Website. http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/HealthEcFin_KP/WP01_
181
88.pdf
Ministerial Leadership Initiative (2010). Reducing Financial Barriers to Reproduc-
tive Health Care Nepal Spotlight.
Website. http://www.ministerial-leadership.org/sites/default/files/events/
event_files/Nepal
Ministry of Finance, Nepal (2011). Economic Survey of Nepal 2011. Website.
http://www.mof.gov.np//en/archive-documents/economic-survey-21.html
Ministry of Health, Government of Nepal (2006). Nepal Health Sector Programme-
Implementation Plan (NHSP-IP) 2004-2009. Website. http://un.org.np/node/
10321
Ministry of Health and Population (2009). Nepal’s National Health Account. Web-
site. http://www.who.int/nha/country/npl/nepalnha.pdf
Moore, M. (2006). State Building in Nepal: Some Medium Term Policy Ideas. Web-
site. http://www.bing.com/search?q=State+Building+in+Nepal%3A+Some+Medium+Term+
Policy+Ideas&form=CPDTDF&pc=CPDTDF&src=IE-SearchBox
Munshi, K. and M. Rosenzweig (2006). Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern
World: Caste, Gender and schooling choice in a globalizing economy. American
Economic Review 96(4), 1225-1252.
Neugarten, B. L., J. W. Moore, and J. C. Lowe (1965). Age norms, age constraints,
and adult socialization. American Journal of Sociology 70(6), 710-717.
Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy. American Economic Review 96(4),
1225-1252.
Oaxaca, R. (1973). Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets. In-
ternational Economic Review 14(3), 693-709.
Oppenheimer, V. K., M. Kalmijn and N. Lim (1997). Men’s Career Development
and Marriage Timing During a Period of Rising Inequality. Demography 34(3), 311-
182
330.
Pasqua, S. (2005). Gender Bias in Parental Investments in Children’s Education: A
Theoretical Analysis. Review of Economics of the Household 3(3), 291-314.
Patrinos, H. (1997). Differences in education and earnings across ethnic groups in
Guatemala. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 37(4), 809-821.
Phelps, E. (1972). The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. The American
Economic Review 62(4), 659-661.
Pudney, S. and M. Shields (2000). Gender, race, pay and promotion in the British
nursing profession: estimation of a generalized ordered probit model. Journal of
Applied Econometrics 15 (4), 367-399.
Riley, G. (2012). Discrimination in the labor market. Website. http://www.
tutor2u.net/economics/revision-notes/a2-micro-labour-market-discrimination.
html
Rosenbusch, N., R. Andreas, S. C. Parker and J.M. Unger (1994). Human Capital,
Gender and Entrepreneurial Success: Empirical Evidence from China and Germany.
Rosenzweig, M. R. T. P. Schultz (1982). Market Opportunities, Genetic Endow-
ments, and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India. Amer-
ican Economic Review 72(4), 803-815.
Roy, K. and D. H. Howard (2007). Equity in out-of-pocket payments for hospital
care: evidence from India. Health Policy 80(2), 297-307.
Sawada, Y. (1997). Human Capital Investments in Pakistan: Implications of Micro
Evidence from Rural Households. The Pakistan Development Review 36(4), 695-
712.
Schmidt, C. M. and K. F. Zimmermann (1991). Work Characteristics, Firm Size
and Wages. The Review of Economics and Statistics 73(4), 705-710.
Schmidt, P. J. and R. Strauss (1975). The Prediction of Occupation Using Multiple
183
Logit Model. International Economic Review 16, 471-485.
Schoen, C. and M. M. Doty (2004). Inequities in access to medical care in five
countries: findings from the 2001 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy
Survey. Health Policy 67, 309-322.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in Human Capital. The American Economic
Review 51(1), 1-17.
Singh, S. and R. Sharma (1996). Early Marriage among Women in Developing
Countries. International Family Planning Perspectives 22(4), 148-175.
Subbarao, K., L. Raney and H. Dundar and J. Haworth (1994). Women in Higher
Education: Progress, Constraints, and Promising Initiatives. Website. http://
publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=0&products_
id=20830
Subedi, J. (1992). Primary Health Care and Medical Pluralism Exemplified in Nepal:
A Proposal for Maximizing Health Care Benefit. Sociology Focus 25(4), 321-328.
Subramanian S.V., S. Nandy, M. Irving, D. Gordon, H. Lambert and G. D., Smith
(2006). The Mortality Divide in India: The Differential Contributions of Gender,
Caste, and Standard of Living Across the Life Course. American Journal of Public
Health 96(5), 818-825.
Szelewicki, M. and T. Joanna (2009).Labour Market Racial Discrimination in South
Africa Revisited. Website. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16440/
The World Bank (1988). Financing Health Services in Developing Countries. An
Agenda for Reform. Website. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/23/000178830_98101903343495/Rendered/PDF/multi_
page.pdf
UNICEF (2011). The State of World’s Children 2011. Website. http://www.unicef.
org/sowc2011
184
Van de Poel, E. and N. Speybroeck (2009) . Decomposing malnutrition inequalities
between Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the remaining Indian population. Eth-
nicity Health 14(3), 271-287.
Van Der Heyden, J.H.A. and S. Demarest and J. Tafforeau and H. Van Oyen (2003)
. Socio-economic differences in the utilisation of health services in Belgium. Health
Policy 65(2), 153-165.
van Doorslaer, E. and A. Wagstaff (1992). Equity in the delivery of health care:
Some international comparisons. Journal of Health Economics 11, 389-411.
van Doorslaer, E. and A. Wagstaff and H. van der Burga and T. Christiansen and
D.D. Graeve and I. Duchesne and Ulf-G. Gerdtham and M. Gerfin and J. Geurts
and L. Gross and U. Hakkinen and J. John and J. Klavus and R.E. Leu and B.
Nolan and O. O’Donnell and C. Propper and F. Puffer and M. Schellhorn and G.
Sundberg and O. Winkelhake (2000). Equity in the delivery of health care in Europe
and the US. Journal of Health Economics 19(5), 553-583.
van Doorslaer, E. and C. Masseria and X. Koolman (2006). Inequalities in access
to medical care by income in developed countries. Canadian Medical Association
Journal 174(2), 177-183.
van Doorslaer, E. and X. Koolman (2004). Explaining the Differences in income-
related health inequalities across European countries. Health Economics 13(7), 609-
628.
Vietorisz, T. and B. Harrison (1973). Labor Market Segmentation: Positive Feed-
back and Divergent Development. The American Economic Review 63(2), 366-376.
Wagstaff, A. (2002). Poverty and health sector inequalities. Bulletin of the World
Health Organization 80(2), 97-105.
Wagstaff, A. and E. van Doorsalaer (2000). Equity in Health Care Finance and
Delivery. In Handbook of Health Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
185
Wan, T. T. and L.C. Gray (1978). Differential Access to Preventive Services for
Young Children in Low-Income Urban Areas. Journal of Health and Social Behav-
ior 19(3), 312-324.
WHO (2007). Health System in Nepal: Challenges and Strategic Options. Website.
http://www.nep.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Health_Information_HSC.pdf
WHO (2009). WHO Global Health Expenditure Atlas. Website. http://www.who.
int/nha/atlas.pdf
William, A. and R. Cookson (2000). Equity in Health. In Handbook of Health Eco-
nomics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Winkleby, M. A., D. E. Jatulis, E. Frank and S. P. Fortmann (1992). Socioeco-
nomic Status and Health: How Education, Income and Occupation Contribute to
Risk Factors for Cardiovascular Disease. American Journal of Public Health 82(6),
816-820.
Woodhall, M. (1973). Investment in women: A reappraisal of the concept of human
capital. International Review of Education 19(1), 9-29.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Wu, S., R. Wang, Y. Zhao, X. Ma, M. Wu, X. Yan and J. He (2013). The rela-
tionship between self-rated health and objective health status: a population-based
study. BMC Public Health 13(1), 313-320.
Yang, D. T. and X. Zhu (2003). Household Production and Parental Investment in
Children. Website.http://www.econ.yale.edu/conference/neudc03/papers/.pdf
Yokozeki, Y. (2000). Gender in Education and Development. Journal of Interna-
tional Cooperation in Education 1(1), 45-63.




Appendix 1: Variables definition (Chapter-1).
Educ1 Years of schooling (the highest level completed).
Educ2 Years of schooling imputed as 0 for those who did not report the highest level
completed but reported as they never attended school.
Age:25-29 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 25-29 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:30-34 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 30-34 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:35-39 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 35-39 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:40-44 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 40-44 years; 0 otherwise.
Age:45-49 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported between 45-49years; 0 otherwise.
Urban Taking value 1 if respondent was born in urban area; 0 Otherwise.
Mage Age at marriage.
Feduc Father’s the highest level of education.
Meduc Mother’s the highest level of education.
Lnholding Price of land-holding by a household.
Hincome Household gross income calculated from farm-earning plus earning from sale of live-
stock plus income from non-farm enterprises plus remittance received
Maithili Taking value 1 if an individual’s language is Maithili; 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 1: Continued.
Avmage Average age at marriage derived from the interaction between ethnicity and region.
Brahman Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Brahman; 0 otherwise.
Chhetri Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Chhetri; 0 otherwise.
Newar Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Newar; 0 otherwise.
Magar Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Magar; 0 otherwise.
Tharu Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Tharu; 0 otherwise.
Tamang Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Tamang; 0 otherwise.
Kami Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Kami; 0 otherwise.
Yadav Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Yadav; 0 otherwise.
Muslim Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Muslim; 0 otherwise.
Rai Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Rai; 0 otherwise.
Gurung Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Gurung; 0 otherwise.
Limbu Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Limbu; 0 otherwise.
Sarki Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Sarki; 0 otherwise.
Other Taking value 1 if a respondent’s ethnicity was reported as Other; 0 otherwise.
Urban Taking value 1 if individual was born in urban areas; 0 otherwise.
Eastern Taking value 1 if an individual was born in eastern development region; 0 otherwise.
Central Taking value 1 if an individual was born in central development region; 0 otherwise.
Western Taking value 1 if an individual was born in western development region; 0 otherwise.
Mid-western Taking value 1 if an individual was born in mid-western development region; 0
otherwise.
Far-western Taking value 1 if an individual was born in far-western development region; 0 oth-
erwise.
Abroad Taking value 1 if an individual was born in abroad; 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 2: Variables definition (Chapter-2).
Tagadhari Taking value 1 if an individual’s ethnicity is reported as Brahman, Chhetri, Newar
and Yadav; 0 otherwise.
Matwali Taking value 1 if an individual’s ethnicity is reported as Gurung, Magar, Tharu,
Tamang, Rai and Limbu; 0 otherwise.
Pani Nachalne Taking value 1, if an individual’s ethnicity is reported as Damai, Kami, Sarki and
Muslim; 0 otherwise.
Lhwage log of hourly wage (cash, in-kind, bonus, transport, and medical allowances).
Education Years of schooling completed (the highest level completed).
Experience Age-years of schooling-6.
Married Taking value 1 if an individual was married; 0 otherwise.
Lnholding Price of landholding by a household.
Rural Taking value 1 if an individual was born in rural area; 0 otherwise.
Small firm Taking value 1 if a firm employs only one employee; 0 otherwise.
Medium firm Taking value 1 if a firm employs 2− 10 employees; 0 otherwise.
Large firm Taking value 1 if a firm employs more than 10 employees; 0 otherwise.
Eastern Taking value 1, if an individual lives in eastern administrative region; 0 otherwise.
Central Taking value 1 if an individual lives in central administrative region; 0 otherwise.
Western Taking value 1 if an individual lives in eastern administrative region; 0 otherwise.
Mid-western Taking value 1 if an individual lives in mid-western administrative region; 0 other-
wise.
Far-western Taking value 1 if an individual lives in far-western administrative region; 0 otherwise.
Abroad Taking value 1 if an individual lives outside Nepal; 0 otherwise.
Unskilled Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation is not included in other categories; 0
otherwise.
Professional Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation was reported as doctor, engineer, ad-
ministrative executive, religious professional; 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 2: Continued.
Clerical Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation was reported as clerk, typist, book
keeper, telephone operator, military, other clerical; 0 otherwise.
Service Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation was reported as travel, trekking, cooking,
housekeeping, care takers, laundry workers, barbers and other service worker; 0
otherwise.
Sales Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation was reported as shop and stall sales
person; 0 otherwise.
Agri-worker Taking value 1 an individual’s occupation was reported as farm manager, farm
worker, agricultural worker, forestry worker, fisherman, hunters and trapper; 0 oth-
erwise.
Skilled Taking value 1 if an individual’s occupation was reported as metal processor, chem-
ical processor, plumber, welders, jewelery workers, paper makers; 0 otherwise.
Agricultural Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as agricultural, forestry and
logging and fishing; 0 otherwise.
Mining Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as coal mining, petroleum gas,
metal mining and other mining; 0 otherwise.
Manufacturing Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as food and beverage, textile
apparel, wood furniture, paper printing, handicrafts, other metallic; 0 otherwise.
Construction Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported buildings, street highways, water
ports project, irrigation, electricity gas and water; 0 otherwise.
Trade Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as wholesale, retail and restau-
rant; 0 otherwise.
FRE Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as finance, insurance and real
estate; 0 otherwise.
Servicesec Taking value 1 if the type of industry was reported as transport, communication,
recreation and cultural and international; 0 otherwise.
Others Taking value 1 if the type of industry is not included in above categories; 0 otherwise.
190
Appendix 3.A: Variables definition
Log OOP Log of OOP expenditure which includes consultation fees, travel and
medicine costs.
Lincome Log of per capita consumption (food and frequently purchased non-food
expenditure).
Lnholding Price of landholdings by a household.
Rural Taking value 1 if an individual resides in rural areas; 0 otherwise.
Male Taking value 1 if an individual is male; 0 otherwise.
Hhsize Number of members in a household.
Lhdi Taking value 1 if individual belongs to 22 districts with the lowest HDI;
0 otherwise.
Age:0-34 Taking value 1 if an individuals’ age was reported within 0-34 years; 0
otherwise.
Age:35-44 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported within 35-44 years; 0
otherwise.
Age:45-54 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported within 45-54 years; 0
otherwise.
Age:55-64 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported within 55-64 years; 0
otherwise.
Age:65-74 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported within 65-74 years; 0
otherwise.
Age≥ 75 Taking value 1 if an individual’s age was reported > 74 years; 0 otherwise.
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Appendix 3.A: Continued
Illiterate Taking value 1 if an individual’s level of education was reported as 0; 0
otherwise.
Primary Taking value 1 if an individual’s educational level was reported within
1-5 years of schooling; 0 otherwise.
High school Taking value 1 if an individual’s educational level was reported within
6-10 years of schooling; 0 otherwise.
University Taking value 1 if an individual’s educational level was reported >10 years
of schooling; 0 otherwise.
Far-western Taking value 1 if an individual was living in far-western region;
0 otherwise.
Central Taking value 1 if an individual was living in central region; 0 otherwise.
Western Taking value 1 if an individual was living in western region; 0 otherwise.
Mid-western Taking value 1 if an individual was living in mid-western region;
0 otherwise.
Abroad Taking value 1 if an individual was living in abroad; 0 otherwise.
Eastern Taking value 1 if an individual was living in eastern region; 0 otherwise.
Chronic illness Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have chronic illness;
0 otherwise.
Other illness Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have illness
other than chronic illness; 0 otherwise.




Illness started<= One year Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have chronic illness from
a year or less; 0 otherwise.
Illness started<= five years Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have chronic illness
from more than a year but less than five years; 0 otherwise.
Illness started<= ten years Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have chronic illness
from more than five years but less than ten years; 0 otherwise.
Illness started>= ten years Taking value 1 if an individual was reported to have chronic illness
from ten and more years; 0 otherwise.
Work missed≤week Taking value 1 if work missed due to chronic illness was reported as
≤ 7 days; 0 otherwise.
Work missed≤month Taking value 1 if work missed due chronic illness was reported as 8-30
days; 0 otherwise.
Work missed>month Taking value 1 if work missed due to chronic illness was reported as
> 30 days; 0 otherwise.
Excellent Taking value 1 if self-assessed health status was reported as excellent;
0 otherwise.
Good Taking value 1 if self-assessed health status was reported as good;
0 otherwise.
Fair Taking value 1 if self-assessed health status was reported as fair;
0 otherwise.
Poor Taking value 1 if self-assessed health status was reported as poor;
0 otherwise.
Very poor Taking value 1 if self-assessed health status was reported as very poor;
0 otherwise.
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Appendix 3.B: Human development indicator by
districts in Nepal.
HDI Name of districts
HDI ≤ 0.2 Kalikot, Bajura and Mugu.
0.2< HDI ≤ 0.3 Kailali, Dang, Sindhuli, Darchula, Kapilbastu, Sindhupalchok, Rukum, Rolpa,
Dadeldhura, Dhading, Baitadi, Dailekh, Rasuwa, Humla, Achham,
Jumla, Salyan, Doti, Dolpa, Jajarkot and Bajhang.
0.3<HDI ≤ 0.4 Bhaktapur, Terhathum, Tanahun, Sunasari, Ilam, Kabhrepalanchok
Syangja, Lamjung, Saptari, Chotwan, Sankhuwasabha
Taplejug, Rupndehi, Parwat, Surkhet, Parsa, Udayapur, Solukhumbu
Bhojpur, Siraha, Okhaldhunga, Dolakha, Baglung, Palpa, Kanchanpur
Arghakhanchi, Dhanusha, Panchthar, Sarlahi, Gulmi, Pyuthan
Mahottari, Khotang, Mustang, Ramechhap, Nuwakot, Myagdi, Bara
Makwanpur, Rautahat, Banke, Gorkha, Manang, Bardiya and Nawalparasi.
0.4< HDI ≤0.5 Kaski, Morang, Jhapa and Dhankuta.
0.5< HDI ≤0.6 Lalitpur.
HDI > 0.6 Kathmandu.
Source: Nepal Human Development Report, 1998.
Note: HDI is a tool developed by the United Nation that ranks the level of social
and economic development of a specific region based on four criteria: life expectancy at
birth, average years of schooling, expected years of schooling and gross national income
per capita.
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